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Part 1. Introduction 
Otto von Bismarck is famously quoted as having claimed that, “God preserves a special 
providence for drunks, fools and the United states of America” (quoted in Meade, 2001:35). 
The quote was supposedly delivered after the German master of realpolitik failed to grasp how 
the United States’ foreign policy could be so successful. Bismarck is certainly not the only one 
to wonder at American foreign policy, and some have even claimed that the United States before 
1941 hardly had any foreign policy to speak of (Mead, 2001:3). Whereas this myth can be easily 
refuted by looking at actual American behavior in the 19th century (Restad, 2012), there is a 
considerable number of scholars, politicians and Americans in general that considers the foreign 
policy of the United States to be largely unique compared to the more realist foreign policy 
tradition of European and other countries. The realist tradition in International Relations (IR) 
and foreign policy studies are, even by its opponents, often considered the most prominent of 
the International Relations theory paradigms (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Yet when it comes 
to the foreign policy of the United States several argue that the expectations of realism do not 
apply (Kennan, 1984; Mead, 2001).   
The question I ask is whether this is in fact true? Does the American foreign policy 
tradition break with the expectations of realism? Is the United States of America a 
special case in the long and often bloody history of the world powers? Or is the idea of 
the unique American foreign policy, based on liberal ideas, just another myth in the 
greater mythos of American exceptionalism that surrounds the only current global 
superpower?  
In this study I shall examine whether there is a serious case for arguing that the American 
foreign policy tradition is as unique as it is often claimed to be. I shall give special attention to 
the claim that it is based mostly, if not completely, upon the morals, ideals and personal interests 
of the American people as opposed to the actual strategic interests of the state. In order to do 
that and test for the influence of realism in the American foreign policy tradition, I will look at 
the case provided by the recent rise of China. If we can expect realism to influence U.S. foreign 
policy at all, it should be when the United States faces a potential challenger and a possible 
future regional hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
An old debate 
I would argue that the debate surrounding the question about the uniqueness of American 
foreign policy goes to the very heart of the realism vs. liberalism debate in international 
relations theory (IR) in political science. A unique American foreign policy poses a very real 
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threat to the generalizability of realism. This is especially the case if it is shown that American 
public opinion and American foreign actions often flies in the face of what is generally thought 
of as sound realist foreign policy. If the United States, the only current superpower on the planet, 
does not adhere to the principles of realism, which mostly focuses on the actions of great 
powers, can we expect realism to apply to other cases? Even if the geographic position of the 
United States is largely unique compared to other great powers, it would still imply that realism 
is unsuitable for use unless the situation that one seeks to explain is first found to contain the 
elements and structure that is necessary for realism to apply. Needless to say such a situation is 
less than appealing when formulating a scientific theory.  
As the primary alternative to realism however, liberalism is seemingly greatly 
strengthened if American foreign policy should prove to move in a different direction than 
realist theory expects it to do. Whereas Realism focuses on the external environment of states 
and the power structure of the international system (Mearsheimer, 2001; Rose, 1998), liberal 
theory argues that it is a country’s population and in particular it’s influential elites that decides 
the route the nation is to take on the international stage (Moravcsik, 1997). If one were to use 
liberal theory in order to make predictions about a country’s foreign policy one would expect 
to find a policy that served the interests and followed the morals of the country’s leading elites.  
American Exceptionalism 
Even staunch realists and proponents of realpolitik like Henry Kissinger often claim that 
American actions on the international stage are governed by an uncommon set of considerations 
that often include more than a little idealism (Kissinger, 1994). According to Kissinger, 
Americans have never been comfortable discussing foreign policy as a way of promoting 
national self-interest. Instead, Americans have claimed that they are “struggling in the name of 
principle, not interest” (Ibid: 810). As a result the political leaders of the US seems to be more 
prone to bursts of idealism than their continental colleagues, and according to Kissinger there 
are few American leaders  that one can consider to be followers of a realist foreign policy.  
This same argument is taken up by George Kennan who, almost in despair it seems, 
claims that American foreign policy more often than not has been influenced by moral 
principles and the changing preferences of the American electorate. This at the cost of a foreign 
policy guided instead by realism and the experts that have the knowledge necessary to conduct 
foreign policy in a consistent and safe manner. The public mood decides the actions that 
government officials and politicians would take, for the simple reason that these same officials 
depends on the public vote in order to keep their jobs. Kennan believed that the American 
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democracy made the US especially prone to conduct its business abroad in this manner, and 
that it constituted a serious weakness whenever the country was faced with a serious challenger 
on the international stage. He also feared that this foreign policy tradition could lead the United 
States into moral wars and foreign adventures that a prudent state would do better to avoid 
(Kennan, [1984] 2012). This last argument was taken up by many prominent realists in the time 
before the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Advertisement in the New York Times, 11.26: 2002). 
This alleged American propensity to focus on principles rather than national interests is 
said to have come from the idea that the United States is an exceptional nation compared to the 
older nations of Europe (de Tocqueville, [1835] 1972:324). This view has since taken root in 
the mythos of the US and its democracy, and led to the idea that as a democratic country it was 
and still is the American duty to spread its democratic and liberal values to the rest of the world 
(See: Mead, 2001: 132-134, or for a more recent example: Krauthammer, 1990-91).  
The idea that the US is meant to lead the world to a better future seems also to be deeply 
entrenched in America’s political elites. This most prominently shown by the necessity for 
American politicians to mention American exceptionalism and America’s role in the world, in 
most of the speeches they make on foreign policy. As shown by the 2012 presidential race, to 
accuse an American politician of not believing in this exeptionalism can be a very serious 
accusation, especially during a heated presidential campaign (Dwyer, 2012). Bill Clinton’s 
former secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright at an interview on NBC, also famously used 
the idea of American exceptionalism to explain U.S. policy decisions. When asked why the 
United States should take the responsibility of “cleaning up the world’s mess” she answered; 
“if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We 
stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future,” (Albright, on NBCTV, 1998).  
Although Americans like to focus on their special role and unique way of conducting 
foreign policy the idea that a nation has a duty to spread its civilization to other people is nothing 
new. As Stephen Walt points out, almost every great power in history has emphasized its 
uniqueness and the special role it plays, from ancient Athens to the British Empire (Walt, 2011). 
Still, despite the fact that Walt obviously denies the idea that the US has a certain destiny to 
play, he nevertheless seems to believe that the foreign policy of America often is decided by 
idealism rather than realism, and that idealists and liberals instead of realists are in overall 
charge of policy (Walt, 2012). Like realists before him, he asks the question “What would have 
happened if realists were in charge of American foreign policy?” Walt’s answer is that a lot 
would be different, and in many cases, to the better. Notably, Walt is not the only scholar to 
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think so, and some claim that a realist foreign policy would lead to a more peaceful United 
States (Rosato & Schuessler, 2011).  
As shown here, it seems to be a large consensus among scholars and politicians that 
American foreign policy is somehow different and more based on ideals and morals than the 
foreign policy of other similar countries. It is claimed that the expectations of realism and 
realpolitik don’t apply to the actions that the United States takes on the international stage. Even 
those that oppose the view that America has a special role to play in the world seem to think 
(sometimes with a small hint of despair) that American foreign policy is formed on the basis of 
the moral expectations of the general public and liberal ideology rather considerations about 
power politics and American national security.  
The idea that the United States represents something new and unique in the history of 
the world powers originally stems from the founding of the nation as well as from de 
Tocquieville’s work Democracy in America ([1835] 1972). American presidents from 
Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush have spoken about the duty of the United States to 
safeguard the world and spread the democratic ideals that exists in America. This idea seems to 
be ingrained in the way many Americans as well as foreigners view American foreign policy, 
and perhaps for a reason. Few other nations have spoken as fervently about liberty and human 
rights on the international stage as the United Sates has done. Sometimes even to the disbelief 
and confusion of other nations who follow more realist principles when forming their foreign 
policies. As Kennan (1984) writes, the American involvement in East-Asian power politics at 
the turn of the 19th century was both confusing and to a certain degree highly embarrassing to 
the European powers already hard at work carving out empires in China.  
Kissinger writes that, “America’s journey through world politics has been a triumph of 
faith over experience. Since the time America entered the arena of world politics in 1917, it has 
been so preponderant in strength and so convinced in the rightness of its ideals that this 
century’s major agreements have been embodiments of American values” (1994:18). 
According to Kissinger, it is the power and the favorable position of America in the world that 
has allowed American leaders to conduct this idealistic and somewhat naïve foreign policy. 
These writers and several like, them all seem to agree on the fact that American 
diplomacy is in fact exceptional. However, few seem to have formed a clear theory of why this 
is. Kennan writes that it is the American democracy and ideals that explains American behavior. 
This argument is supported by Walter Lippmann who argues that the democratically elected 
politicians often are compelled by the wishes of the people into doing either to little or too much 
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(Lippmann, 1955:20). This despite the fact that politicians and professionals, according to 
Lippmann, often knew at the time what would have constituted the wiser action.  
Accepting the democracy argument, Kissinger claims that American power allowed its 
foreign policy and principles to triumph where other weaker democracies were unable to 
prevail. However there existed democracies more powerful than the United States for more than 
half of that country’s history (both Britain and France comes to mind), and few of these have 
gone to the same length in order to promote their values in the way the United States have done.  
Attempting to dig out the core and reasoning behind more than 200 years of an active 
foreign policy is a daunting task, but one which has been attempted by Walter Russel Mead in 
his book Special Providence. Mead is one of the proponents of unique kind of American foreign 
policy, and he argues strongly and consistently for his point, namely that the United states has 
developed a way of behaving on the international stage that differs greatly from what he call 
continental realism (Mead, 2001). 
Mead especially confronts the idea that there was hardly any American foreign policy 
to speak of before World War 2. Instead, he claims that American leaders consistently protected 
the interests and principles of the United States during the whole period, and that they were 
remarkably successful in doing so, despite the fact that their policies often deviated from the 
expectations that follows from realist theory. If American foreign policy has been so 
inconsistent and as chaotic as many of its critics claim, says Mead, it would be inconceivable 
that the United States should have been as successful in promoting its interests and values. 
The assumptions of continental realism does not apply to the U.S. says Mead, mainly 
because of the strong geographic position occupied by the United States (Mead, 2001). Behind 
the Atlantic “mote”, the US developed a distinct view of looking at the world, and especially a 
distinct way of conducting its foreign policy. In fact Mead claims that four such distinct views 
developed and that their premises and ideals echoes down through the generations of American 
statesmen and still influences leaders and the greater American public today.   
Mead names these four schools of thought after former American politicians who each 
stand as the main proponent of one of these schools. Hamiltonians, Wilsonians and 
Jeffersonians. Mead claims that all of these three schools are found among Americans and 
especially amongst the American political elite who formulates American foreign policy. 
However, Mead identifies a fourth school which he claims is a largely populist school that is 
often reflected in the views of the common people. This school of thought is named 
Jacksonianism by Mead, after American president Andrew Jackson. The followers of 
Jacksonianism believe that the primary role of the government’s foreign policy is to safeguard 
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the physical security and wellbeing of the American people. According to Mead it is this idea 
that pitches the American public into a righteous frenzy during war, and that leads to large 
periods of isolationist tendencies in American foreign policy during times of peace.  
It is argued in Special Providence that it is the isolationist tendencies of Jacksonianism 
that lead foreign powers into underestimating American resolution and willingness to risk war. 
Mead claims that both the Japanese before the Pearl Harbor attack as well as Al-Qaeda’s attacks 
on September 11th demonstrates this. Faced with attacks on its home soil, the American public 
opinion changes from one of peaceful isolationism to one dedicated to the prosecution of war 
by all means until total victory is achieved. As Mead puts it, “The whole Hive swarms out to 
sting the intruder to death. As an imperial power… the United States can be irresolute and 
divided; in self-defense it is focused and ruthless” (Mead, 2001:336). Mead claims that it is 
these two inherently opposite sides of American public sentiment that have baffled foreign 
observers, and that the Jacksonian element of the American public is both a source of strength 
and worry for American politicians. It often makes the United States look sluggish on the world 
stage and can at times prevent American leaders from acting decisively, but when turned upon 
a foreign attacker, Jacksonian sentiment and the public outrage that follows will often prove to 
be devastating. Mead claims that the combination of the four thoughts of school have allowed 
the United States to conduct an effective foreign policy that differs from continental realism. 
He also claims that powerful groups within the US still adhere to these schools when forming 
foreign policy.  
Opposing arguments 
The extent to which this idea of exceptionalism has taken root might in itself be used as an 
argument in favor of it; however, the same sentiments are to be found in other nations and great 
powers as well. When E. H. Carr wrote the Twenty Years’ Crisis in 1939 he was of the opinion 
that the British public and British politicians had become too idealistic and had forgotten the 
values of a more realistic foreign policy. This could, according to Carr, lead to a weakening of 
British power and security in the long run (Carr, 1939). The fears that many American realists 
harbor about their country’s foreign policy today, echoes those of Carr’s in the late 1930s.  
Besides the fact that other great powers have been in similar situations to the United 
States before there is also the argument that John Mearsheimer (2001) presents. Unlike many 
of his fellow realists he claims that American foreign policy for the most part has followed the 
expectations of Realism. Of particular note is the fact that the United States is the only state in 
the modern world to achieve regional hegemony. This achievement is, according to 
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Mearsheimer, the real basis for American exceptionalism, and not the idea that American 
foreign policy is based on ideals rather than realism (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
Mearsheimer argues that through clever application of force against its neighbors and 
the native population in North America, the United States managed to achieve a position of 
supremacy on its continent. Combining this with a policy of not antagonizing Great Britain, in 
order to avoid a showdown with the only great power that could challenge it, America achieved 
security and dominance in its own back-yard. After regional hegemony was achieved America 
preferred to act as an off-shore balancer rather than an imperial power 
The reason why the United States, or Britain for that matter, never attempted to create 
an empire in either Europe or Asia, and instead acted as an off-shore balancer, is because large 
bodies of water makes it close to impossible to conquer distant land masses. Since both 
continents, and especially Europe, contains other great powers that would oppose such an 
adventure and any amphibious landings that would have to be attempted, it would be close to 
impossible for the US or Britain to effectively conquer and control these regions (Ibid). 
There are also others who argue that American foreign policy have been more realistic 
than it would seem. Some claim that American foreign policy since World War II has been 
formed by both realism and liberalism (Howard, 2001), and that the net result was a consistent 
foreign policy that focused on balancing against the Soviet Union both for ideological and 
strategic reasons.  
According to Joseph Nye, there has long existed a foreign policy tradition that 
incorporates both realism and liberalism in the United States, and several American presidents 
have borrowed ideas from the different schools of thought that exist in the debate. Nevertheless 
he thinks that the two schools of thought needs to be further reconciled if America is to have a 
successful foreign policy in the coming years, and he introduces the term liberal realism as a 
new form of power strategy Nye would like American decision makers to follow (Nye, 2011).  
The problem with exceptionalism 
As shown, a number of people considers American foreign policy to be at least partially based 
on realism and power-politics consideration. Nevertheless even Mearsheimer admits to the fact 
that realism is hard to sell in America and that American leaders often tend to focus on ideals 
and values when holding speeches on foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2001:23). 
All this considered it is a source of curiosity that there seems to be conducted so little 
research on the question of whether the United States really is unique in the way they act on the 
global stage. Instead it looks as though this view is simply accepted among most of the scholars 
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in the foreign policy field (see for example, Moravcsik, 2005), although with some prominent 
exceptions (Mearsheimer, 2001; Dueck, 2005). Despite this acceptance, there are several 
examples of American foreign action where it would seem realism trumped idealism. One of 
the more prominent ones would be the about turn of American propaganda after World War II. 
In the face of Soviet expansion and possible aggression, American leaders quickly discarded 
the wartime image of “Uncle Stalin” and the friendly and courageous Russian soldier “Ivan”. 
Instead, the soviets were cast for the role as the new enemy of democracy (Mead, 2001).  
Another example would be the opening of trade and diplomatic talks with China during 
the 1970s, a move which was planned in large parts by Henry Kissinger and executed by 
President Richard Nixon. The goal was to play on the antagonism that had developed between 
China and the Soviet Union and thereby create a more favorable diplomatic climate for the 
United States to maneuver in (Kissinger, 1994). The plan worked, and from 1979, until the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the Chinese were generally friendlier to the United States 
located on the far side of the Pacific Ocean, then they were to the Soviet Union with which 
China shared a long and, in places, hotly contested border (Zhao, 2004). As one can see, 
American leaders have been capable of committing to realist policies, even if they were forced 
to sell these ideas as based on ideals and a fight for democracy to the American electorate. 
The emergence of a challenger 
In the aftermath of the Cold War many of these interests seems to be located in Asia and in 
particular in East-Asia. This has prompted a “pivot” towards Asia in the foreign policy of the 
Obama administration (Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). Traditional areas like Europe are 
now of less concern, and the American focus seems to be directed at Asia and especially China.     
The rise of Chinese power and confidence during the two first decades of the 21st century 
looks as though it might have reawakened American leader’s focus on power politics and geo-
strategic considerations. Despite some claims to the contrary many American leaders and 
observers now seems to look upon the rise of China as a considerable challenge for the United 
States, maybe even the greatest challenge the U.S. will face in the foreseeable future (Friedberg, 
2011; Kissinger, 1994; Kristof, 1993; Clinton, 2011; Ikenberry, 2008). Some observers even 
seem to be of the opinion that a conflict between China and the United States are bound to 
happen (Bernstein & Munro, 1997).  While others are already wondering how a potential war 
between the two powers would be fought, and how the United States can best prepare for such 
a fight (Kaplan, 2005). It is certainly true that the Chinese have committed to a great increase 
in their military expenditure since the end of the cold war (Sipri, 2012), And equally true that 
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the Pentagon continues to watch this Chinese force improvement and military buildup with 
some worry (Annual Report to Congress, 2011).  
Whether one believes in the probability of such a conflict is often decided by which side 
of the realism vs. liberalism debate one finds oneself. As mentioned above, Friedberg (2005) 
argues that there is considerable number of American experts that expects the Sino-U.S. 
relationship to be a peaceful one. Trade and cooperation will, according to these observers, lead 
to both an environment where neither China nor the United States can afford a war, due to the 
loss of trade this would entail, as well as the development of a democratic China that will adhere 
to the liberal theory of democratic peace. The argument goes that if leaders on both sides can 
keep their cool, the rise of China will cause few if any problems for the United States (Li, 2005).  
However, if we follow the predictions of offensive realism as laid down by 
Mearsheimer, the picture changes quite dramatically. Realists share few of the hopes that the 
liberal thinkers base themselves upon. The argument goes that as China’s strength increases, 
the United States are most likely to attempt to balance against it in order to make sure that no 
other power but the United States are able to attain regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
No amount of trade and international cooperation will change the fact that “each State pursues 
its own interests, however defined in ways it judges best” (Waltz, 1959:238). After all, the fact 
that the British and German economies were interconnected and largely dependent upon each 
other before 1914 (Reynolds, 2000:78) did not stop them from waging war against each other. 
Both states at that time believed that the only way of preserving the national security was to go 
to war. As such, the interests of survival trumped the interests of trade. 
The Case and method 
The case of China’s rise, and the American response to this rise, seems to be the perfect 
opportunity to test whether American foreign policy does indeed follow its own peculiar ways 
rather than being dictated by traditional concerns about national interests. If Mearsheimer is 
correct, and the United States does indeed follow realist principles when faced with a serious 
challenge, then we can expect to see a United States that is currently strengthening its presence 
in East-Asia. The American goal here will be to stop China from attaining a position of 
Hegemony in the region. Primarily, we can expect to see that the American military presence 
in East-Asia will increase substantially. Further, realism would also expect an increase in 
American support to local allies in the region as well as an attempt to strengthen these alliances. 
We could also expect American leaders to worry about the closing gap between American and 
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Chinese economic power and see policy decisions that attempt to rectify the export/import 
advantage that China currently seems to enjoy. 
As an alternative to the explanatory power of offensive realism, I will be looking at the 
liberal theory of preference as laid out by Moravcsik (1997). Moravcsik states that the 
preferences of the elites influence a country’s foreign policy.  If Friedberg (2005) is right and 
the majority of American leaders and policy makers favor a liberal policy towards the rise of 
China, then Moravcsik’s theory claim that we would see a foreign policy based on these ideals. 
Namely attempts at increasing trade and cooperation as well as attempts at strengthening the 
opposition in China that favors democratic reform. 
This master thesis will be based on a case study of the American foreign policy reactions 
to the rise of China spanning two decades from the end of the cold war in 1992 and until 2012. 
The study will be carried out as what Jonathon Moses and Torbjørn Knutsen calls a “Mis-
fitting” Case Study, that is, a case study “that seek to show how a case does not fit a general or 
universal claim” (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:134). I will test the validity of using either 
Moravcsik’s preference based Liberal theory or Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism theory as a 
way of explaining U.S. foreign policy. Through this test I will determine whether there is any 
real cause for saying that the American Foreign Policy tradition differs from that of other states 
in the sense that it is more prone to follow the wishes and interests of the electorate and elites 
rather than the pursuit of power and safety in an anarchic state structure. The Case study is by 
its nature unable to provide us with a definite answer to whether the entirety of American 
foreign policy is exceptional, but it can provide some indications. I also hope that this can be a 
stepping-stone for further studies into this particular area. 
I will show that there is a case to be made for both theories, but that their explanatory 
power seems to switch over time. During the 1990s, liberalism and idealism seems to have had 
the greatest influence on American foreign policy. However, as Chinese power grow the foreign 
policy conducted by the Americans towards China begins to exhibit signs of being realist in 
nature rather than liberal. This corresponds with China’s growing power and suggests that there 
is a considerable realist component present in American foreign policy decisions. As such, I 
suggest that there is a case to be made for a more nuanced view of U.S. foreign policy and that 
little support the notion that the United States constitutes a special case. In other words, I have 
found no clear evidence that points to the existence of an exceptional American foreign policy. 
Due to the prevalence of this notion of American exceptionalism I would suggest that further 
study is devoted to examining this claim, as the myth of American exceptionalism have the 
potential to be a source of miscalculation by both American and foreign politicians. 
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Part 2. Theoretical framework for examining exceptionalism 
In this section I will outline the competing theories which I will use in order to test the claim of 
whether there exists a certain American exceptionalism in the way the United States acts on the 
international stage. I have chosen to focus on the Offensive Realism theory, most prominently 
laid out by Mearsheimer (2001) as well as the preference based Liberal theory laid out by 
Moravcsik (1997). I will begin by examining the respective historical traditions and 
philosophical foundations that these two theories rest upon and go into the respective theories 
in some detail. This will open up the possibility of formulating a set of hypotheses about how 
the foreign policy actions of the U.S. can be expected to look like if it follows the expectations 
laid out by Realism or Liberalism. These hypotheses will allow me to test empirically the claim 
of exceptionalism later in the paper. I will then proceed to explain why these two theories can 
be used for testing for a possible American exceptionalism in its reactions to the rise of China. 
The purpose of theories 
According to Kenneth Waltz theories explain the laws that one assumes exists in the real world. 
A law in itself cannot explain “why particular association holds” (Waltz, 1979:6). As such, in 
order for scientists to understand the laws that govern the real world, one would first need theory 
that explains the particular phenomenon one examines.   
Examining the foreign policy tradition of a country like the United States can be a 
daunting task. With a history spanning centuries and foreign interests spanning most of the 
globe, there are potentially hundreds of variables that one could argue deserve to be examined 
in order to create a complete picture of the American foreign Policy tradition. One would also 
be forced to look at the foreign policy traditions of other countries before we could establish 
whether the United states is in fact exceptional. Naturally such a thorough examination is 
beyond both the ambition and feasibility of this analysis. By applying theory to the research 
question however, one is able to narrow the areas of research down considerably.  
By using Realism and Liberalism I will be able to pick my battles with much better 
precision than I otherwise would. Add to this that it is in large parts the claimed irrelevance of 
realist theory as an explanation of American foreign policy that I seek to verify or discard, the 
application of these theories are necessary. In short, the application of theory allows the social 
scientist to focus on relevant areas of research instead of chasing down every irrelevant fact 
(Popper, [1959] 2003). As such, the application of theories is necessary in an analysis of this 
scope, without it I would be left to examine the foreign policy actions of every state on the 
planet in order to test for any American exceptionalism.  
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The Foundations of Realism 
Perhaps the most prominent of the current theories of international politics and foreign policy 
today (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999), realism is considered to be one of the oldest theories in 
international relations studies, and its proponents often claim that the tradition include such 
classical writers as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Rousseau (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008:97). It is 
also worth noting that there is not a single consistent theory of realism that exists, but that 
several different types have developed since Hans Morgenthau formed his theory of Classical 
Realism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008:97).  
Many of these different types vary greatly; common for all of them however is a set of 
assumptions about the world, and more importantly the structure of the international system. 
The idea here is that humanity is divided into states, these states are often widely different from 
each other, yet they are equal in the tasks they face. The difference lie in the ability each state 
has to perform these tasks (Waltz, 1979:96). Even more importantly, states exist in an anarchic 
system with no higher legal force that can rein them in and stop them from threatening or 
attacking each other. There are other forces in the world, but when it comes to influence and 
the ability to use power, the state has no equal and even weak states will often retain the ability 
control or greatly influence strong non-state actors (Ibid:94-95).  
Kenneth Waltz claims that this idea of international anarchy is as old as the writings of 
Thucydides, and that the anarchic system holds the potential for war between states, “with many 
sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them… conflict, sometimes leading 
to war is bound to occur” (Waltz, [1954], 2001:159). In such a system it follows, says Waltz, 
that each nation must at all times be ready to use its own power and resources in order to counter 
the potential actions of other states. According to Waltz the actions each state can take is 
“imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist” (Ibid:160).  
All the different theories of realism adhere to the notion of anarchy among states, but 
they often differ when they attempt to explain how wars come to pass within this anarchic 
system. Waltz believe that the structure of the system and a state’s relative power influence 
what actions a state will take (Waltz, 1979), whereas others focus on how decision makers 
perceive these powers and how they act according to these perceptions (Rose, 1998). Oldest 
among the realist traditions which seek to explain this are the Classical Realism of Thucydides 
and Morgenthau, which I will examine underneath. 
Classical Realism 
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Written in the 5 century BCE, Thucydides’ History of the Peoponnesian War lays the 
groundwork of classical realist theory in international relations. Writing about the war between 
the then great powers Sparta and Athens, Thucydides claims that it was the fear that the Spartans 
had about the growth and intention of the Athenian empire that led the two cities into open war. 
To quote him: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which 
this caused in Sparta” (Thucydides, [1954] 1972:49). Sparta’s interests lay with its own 
survival, and when they felt that this survival was threatened by the increasing strength of 
Athens they went to war against their challenger. The comparison with Sparta and Athens at 
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war has since been made several times when great powers 
face each other, perhaps most recently during the cold war and the U.S. Soviet standoff (Nye 
& Welch, 2011:20).  
In the classical realism of Thucydides it is the human drive to power and the fear that 
states have for one another that leads them into conflict. Human nature leads states into 
conducting power politics and to seek dominion over others in order to maximize security 
(Dunne & Schmidt, 2008:95-96). Perhaps the most famous proponent of classical realism, Hans 
Morgenthau attempted to develop realism as a comprehensive theory of international politics. 
He argued that international politics was governed by universal laws that had their roots and 
origin in human nature rather than it being the product of personal choice and impulses of 
leaders (Morgenthau, [1948] 1993:4). Morgenthau claimed that humans would actively pursue 
their interests and that interests are defined as power (Ibid: 5-6). As such, the human search for 
power is the chief reason for international conflict and wars. In the classical realist tradition 
then, it is the flaws of men and our perpetual desire for power that influence a country’s foreign 
policy. As Morgenthau says, “the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to 
all men” (Ibid: 30). Challenging this rather dark notion that human nature drives us to war, 
Structural Realism places the cause of conflict with the international structure rather than 
humans, this theory will be my next subject of examination. 
Waltz and Structural Realism  
The next big development in realist theory came with the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz. 
In his book Theory of International Politics Waltz attempted to create a general theory of 
Realism that was easily tested. He points out early that few theories of international politics are 
actually worth testing; they are often to complex and make assumptions that cannot easily be 
verified (Waltz, 1979:14). He claims that the development of theories that scientists are capable 
of testing scientifically should be a primary task for social scientists (Ibid: 16).  
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Following his own advice, Waltz developed a form of realism that focuses on the 
structure of the system, rather than the actors. With this theory he attempted to explain why it 
is that the relationship between states hardly changes despite the fact that the individual actors 
change all the time, new leaders have new priorities for example. The explanation that Waltz 
arrives at is that the system affects the behavior of the interacting units just as these units 
themselves affect the structure of the system (Ibid: 40). Further, Waltz argues that in order to 
explain state actions on the international stage one has to study the structure of the international 
system, rather than the individual states. The actors (states in this case) do not, in themselves, 
have the power to change the structure unless the arrangement of the states in the international 
system is changed (Ibid: 80).  
The structure that he envisions is anarchic in nature and this anarchism explains, 
according to Waltz, why one can see the same types of conflicts played out on the international 
stage again and again throughout human history. “The relations that prevail internationally 
seldom shift in type or in quality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence, a 
persistence that one must expect as long as none of the competing units are able to convert the 
anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one” (Ibid:66). What follows then, says Waltz, is 
a structure where conflict between states is not only a possibility, but a necessary consequence 
Echoing Hobbes’ famous claim about the nature of man in the Leviathan, Waltz says that: 
“Among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Ibid: 102).  
By this Waltz means that each state has the capacity to act aggressively at any time, 
rather than claiming that states always wage war against each other. In fact, Waltz claims that 
rational states will go to great lengths in order to avoid war since the cost of fighting wars can 
be huge (Ibid:114). Still, it is the goal of every rational state in the system seeks to survive into 
the future (Ibid: 91) and to retain its independence and freedom of action, no states wishes to 
be dependent upon any other state. This desire for independence foster insecurity because any 
international organization capable of protecting the states against each other would be able to 
coerce them as well (Ibid: 112). In a self-help system of the kind Waltz describes, the states in 
it will worry about their survival and this worry will often determine their actions within the 
international system (Ibid: 105). The fear of being destroyed or subjugated by other states will, 
according to Waltz, drive states into creating a Balance-of-power system (Ibid: 118). 
This balance of power theory assumes that states will eventually strive for their own 
preservation, and possibly “drive for universal domination” (Ibid: 118). States attempt to 
achieve these goals by strengthening their own military and economic power at home, and 
creating alliances that can help protect them abroad. According to Waltz his Balance-of-power 
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theory applies if only two conditions are met: “That the order be anarchic and that it be 
populated by units wishing to survive” (Ibid: 121). He also claims that his Balance-of-power 
theory cannot explain foreign policy, but rather illuminates the restraints that the international 
system sets upon the actions that states can perform, and allows some predictions to be made 
about how states will act within these restraints (Ibid: 122). 
The practical consequences of an anarchic Balance-of-power system, is that, whenever 
one state or an alliance of states increases their relative power, other states will join balancing 
coalitions against these states in order to make sure that no one “wins” and gain a position of 
leadership. These coalitions will then break apart again the moment the threat that led to their 
creation is eliminated or weakened. Waltz also claims that the maximizing of security, and not 
power is the primary goal of states. States only seek to maintain their position in the 
international system, and they do this by conducting balance of power politics (Ibid: 126). As 
such states not yet aligned to any alliances will flock to the weaker side in any conflict because 
it is the stronger side that threatens them most (Ibid: 127). This state behavior leads to a 
relatively stable system where states for the most part act as status quo powers rather than 
revisionists, and where peace can be maintained through the careful maintenance of this 
balance. Waltz further claims that multipolar systems (a system with several great powers) are 
more prone to conflict than a system with only two main great powers (a bipolar system). This 
is due to the fact that a multipolar system opens the door for greater confusion and a more 
chaotic image than a bipolar system does (Ibid: 170-172).  
Waltz’s idea that states only seek to maintain their position in the system instead of 
seeking to maximize their power, and therefore act defensively rather than offensively, is 
considered to be the primary proponent of this branch of realism (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 99). 
Whereas the theory of Defensive Realism argues that states only seek to maintain their 
position in the international system, Offensive Realism argues that a state is going to seek 
greater power no matter its current position (Mearsheimer: 2001; Toft, 2005). Offensive 
Realism is the theory that I will focus on beneath, and the theory that will be used in my attempt 
at exploring the possibilities of a unique American Foreign policy. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First is the fact that whereas Waltz claim that structural realism is unable to explain 
the details of foreign policy, Mearsheimer argues that realist logic often will guide or influence 
a state’s foreign policy (Ibid: 17, 26). Secondly the focus on power in Offensive Realist theory 
is also closer to the classic idea of realpolitik and European Realism than the Balance of Power 
theory in Defensive Realist theory is (for a definition of Realpolitik see: Kissinger, 1994:137). 
This is important since, as I mentioned in the introduction, the claim of American 
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exceptionalism is based mostly on the idea that American foreign policy is focused on ideals 
and values rather than power and state interests. As such, Offensive Realism seems to be more 
opposed to any theory of American exceptionalism than Defensive Realism. 
The Offensive Realism of John Mearsheimer 
Through the theory of Offensive Realism John Mearsheimer builds upon the framework of 
structural realism that was laid down by Kenneth Waltz (Toft: 2005). Like Waltz, Mearsheimer 
subscribes to the idea of an international anarchic system, and that the structure of this system 
influences the states that are part of it (Mearsheimer, 2001:22). Like Waltz, he argues that it is 
the fear of other states that makes states seek security through power and military might. Unlike 
Waltz however, Mearsheimer does not believe that states merely wish to gain enough power to 
maintain their position and security. By examining the actions of some former and current great 
powers, Mearsheimer seek to improve upon the theories of Waltz by explaining why strong 
states often seek to increase their power and improve their position in the international system, 
beyond what is needed in order to balance other states that might threaten them (Ibid: 21-22).   
Great powers, says Mearsheimer, are not always happy with the amount of power that 
they can bring to bear, and will in general seek to escape the security competition of the 
international system by accumulating as much power, and latent power, as possible (Ibid: 43). 
This leads to the classic example of the security dilemma, where one state, in order to safeguard 
itself increases its military might. A military buildup does however also have the unfortunate 
side effect of increasing the amount of fear that this state instill in its neighbors, and thereby 
providing a strong incentive for these states to increase their own military might. This again 
scares the original great power into seeking to increase its power even further. The result can 
be a spiraling arms race that has the potential to erupt into open war (Herz, 1950). The 
implications of the security dilemma for individual states are clear says Mearsheimer “The best 
defence is a good offence. Since this message is widely understood ceaseless security 
competition ensures” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 36). 
However, this does not imply that states are going to act offensively all the time. The 
way states act is bound to depend upon their relative power and position in the international 
system. A great power that is markedly more powerful than its rivals is likely to behave more 
aggressively, whereas a great power that faces more powerful opponents will most likely 
attempt to balance against them rather than confront them head on (Ibid: 37). Over time, the 
ultimate goal of a great power is to achieve the position of hegemon in the system. Unlike Waltz 
and other defensive realists, Mearsheimer claims that states only become status quo powers 
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once they have achieved a position of hegemony (Ibid: 34). The argument goes that only a 
hegemon can achieve total security from the aggression of other states. Once a state has 
achieved hegemony it is for all intents and purposes the only great power left in the system, 
since no other state has the military might to threaten it (Ibid: 40). According to this theory, no 
rational state would forego the chance to become the hegemon of the system, and even if a state 
has no chance at achieving hegemony it will still attempt to assemble as much power as it 
possibly can in order to safeguard itself. 
If all states follow this logic then they will, according to Mearsheimer, seek to take 
advantage of each other, and constantly try to increase their power on the expense of rivals. At 
the same time states also seek to defend themselves, and maintain the power they have already 
gained, they will therefore attempt to check potential challengers, and stop other great powers 
from rising (Ibid: 35). In Offensive Realist theory, it is this perpetual hunt for power that leads 
to security competition and eventually to conflict between great powers. It is also worth 
mentioning that this security competition makes cooperation between states difficult since they 
all think in terms of relative gains, and few states will accept a deal if that means their 
competitor gain more than they do (Ibid: 52; Mearsheimer, 1994-95).  Mearsheimer himself has 
stated that he finds the whole picture depressing, and that no amount of goodwill will help great 
powers avoid the security competition that arises when one of them increase its relative power 
and capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
In The Tragedy of Great Power politics (2001:30-31) Mearsheimer lists five bedrock 
assumptions that he feels is necessary for his theory to hold true. These are: 
 First the international system needs to be anarchic in nature. Although it is worth noting that he 
never claims that anarchy necessitates chaos and constant war. 
 Secondly Mearsheimer claims that all great powers inherently possess the some offensive 
military capability that can be brought to bear on an opponent. In other words, states are a danger 
to each other. 
 The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of another state, and 
as such a state can never be one hundred percent sure that another state does not harbor any 
hostile intent towards it.  
 Fourth: Security and survival is the most important goal of any state. Without it all other actions 
are impossible since the state will cease to exist. As such this goal trumps all other goals.  
 And finally that all great powers are rational actors and that they think strategically about how 
to survive in the environment they find themselves in. 
Offensive realists claim that if all of these assumptions holds true then we can expect to see 
foreign policy behavior from states that mostly focuses on their own state interests through the 
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accumulation of power. Now, one must remember that it is argued that the power of a state can 
depend upon several factors, from the preeminence of a state’s ideological values, through 
economic and industrial might as well as cyber knowhow and infrastructure, and to its 
geographic position and resource basis (Nye, 2011).  
For an offensive realist however, military, and primarily land-based armed forces, are 
the most important measure of the power of a great power (Mearsheimer, 2001: 83). In the end, 
as the Melians discovered in the Peloponnesian war, the power of your legal argument is 
irrelevant if somebody is holding a gun to your head (Thucydides, [1954] 1972: 400-408). In 
his examination of military power, Mearsheimer argues that both sea based power (navies) and 
air based power (air forces) has severe limitations in their application (Ibid: chapter 4). 
According to him, only land forces are capable of actually controlling landmasses and 
occupying territory. Mearsheimer also makes the claim here that the ability of large bodies of 
water in acting as a sort of mote, can severely limit the power projection capabilities of land 
armies. This is an important point for Mearsheimer since it helps offensive realist theory to 
explain why sea based powers such as the U.S. and Great Britain never have made a serious 
attempt at conquering Europe, or occupying territory on other continents when faced with the 
serious opposition of another great power (Ibid: 114, 254-265). Large oceans are simply so 
difficult to traverse with large numbers of troops, and amphibious landings are so difficult to 
pull off that invading territory overseas held by another unengaged and prepared great power is 
close to impossible (Ibid: 120). 
The goals and strategies of great powers in Offensive Realist theory 
As stated above, the main goal of any state in an anarchic international system is to survive. 
The surest way for a state to ensure its survival is, according Mearsheimer, to gain such an 
amount of power that no other state can challenge you, or in other words; to become a hegemon. 
The ultimate position of strength, and therefor of security, would be as a world hegemon. 
However, because of the stopping power of the World’s oceans, this position is very difficult 
to achieve if not completely unattainable. Instead, states will seek to gain regional hegemony 
in its part of the world (Ibid: 140). States will also attempt to stop other powers from gaining 
hegemony in another region of the world. This is because only a regional hegemon has the 
power and resource base that are needed to threaten the position of another hegemon. Even if a 
direct attack upon another hegemon is unfeasible in itself, the distant hegemon may threaten 
the local balance of power, and thereby threaten the supremacy of the local hegemon (Ibid: 
142).  
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Besides aiming at being the only hegemon on the planet, states also seek to generate and control 
as much of the wealth in the world as possible, to have the strongest armed forces in its region, 
and finally to gain nuclear superiority despite the fact that nuclear superiority is very difficult 
if not impossible to achieve (Ibid: 147).   
When it comes to behavior of great powers Mearsheimer claims that because relative 
power plays such an important part in the relationship between states, great powers have 
developed several distinct strategies as a way of gaining and maintaining power as well as 
hinder other states from obtaining it (Ibid: 138). In order to gain relative power a state can either 
attempt to use war, blackmail, bait and bleed or bloodletting strategies. Out of these three 
waging war is risky and can be costly, but is still the main strategy great powers use for gaining 
power and achieving a position of hegemony (Ibid: 138).  
Strategies for preventing a rising great power from upsetting the balance of power 
include balancing, buck-passing, appeasement and bandwagoning. Although Mearsheimer 
argues that bandwagoning and appeasement are poor choices in a realist world. This is because 
they both allow the aggressor to gain more relative power than the defender. Instead the real 
choice for a state stands between choosing to balance against a threat by itself, or attempt to let 
another state face the challenger instead through the strategy of buck-passing (Ibid: 140).  
Since I am currently examining the foreign policy practices of a regional hegemon, the 
United States, and because offensive realists expect regional hegemons to act as status quo 
powers, it would seem a waste of time to examine the strategies that states use in order to gain 
power. Instead, I will look at primary ways by which states seek to contain and check 
aggressors. First, Mearhseimer claims that the formidable armed forces that great powers are 
wont to build, often will prove enough for deterring potential enemies (Ibid: 155), however, 
from time to time more drastic action will have to be undertaken in order to check aggressive 
states. If we accept the arguments that Mearsheimer presents about the unfeasibility of 
appeasement and bandwagoning, the two remaining strategies left are balancing and buck-
passing.  
What to expect with a realist US foreign policy? 
Balancing against a challenger is as we have seen a very old concept, and it is also the action 
that Waltz, and other defensive realists, expects threatened states to prefer in the face of a 
challenger. Balancing also has an important role to play in offensive realist theory; however, 
Mearsheimer concludes that states prefer to “pass the Buck” whenever they are feeling seriously 
threatened.  
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“A buck-passer attempts to get another state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting 
an aggressor, while it remains on the sidelines. The buck-passer fully recognizes the need to 
prevent the aggressor from increasing its share of world power but looks for some other state 
that is threatened by the aggressor to perform this onerous task” (Ibid: 157-158).   
Mearsheimer argues that the popularity of buck-passing stems from the ability that strategy has 
of providing cheap security. Wars are costly and risky so having another great power fighting 
your war for you is a tempting prospect for most states (Ibid: 160). 
However, buck-passing is only possible if another great power exists which is capable 
of fighting and potentially win a war against the aggressor. In the case of China’s rise and the 
American response to this rise, there are few other powers in the region that would be capable 
of containing China on their own. Japan comes to mind, but Japanese strategy with regards to 
a potential Chinese threat seems to be based on cooperation with the U.S.in every aspect rather 
than any attempt at taking on China by itself (Shinzo, 2012). Other democratic countries that 
face a potential threat in a rising China are India and Australia these (and especially India) could 
at first glance look like prime candidates for American buck-passing strategy, but on closer 
inspection one realize that neither really are. Like Japan, Australia also seems to have realized 
that a growing China could spell trouble for the future, and like Japan, Australia looks to the 
U.S. for a security partner (Australian Defense White Paper, 2009). With regards to India, Delhi 
does have serious security concerns over increasing Chinese strength; however, the Indian 
government looks like they prefer to work with the United States rather than alone when it 
comes to facing these security concerns (Friedberg, 2011: 206).  
Even more important than the strategies these individual governments seek to 
implement, are the fact that none of these powers possess the military capability to contain 
China on their own. When looking at the military expenditure for Australia, India and Japan 
compared to China we find that the biggest spender of the three, Japan, spend less than half of 
what China does on its armed forces (119 billion dollars for China vs. 54 billion for Japan in 
2010) (Sipri: 2012). In short, even if American decision makers wanted to, there is no great 
power in East Asia that the United States could reliably pass the buck to. As such, the only 
realist route left for American strategy with regards to China seems to be to balance against and 
contain the rising power. Much in the same way as the U.S. was forced to balance against the 
Soviet Union in Europe during the cold war (Mearsheimer: 2001:392). This is in fact what 
Mearsheimer expects the United States to attempt as China increases its power and seeks to 
influence its local region (Mearsheimer, 2006).  
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When attempting to balance against a rising great power, the balancer takes it upon itself 
to make sure that the aggressor does not upset the balance of power. This includes trying to 
contain and deter an aggressor, and fighting a war if the balancing fails and the rising power 
remains aggressive (Mearsheimer, 2001:156). Mearsheimer lists three actions that a balancer 
can take in order to contain an adversary, they are as follows: 
 “First, they can send clear signals to the aggressor through diplomatic channels…that they are 
firmly committed to maintaining the balance of power, even if it means going to war. 
 Second, threatened state can work to create a defensive alliance to help them contain their 
dangerous opponent. 
 Third, threatened states can balance against an aggressor by mobilizing additional resources of 
their own. For example, defense spending might be increased or conscription might be 
implemented… But there are usually significant limits on how many additional resources a 
threatened state can muster against an aggressor, because great powers normally already devote 
a large percentage of their resources to defense… Nevertheless, when faced with a particularly 
aggressive adversary, great powers will eliminate any slack in the system and search for clever 
ways to boost defense spending” (Ibid: 156-157). 
Keeping this in mind, and accepting the argument that the United States do not have the option 
of following a buck-passing strategy in the face of growing Chinese powers, we should be able 
to make some assumptions about how the foreign policy of the U.S. would look like if American 
decision makers were influenced by realist thought. We should expect to see a United States 
who sends a clear signal that it will not tolerate any Chinese aggression or attempts at gaining 
hegemony in Asia, and who convey their willingness to confront such a potential act of 
aggression. We should be able to observe American leaders who attempt to balance against 
China through the construction of alliances and improving their own standing among nations 
who are located in the east-Asia and south-east-Asia region. We should also expect to see an 
American military that plans for and worries about a potential war against China. This will 
include focusing its efforts in east-Asia, and improving its capabilities in this crucial region of 
the world.  
My two assumptions about what kind of American foreign policy we can expect, 
provided American policy makers are following a realist foreign policy, are as follows: 
 1: That the U.S. are sending clear diplomatic signals to China that it will not tolerate any 
Chinese aggression or bullying tactics against America, American allies or other nations in 
East-Asia. Further; that the United States are focusing a substantial amount of their available 
military capacity on the East-Asia region in order to contain the growing Chinese military 
 2: That the American government is hard at work shoring up its existing alliances, creating new 
ones, attempts to foster better relationships with unaligned nations in the East-Asia and South-
east-Asia region, and generally supports nations whose interests clash with those of China. 
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Examining whether these two assumptions holds true will be a vital task of this study, and will 
help us determine whether American foreign policy can be said to be truly detached from realist 
consideration and therefore exceptional. If these assumptions prove to be false, one we will 
have to look for better explanations of American foreign policy. With that in mind I will now 
turn to the Liberal tradition in international relations theory. 
Liberalism as a theory of international relations and foreign policy 
As noted in the introduction, there seems to be a majority of decision makers and foreign policy 
experts that argues in favor of a liberal American foreign policy (Friedberg, 2005). Liberalism 
is also the historical rival to realism and the theory has been widely influential in the 20th century 
(Dunne, 2005:110). Besides being the historical alternative, Liberal theory also fits better with 
the arguments of Walter Russel Meade about American exeptionalism, and it is the favored 
theory among most American presidents and politicians (Mead, 2001; Kissinger, 1994; 
Mearsheimer, 2011).  
While Realist theory stands in direct opposition the argument of this exceptionalism, it 
is my view that the presence of a liberal foreign policy would lend credence to this theory. I 
will in this part of the paper show how liberalism and specifically the preference based 
liberalism as put forward by Moravcsik (1997), can be used to test for exceptionalism and help 
explain the American foreign policy tradition.  
Classical Liberalism 
The original ideas of Liberalism developed in the 17th and 18th century, and grew from the 
writings of several distinguished authors such as John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart 
Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant (Dunne, 2005). Liberal ideology focuses in 
its core on the liberty of individual, as well as the right and the ability to choose that it claims 
every individual human being possesses (Heywood: 2007: 27). Liberalists like John Locke 
agree with Thomas Hobbes in his argument that humans originally existed in a state of nature 
(Locke, [1689] 1988: 269), but unlike Hobbes, Locke argues that this state is not a state of war, 
and that individual freedoms can be protected without compromising human society or the state. 
The individual has a given right to decide for itself.   
Whereas the theory of Locke mostly focuses on the organization of the state, the theories 
of Immanuel Kant touches more on the relationship between nations and are as such more 
applicable in international relations studies. Kant argued that liberal democratic countries would 
be more inclined to settle their differences with diplomacy rather than on the battlefields, and 
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he predicted that a group of liberal nations would develop that would cooperate on security 
rather than compete against each other (Doyle, 1986).  
Whereas realists claim that the structure of the international system put strict boundaries 
upon the actions that leaders and politicians might take on the international stage, liberals tend 
to take a more optimistic approach to international politics. It may be that the structure play 
some part in deciding a country’s foreign policy, but often, leaders are very aware what their 
constituents want and will attempt to take this into consideration, after all most leaders want to 
get reelected. At the same time, the actions following these concerns will influence the 
international community, and may change the priorities of other states as well as the 
international structure itself (Putnam, 1988).  
Because the people of any given state is likely to influence decision makers liberals 
often also argue that the rules that govern within states may be transferred to the international 
stage, and by transferring these rules order may be created and wars may be avoided more easily 
(Dunne, 2005: 110). The international natural state is not necessarily a state of war says liberals, 
and by applying laws, rules of conduct, and human morals one can avoid the pitfalls of war that 
threatens within an anarchic international system.  
This then is the reason why I have decided to use liberalism as a further test of American 
exceptionalism. The rejection of realism as a way of conducting foreign policy will strengthen 
the idea of American exceptionalism. Similarly, the embracing of liberal ideals and the attempt 
to enforce American values in the international system will strengthen this theory even further. 
Indeed, like the liberals, Walter Russel Mead claims that the interests of the democratic 
populace and the American elites largely shape American foreign policy (Mead, 2001:84-86). 
The preference based liberalism of Andrew Moravcsik 
In his 1997 article Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics 
Moravcsik attempts to reformulate liberal international relations theory “in a nonideological 
and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science” (Moravcsik, 1997). Like many 
liberals before him, Moravcsik argues that the foreign policy and behavior of a state is 
fundamentally dependent upon the structure and internal social context of said state. He claims 
that, despite years of severe criticism and allegations of utopianism from realist and 
institutionalists, liberal preference based theory provides the best explanation of state behavior. 
“For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics—not, as 
realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional 
regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of information and institutions” (Ibid: 513). 
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Moravcsik claims that this theory also addresses one of the main weaknesses in realism, namely, 
what liberals claim is, its inability to explain changes in the in the international structure (Ibid: 
535).  
Unlike the realists who assume that states are the primary actors in the international 
system, Moravcsik maintains that the behavior of states fundamentally rests on individuals and 
private groups that behave rationally, avoids risks and tries to maximize the amount of resources 
they control and are able to utilize. These groups will use their influence in order to pursue their 
own interests and what they perceive is the interests of the state. It is also worth noting that 
what these groups perceive as the interests of the state often will be in their own interests as 
well (Ibid: 517). The function of the state in this theory is simply to represent the primary 
interests groups and individuals that exist within that stat on the international stage. Needless 
to say Moravcsik’s assumptions about the international system differs greatly from those of 
Mearsheimer and other realists. His three main assumptions about international relations 
politics are as follows: 
 Assumption 1: The Primacy of Societal Actors 
The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on 
the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote 
differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and 
variations in societal influence. 
 
 Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences 
States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of 
whose interests state offıcials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics. 
 
 Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System 
The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior. (Ibid: 516-
520). 
If we accept the premise of these assumptions, the international conflicts in Moravcsik’s theory 
will arise not from the attempts by states of gaining security through power, but rather from a 
clashing of interests between the dominant social groupings in two different countries. When 
one of these groups attempts to use their state as a tool on the international stage in order to 
realize their preferences and these preferences clashes with those of another dominant group, 
conflict has a high chance of arising. It is, according to Moravcsik, not the configuration of 
power among states that decides whether conflict will eventually erupt, but rather the value that 
the dominant group within a given state put on the issue in question, as well as their willingness 
to accept risks and bear the burden of a potential war over this issue (Ibid: 521). In the same 
sense, cooperation between states will ensue when the ruling elites within the states have 
correlating interests and values. If this situation occurs, one can expect to see states that go to 
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great lengths in order to cooperate and protect each other. Unlike realists who claim that states 
act within their capabilities and the means they have of achieving their goals, the liberal theory 
of Moravcsik claims that the primary concern of states is the ends they wish to achieve with 
their foreign policy. “Variation in ends, not means, matters most” (Ibid: 522). 
Since Moravcsik claims that elites and interests groups decide how a countries foreign 
policy is going to look like, we will need to examine what the interests as well as the morals 
and ideologies of American elites are with regards to the rise of China. As to the matter of 
determining which group has the most influence in Washington, Friedberg (2005) claims in his 
article that this is the “optimist liberals”. This claim corresponds with what Mead (2001) argues 
in “Special Providence” where it is claimed that the liberal Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools 
of thought dominate among American elites (Mead, 2001: 267). Below I will look at the most 
prominent theories and interests that I am able to discern in the liberal American foreign policy 
elite and among other groups with influence in the establishment. However, before we arrive at 
these interests I will first address the influence on foreign policy that common Americans is 
believed to have. 
In his work American diplomacy (1984) George Kennan suggests that the moral values 
and interests of ordinary Americans are part of the reason why decision makers in the United 
States refrains from following a realist foreign policy. Despite of this I am going to focus my 
attention on the American elites rather than the common voter. The reasons why I choose not 
to include the ideals, interests and values of ordinary Americans in this analysis is threefold:  
 First: Moravcsik himself focuses mostly on elites and decision maker, because these are the 
persons that are going to have to most influence on the final decisions and be best placed to 
change them (Moravcsik, 1997).  
 Second: Despite the fact that Mead claim to have identified what he calls Jacksonianism as a 
very common set of foreign policy priorities among ordinary Americans (Mead, 2001), the 
breadth of interests among a population of more than 300 million people is bound to be 
immense. It follows then that the general interests of the populace is very hard to ascertain both 
for the social scientist and for the politician taking the final decision on policy.  
 Third: Several social scientists have suggested that, while politicians and the government are 
influenced by the wishes of the general populace through, among other institutions, the media 
(Iyengar, 2011:92-93). The established Media will in cases of most national security questions 
follow the line as it is laid down by the government and accept the government’s arguments in 
order to “stay in the loop”. This deprives the general population of the information necessary 
for people to decide whether the current foreign policy being conducted really is in their best 
interests (Bennett, 1990).   
For example, before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 there was widespread opposition among 
ordinary Americans to this invasion. However in the weeks before the invasion started and once 
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the attack was underway, the opposition in the established media went almost completely silent, 
and the result was that support for the war skyrocketed among ordinary Americans (Iyengar, 
2011: 105-106). Since the case of China’s rise is most definitely a security question, there is a 
case for assuming that the security elite will make most decisions on this matter and that the 
opinions of ordinary Americans will have little influence on the final decisions that are made.  
All that considered, let us now take a look at the theories that I assume drive the liberal 
decision makers in the United States. These have already been categorized by Aaron L. 
Friedberg in his 2005 article “The future of U.S.-China relationship, is conflict inevitable?” and 
in my analysis I will for the most part use the theories he claims are determining the preferred 
strategies of optimist liberals in America. 
The Democratic Peace theory 
Kant’s idea about the relationship between liberal republics eventually developed into what is 
today known as the Democratic-Peace theory. In short, its expectations are that liberal 
democratic countries very seldom wage war upon each other. This is partly because the 
electorate of those countries never would permit their politician to go to war against another 
liberal democracy (Doyle, 1986), but also because liberal republics recognize the “international 
rights of foreign republics. These international rights of republics derive from the representation 
of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals” (Ibid: 1162). Democratic peace theory 
suggests that the best way of achieving perpetual peace is to make sure that all states are liberal 
democratic republics. In contrast, realist thinkers only accept the implementation of a world 
government or the rise of a world hegemon as a way of securing world peace (Waltz, 1959). 
Some authors have claimed that the democratic peace theory is as close to a general law as one 
can get in international politics since wars between democratic countries are extremely rare if 
not none existent (Russet, Layne, Spiro and Doyle: 1995). Nevertheless the democratic peace 
theory has faced severe criticism by several realists over the years who claim that there are 
instances of democracies who wage war against each other and that these wars therefore refutes 
the theory (se for example: Layne, 1994).  
Despite this criticism the democratic peace theory still has many supporters among 
theorists and decision makers, and perhaps especially among the American elite (Friedberg: 
2005; Lieberthal and Wang: 2012). One could see a clear example of this before the American 
led invasion of Iraq in 2003, where one of the main arguments of American President George 
W. Bush in favor of the invasion was that tyranny had to be defeated all over the world in order 
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to create a safe planet of democratic states. Delivering his second inaugural address in 2005 
Bush claimed that: 
“The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world… So it’s the 
policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and every culture, with the ultimate goal of ending Tyranny in our 
world” (Quoted in Nye & Welch, 2011:62).   
The will to use force in order to create peaceful democratic states was perhaps especially 
pronounced during the Bush administration, but the democratic peace theory continued to 
exercise strong influence on officials during the administrations of President Barack Obama as 
well. Obama made this perfectly clear in his Nobel Peace Prize lecture in 2009, when he stated 
that:   
“Only when Europe became free did it finally find peace. America has never fought a war 
against a democracy, and our closest friends are governments that protect the rights of their 
citizens. No matter how callously defined, neither America's interests – nor the world's – are 
served by the denial of human aspirations” (Obama, 2009a).   
With the democratic peace theory so prominent in American foreign policy thinking, despite a 
change of administrations, we should expect to see an American policy towards China that 
promotes democracy within that country and that aims at turning China into a liberal republic 
of the kind that Kant envisions. As a strategy for achieving this goal, we can expect to see 
American support for human rights activists within China, a policy of condemnation whenever 
the Chinese government is perceived to break the human rights, and an attempt at influencing 
prominent Chinese officials and future Chinese leaders into accepting democracy as a valid and 
preferable way of government. Further it is the belief of several of these liberalists that the 
economic development of China will create a strong middle class that eventually are going to 
demand their democratic rights (Lieberthal, 1995). This focus on China’s economic 
development brings us over to the second set of interests that seems to be prominent among the 
American elites. That is, the growing economic interdependence between the U.S. and China 
as well the immense wealth invested by the two countries in each other’s economies. 
China-U.S. economic ties 
Like the democratic peace theory, the theory of economic interdependence is popular among 
liberal thinkers. The basic idea of this theory is that as trade grows between modern countries, 
the cost of going to war against your trade partners grows as well.  
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“Trade provides valuable benefits, or “gains from trade,” to any particular state. A dependent 
state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close 
ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states 
should prefer to trade not invade” (Copland, 1996:8). 
Particularly the expectation of growth and a stronger future trade relationship is expected to 
influence the decisions makers. When the trade between two nations is expected to grow in 
such a manner, liberals argue that the incentives to find peaceful solutions to any potential 
disagreements between the two countries are going to increase (Ibid). When American liberals 
apply this theory to the case of a growing China they will expect that with an increase in trade 
and economic interdependence, the economic interests of elites on both sides are going to 
combine to stop any war that could threaten the trade that is making them all rich (Friedberg, 
2005:12). This interest in fostering a peaceful relationship between the two countries through 
trade combines with the pure economic interests that the American business elite have in 
increasing trade. This is likely going to puts considerable pressure on any American 
administration’s foreign policy. 
The trade between China and the U.S. has been steadily growing since the opening of 
China by President Richard Nixon in the 1970s, and is expected to continue to grow despite 
some American concerns about Chinese regulations and business practices (U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012). In fact, China is now the premier trading 
partner of the United States and their economies are heavily linked to each other. Several 
American companies operate in China and vice versa. These businesses have already sought to 
influence American trade policies and it is claimed that they have been highly successful. Even 
to the point where the American focus on democracy and human rights have been forced to step 
aside in order to accommodate a more profitable foreign policy towards China (Cohen, 2005). 
With regards to the peace making aspect of this theory there are already claims that American 
attempts at integrating China into the international economic system are stabilizing the East-
Asia region (Christensen, 2006).  
To sum up, if American foreign policy is best explained by liberal theory, we can expect 
to see a policy that strives to improve the business environment between China and the U.S. 
We should also expect a policy that seeks to integrate the two economies even further in order 
to foster a lasting peace between them and avoid potential conflict that may arise as China 
increases both its economic and military strength.  
However worries about Chinese trade practices is already causing concern among the 
American business elites, politicians and experts (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
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Commission, 2012). If these practices eventually start to impair the ability of American 
companies to make a profit from deeper economic integration with China, we could see a shift 
in U.S. policy to one based more on preserving American competitiveness on the world market 
rather than one focused on facilitating trade between China and the United States.  
The promise of international institutions 
Unlike realists who are quick to claim that the international institutions of the world have no 
discernible effect upon peace between countries (Mearsheimer, 1994-95), liberals often place 
great faith in these same institutions as ways of creating order in the anarchy that exists on the 
international stage (Keohane: 1998; 1988). The hopes of the proponents of institutionalist 
theory are that international institutions, such as the UN, can help clear up the often muddled 
field of international politics by reducing uncertainty about state intentions. It is also claimed 
that international institutions often improves communications between nations and allow these 
same nations to cooperate closer together than they usually would have been able to do 
(Friedberg, 2005:13). All of this allows a nation feel safer in an uncertain world and helps 
mitigate the effects of anarchy. Proponents of liberal institutionalism also note that the 
importance of international institutions such as the WTO, the UN and NATO has kept 
increasing during the latter part of the 20th century and that even realists like Henry Kissinger 
who used to ignore these institutions now admit their importance (Keohane, 1998:85). If the 
United States can help improve upon the already existing institutions that operate in East-Asia 
as well as integrate China into the current international structure, liberals expect that the two 
countries can manage to maintain a peaceful relationship (Christensen, 2006). In fact, the 
ongoing integration of China into these international institutions is expected to have already 
turned the Chinese into a more responsible partner. This can potentially lead to a situation in 
the future where the Chinese aid the Americans in propping up the international system they 
both profit from (Shambaugh, 2004-2005:69).  
Like the Democratic Peace theory and the growing economic ties between China and 
the U.S., the potential for peace inherit in an international system structured by institutions is a 
strong incentive for liberal policymakers. As such, we can expect these liberals to pursue a 
policy that aims at integrating China into such a system. Following the liberal theory of 
Moravcsik it is reason to claim that any American foreign Policy based upon a liberal tradition, 
and which therefore could be claimed to be exceptional for America, can be expected to aim at 
integrating China into such institutions. More precisely, we can expect the Americans to support 
such institutions in the East Asia region, as well as promote the inclusion of China into these 
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same institutions and other more worldwide organizations. I would also expect to see a United 
States that seeks to conduct its diplomacy within the framework of these institutions rather than 
on a bilateral basis when negotiating with the Chinese. 
An exceptional and liberal foreign policy 
With the three main liberal theories accounted for it is time to summarize what I expect to 
observe if American foreign policy is driven by liberal considerations rather than realist. If we 
accept that Friedberg (2005) and Mead (2001) are right and the liberals really are the most 
influential group in Washington, we can expect to see an American policy that focuses on these 
two aspects: 
 1: American attempts at turning China into a liberal democracy along the lines of 
western democracies. Further, since many liberals are arguing that international 
institutions promote peace, I will expect to see an American foreign policy that promotes 
these institutions and aims at integrating a rising China with them.  
 2: we can expect to see American attempts at fostering greater economic cooperation 
and integration between the two powers, even if this trade does not benefit the U.S. in 
the short term.   
The tests for liberal exceptionalism 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the basis for claiming that there exists a unique American 
way of conducting foreign policy lies foremost in the perceived absence of realist 
considerations in the American foreign policy tradition, as well as the pressure that the 
democratic system and the importance of spreading “American values” put on politicians (see 
Mead, 2001:30-31; Kennan, 1984:49-50). The preference based liberal theory by Andrew 
Moravcsik serves as way of identifying the most important groups that influence American 
foreign policy. These groups can for the most part be said to stand for what have traditionally 
been characterized as American exceptionalism. On the opposite side of the spectrum, you find 
the Offensive Realism of John Mearsheimer. As noted earlier, Mearsheimer claims that the 
United States acts like any other great power and that unlike what is generally believed state 
interests and the race for power is what drives U.S. foreign policy forward. Therefore, the 
presence of clearly realist foreign policy decisions in the United States’ relationship with China 
should be hard to explain through the theory of American exceptionalism.    
Having considered this, I have chosen to test for the absence or presence of realist 
considerations in American foreign policy as well as the absence or presence of policy driven 
by the values and preferences that dominates among the American elite. Below are listed the 
respective foreign policy actions that I expect to see with the presence of a policy driven by 
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either realist or liberal/exceptional preferences. I have divided the behavioral patterns I expect 
to observe into two hypothesis for the Realist theory and two for Liberal theory. 
Realist founded U.S. foreign policy towards China 
 1. Hypothesis: A strong and clear American posture with regards to Chinese expansion 
of its military capabilities and Chinese attempts at influencing its neighbors, as well as 
a substantial increase in American military deployment to the East-Asia and the South-
East Asia regions. American military assets in the Pacific and in East Asia should also 
be shielded from defense cuts, even to the point where the budget for this area is 
increased despite other cuts. 
o Variable: Military focus and American perception of China as a threat 
 Empirical indicators: Statements of policy, Military presence, 
Development and deployment of weapons aimed at countering China 
and American military Strategy.  
 2.Hypthesis: An attempt at containing China through the application of alliances and 
cooperation with the other states in the region.  
o Variable: Alliances and American alliance building in the region. 
 Empirical indicators: Statements of intent, high profile joint exercises 
and defense agreements. 
Liberal founded U.S. foreign policy towards China 
 1. Hypothesis: An American diplomacy focused on human rights and democracy while 
attempting to bring about these changes within China through cooperation and 
avoiding unnecessary confrontation between the two nations. A U.S. policy that seeks 
to integrate China into international institutions in order to create a more stable frame 
for China to rise within.  
o Variable: Bilateral diplomatic cooperation and American support for Chinese 
integration into international institutions 
 Empirical indicators: Statements of policy in documents and following 
meetings, Positive and friendly rhetoric towards China and American 
support for Chinese membership in international organizations and fora. 
 2. Hypothesis American attempts at fostering greater economic cooperation and 
integration between the two powers in order to ensure a peaceful relationship as well 
as cater to the whishes of the American business elite. 
o Variable: U.S. bilateral trade with China. 
 Empirical indicators: Statements of intent, increase in trade 
between the U.S. despite of an American trade deficit and China, 
as well as successful pressure on decision makers from the 
economic elite.  
Having established these parameters, I will now take a closer look at the actual American policy 
decisions that have been made since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the first Bill 
Clinton presidency. 
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Part 3. Mapping the Empirical Basis for the Chosen Theories 
My last section focused on the two theories that I would use as a way to examine the possibility 
of an exceptional American Foreign policy. I also outlined what I would expect to see if 
American foreign policy followed the expectations of either Realist theory or Liberal theory 
respectively. This section will map the empirical evidence found within the case of China’s 
rise, which can support either of the two theories. It will be organized along the lines which 
were provided in the theory section. To be more precise I will first outline evidence that supports 
the existence or nonexistence of U.S. foreign policy behavior based on the two expectations 
that were identified for realist theory. Following that I will gather outline the data that supports 
or go against either of the expectations that follow from preference based liberal theory. 
This data, which shows American foreign policy behavior and statements of intent in 
the period from the end of the Cold War, will form the basis for my analysis of American policy 
with regards to China. I will look at each presidential period from Bill Clinton until the first 
Obama presidency, looking first at the realist hypotheses and then at the liberal. However, 
before we dive into the depths and detail of American strategy and foreign policy, I want to 
start with a short overview of the relationship between the U.S. and China since the beginning 
of the cold war and especially the thawing of that relationship during the 1970s. This is relevant 
because the opening of China as well as the Tiananmen Square incident sets the stage for the 
American foreign policy that has been directed towards China for the last two decades.  
Historical Prologue 
Thawing the Ice 
The relationship between China and the United States after World War 2 was heavily 
characterized by the cold war standoff between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. The two countries 
went from being allies during the WW2 to competitors and enemies in the years after 1949. The 
U.S. policy during this period was one of containment and in one instance war against the 
Chinese. The Korea war was originally a response to the aggression of North Korea towards 
South Korea, but in reality the Chinese fear of American encroachment (Scobell, 2004) and the 
American fear of spreading communism (Kissinger, 1994:476-477) led to what was to all 
intents and purposes a hot war between China and the U.S. It was during this was that the U.S. 
first committed itself to the defense of Taiwan with President Eisenhower stating that: “The 
occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the 
Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in 
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that area"( (Ibid: 479). This commitment would prove to be significant for the development of 
later U.S.-Sino relationship.  
The relationship between the two powers remained frosty until the beginning of the 
1970s and the Presidency of Richard Nixon (Ibid.). Nixon and his staff followed a strict balance 
of power policy with regards to the Soviet Union and his main goal was to shift that balance in 
favor of the United States. His preferred way of achieving this goal was by detaching China 
from the Soviet Union and bringing them to the American side, or at the very least make sure 
they remained neutral (Cohen, 2005: 8). To quote Nixon: 
“We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended 
period of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes 
infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that danger of war arises" (Nixon, 
quoted in: Kissinger, 1994:705).  
For their own part, the Chinese were more than happy to cooperate with the Americans. Indeed 
many Chinese leader were at the time considering the Soviet Union to be a bigger threat to 
China than the U.S. constituted (Siu-Kai, 2004:95-96). The most serious source of contention, 
the question of Taiwan, was put off until later. Mao was even claimed to have stated that: “We 
can do without them [Taiwan] for the time being, and let it come after a 100 years” (Kissinger, 
1994:727). The Chinese were in other words resolved to being patient concerning the Taiwan 
question for the time being.      
The political and economic consequences of Nixon’s newfound cooperation with China 
were significant. Trade between the two countries expanded rapidly, Chinese leaders opened 
their country’s economic system to some capitalist practices and the communist leadership 
seemed more inclined to accept a greater personal freedom for the average citizen. As a 
consequence several western commentators in the 80s claimed that it was now only a question 
of time before China developed into a fully-fledged liberal democracy similar to the United 
States and other western countries (Cohen, 2005:15). 
The Tiananmen Square  
The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 came as a wakeup call to both Chinese decision makers 
and Americans. The killings of close to one thousand demonstrators shattered the image of 
China as a developing democracy that the west had entertained for several years (Ibid: 14-15). 
For decision makers in Washington the whole incident seems to have come at a very 
inopportune moment. With the Soviet Union opening up, but still a threat, President Bush was 
anxious to retain China as an ally. At the same time he faced increasing criticism from the 
American public and opposition who wanted to punish the Chinese leaders for their actions. 
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The result was a sort of compromise where Bush stopped all weapons sales to China, but at the 
same time maintained diplomatic and trade relations as a way to maintain at the very least the 
semblance of a relationship between the countries (Ibid.: 15-16). This was done despite severe 
condemnation of the Chinese actions from the American media, the opposition and the general 
public. In other words, China was too important to alienate completely even if the cold war in 
effect was coming to an end (Friedberg, 2011:91). Still the incident marked the beginning of a 
new form of U.S. policy towards China, one which retained the earlier optimism about 
democratic change but which included a greater skepticism towards the goals of the Chinese 
leadership (Ibid.:89-90).  
With the historical background out of the way, the rest of the chapter will examine the 
policy conducted by the U.S. towards China and East and South-East Asia in this period. I will 
begin with examining the factors that are necessary for testing the Offensive Realist theory.  
Testing for a Realist U.S. Foreign Policy 
1992-1996: The first Clinton Administration  
Military deployments and U.S. diplomatic posture 
When Bill Clinton arrived in the White House in January 1993, foreign policy seemed to be 
very far from his mind. Economic issues dominated and if international issues came up they 
were almost all focused on the economic aspect (Cohen, 2005:57). It is worth mentioning 
however, that during the presidential race between Clinton and George Bush sr. the question of 
how to respond to the Tiananmen massacre was a hot topic. Clinton himself criticized Bush for 
not acting more forcefully towards the Chinese leadership, and promised a tougher stance on 
human rights if he was elected President (ibid.). According to Cohen, this stance was 
nevertheless quickly abandoned when Clinton took office, in favor of a policy that focused on 
economic cooperation with China rather than risking actions that could lead to a strained 
relationship (Ibid.). The Clinton administration tried for a time to push China into concessions 
on human rights and political liberties. However when threats to link Chinas Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status to its human rights record failed to produce results, the White House 
started to assert that the United States could best promote change by encouraging trade instead 
of withholding it (Friedberg, 2011:93).   
For Clinton, it seemed economic prosperity and national security was two sides of the 
same coin and that economy was the priority. In the National Security Strategy Report for 1994 
(page: 15), this is stated quite clearly: 
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“A central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through 
efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly 
inseparable. Our prosperity at home depends on engaging actively abroad. The strength of our 
diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values  
abroad… all these depend in  part on the strength of our economy”. 
The report also stresses the unique situation that the U.S. found itself in in 1994. With no real 
peer competitor to speak of and democracy on the rise in most parts of the world, the image that 
is painted in this report is an optimistic one. The Clinton administration focused on smaller 
more asymmetric threats as the main problem and threat that America faced, and as a 
consequence the armed forces were expected to be more flexible than before. The 
administration still expected the United States armed forces to be able to fight and win two 
almost simultaneous wars against medium strength states in different parts of the world 
(National Security Strategy Report, 1994:6 (NSS)), but the emphasis had shifted away from the 
cold war strategy of massive wars against another great power. Nevertheless, the Clinton 
administration stated in its Strategy that it wished to maintain at least 100 000 American troops 
deployed to the Asia-pacific region (Ibid: 23). The 100 000 mark was to be retained throughout 
the Clinton years. 
As with regards to China, the country is mentioned as a future partner rather than 
competitor and a strategy of integrating China into the regional order is emphasized as a means 
of making sure that Chinas neighbors are reassured. To quote the report again:  
“We are also working to facilitate China's development of a more open, market economy that 
accepts international trade practices. Given its growing economic potential and already sizable 
military force, it is essential that China not become a security threat to the region. To that end, 
we are strongly promoting China's participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its 
neighbors and assuage its own security concerns.” (NSS, 1994 :24). 
If we look at the actual number of American troops we see that despite of Clinton’s emphasize 
on the importance of Asia, the number of troops deployed to the Asia-pacific region and the 
two important U.S. pacific bases on Hawaii and Guam by 1994, had dropped by 21 289 men. 
Down from 168 038 in September 1990 to 146 749 in September 19941.  
By 1995 the number had been reduced even further and the number of U.S. army personnel 
deployed was now at 132 987, down 13762 from 1994. Adding this up we can see that more 
than 35 000 U.S. troops were redeployed from the Asia-pacific region during the first half of 
the 90s. 35 000 troops constitute more than a 20 percent decrease of American military presence 
                                                          
1 All data that I make use of on the U.S. troop levels in the Pacific and East-Asian region are collected from: DoD PERSONNEL & PROCUREMENT 
STATISTICS; http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm. Individual direct links for each year is found in the literature list. For 
an overview of U.S. troops deployments to East Asia during the different presidential periods see the Appendix.  
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in the region since the end of the cold war. This was done despite that growing importance of 
the region and the expanding economic and military potential of China. It is however clear from 
the National Security Strategy Reports (1994, 1995) that the White House did not consider 
China to be an important military threat at the time, despite warnings from writers like Henry 
Kissinger (1994) and Samuel Huntington (1993). As such, it is not surprising that the presence 
of American forces in the region declined through the early 90s.  
Alliance and containment policy in the period 
As for alliance policies and partners, most of the U.S.’s long time partners in the region such as 
Japan and Australia were mentioned in the NSS for 1994 only in passing. The exception would 
be South-Korea but this has probably more to do with a relatively aggressive North-Korea than 
with a rising China. Overall the Clinton administration seems to have been more concerned 
with the legal framework of trade practices than with strengthening the alliances in the region. 
This is perhaps not surprising when one considers the rather weak international position of 
China at the time. Some American analysts even argued that Japan was actually a stronger 
competitor to America than China was (Cohen, 2005: 42). 
1996-2000: The second Clinton administration 
Military deployments and a strong stance 
The period from 1996 - 2000 incorporates the first incident since the end of the cold war where 
China and the United States directly opposed each other and the U.S. actively tried to deter the 
PRC from pursuing a specific course of action. The action in question was Chinas attempt at 
using threats and force in order to influence the 1996 presidential election on Taiwan (Ross, 
2000; Thies & Bratton, 2004; Scobell, 2000). These threats came as a result of increasing 
Chinese fears about the intentions of the Taiwanese Leadership, and what the Chinese claimed 
were obvious American and Taiwanese provocations (He & Feng, 2009), such as the decision 
to allow Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui to visit the United States in 1995 (Bush, 2005:83).  
The Chinese missiles tests and following amphibious operations and troop movements 
in 95 and the spring of 96, led to the deployment of the American aircraft carriers Independence 
and Nimitz to the Taiwan Strait as an assurance to Taiwan and a way of deterring the Chinese 
from further aggressive action. The Americans wanted to send a strong signal to China that 
military aggressions against Taiwan would not be tolerated and the U.S. was prepared to fight 
if China went so far as to invade Taiwan (Ross, 2000). The Pentagon gave this statement to the 
press when it became common knowledege that the two ships and their escorts had been 
deployed to the Taiwanese Straits: 
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“The signal that these ships are sending is one of precaution and reassurance: precaution because 
we want to make sure that there is no miscalculation on the part of Beijing as to our very firm 
interest in that region of the world; reassuring because we want our friends in the area to know 
that we have a large stake in the stability and the peace in that region…But I also want to point 
out, Charlie, that there has been absolutely no indication that the Chinese have any intention of 
doing anything other than settling their differences by peaceful means”. (Doubleday, 12 mars 
1996). 
In short, the Taiwan crisis in 1996 seems to have forced the Americans into thinking about 
China as a possible threat, at least for a short while. Some argue that the Taiwan Straits 
constitutes the most volatile area that the U.S. is currently engaged in, and that the Taiwan crisis 
in 95-96 brought this to the forefront of planners and staffers’ minds (Tucker, 2005). Following 
the arguments of Offensive Realism, we should expect to see an increase in American military 
deployment to East Asia and the Pacific after the 1995-96 confrontation with China. After all 
American resolve had been challenged and their willingness to defend an ally tested. 
Looking at the numbers we can see that from September 1995 to September 1996 the 
number of American troops in the region rises from 132 987 to 136 888. While this is an 
increase of almost 4000 men, the increase should be explainable by looking at the extraordinary 
measures the U.S. took in order to guard against Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the Crew 
of a single Nimitz class carrier alone constitutes more than 5000 troops for example (Americas 
Navy Fact File, 2012). At any rate, the increase in troops did not turn out to be permanent and 
a year later, in 1997, troop levels had fallen below those of 1995 down to 130 631 deployed 
personnel.  
The NSS reports for the years following the Taiwan Crises does not differ a lot from 
those of the earlier Clinton administration either. One does get the feeling that there exists a 
certain amount of urgency with regards to integrating China into the world order as a 
responsible power. However very little actually portrays China as a potential threat:  
“An overarching U.S. interest is China's emergence as a stable, open, secure and peaceful state. 
The prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China's role as a responsible 
member of the international community. China's integration into the international system of 
rules and norms will influence its own political and economic development, as well as its 
relations with the rest of the world”. (NSS Report, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 1997 stresses the importance of 
maintaining American military supremacy and mentions as a threat potential great powers that 
are currently engaged in modernizing their forces (QDR, 1997). At the time this review was 
written China was the only potential challenger that was busy modernizing its forces to any 
great extent. The QDR also states that even if the state department saw no reason to expect 
China to become a “peer competitor” before 2015, the country did have the potential to become 
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so at a later date. With this in mind, one can assume that China’s growth had started to weigh 
on the minds of the planners in Pentagon and the State Department. 
Looking at the numbers for the years 1997-2000 one finds that the overall number of 
troops deployed to East Asia, Hawaii and Guam increases quite a bit. From 130 631 in 
September 1997 to 138 643 in September 2000 (see figure 1.). This troop increase coincide 
with a greater urgency among the top leaders in Washington to come up with a strategy for 
containing China if that country were to gain the strength to challenge U.S. interests (Friedberg, 
2011:98). So despite attempts by President Clinton at emphasizing cooperation and partnership 
with the Chinese in the years following the Taiwan crisis (see for example: NSS, 1998), we also 
see an increase in American troops deployed to the East Asia region. Further one can see 
increasing American worry at the prospect of a strong and confident China among the top 
leaders in the State Department, the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies (Friedberg, 
2011:98-99).  
The year 2000 also saw the first annual report to Congress on the military power of the 
People’s Republic of China (Annual Report to congress, 2000). These reports were meant to 
keep a seemingly increasingly worried Congress up to date on the military developments of the 
People’s Liberation Army (Friedberg, 2011:97). Overall, one can witness an increasing 
American worry over Chinas growth at the turn of the millennium, this worry developed despite 
reports that concluded that China was still lagging far behind U.S. military might and would 
need decades to catch up with the Americans, and even more if China aimed at surpassing the 
United States (se for example: Ross, 2002). 
The increase in American focus on China is not surprising when one considers the 
Taiwan crisis in 95-96, but it also coincides with growing Chinese military might and spending. 
If one looks at the figures on military spending one will learn that from 1995 to 2000 the 
Chinese military budget increased by more than 50 percent, from $23b in 1995 to $37b only 
five years later (SIPRI, 2012). Even if American leaders were not going to admit it, they would 
almost certainly look upon such an increase in Chinese military spending with some worry. 
Even if the Americans believed that it would take 15 years before China could become a peer 
competitor in 1997 (QDR, 1997), the rise of peer competitor in 15 years’ time is still a source 
for worry. 
Alliance building and partners from 96-00 
This period saw an increase in American troop deployments to the region, but it also led to a 
strengthening of military ties between Taiwan and the United States. The crisis in 95-96 drove 
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the American and Taiwanese military closer together and signified a newfound cooperation 
between Taiwan and the U.S. In fact the American military and the Taiwanese armed forces 
were at the time of the crisis largely ignorant of each other’s operational procedures and the 
crises forced a quick change in American strategy (Chase, 2005:166). Contrary to separating 
Taiwan and the United States, China’s actions in 1995 seem to have brought them closer 
together and strengthened their alliance considerably. 
As to the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the “1997 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation” saw a strengthening of ties between the two countries. The 1997 guidelines seem 
to have been an attempt by the U.S. to counter the threats from both China and North Korea at 
the same time (Ajemian, 1998). They allowed the U.S. to count on Japanese help in the event 
of a war against China over Taiwan as well as in a potential conflict against North Korea. As 
such, this is a clear example of the Strengthening of U.S. alliances in the region after a period 
of confrontation with China, although it is perhaps worth mentioning that the NSS released in 
December 2000 stressed that the Guidelines were not meant to be directed against any one 
country. 
 
Figure 1. Source: DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics. 
2001-2004: The first George W. Bush administration  
Military deployments and U.S. diplomatic stance 
The first foreign crisis that George W. Bush experienced came when a Chinese fighter plane 
and an American reconnaissance plane collided of the coast of China in April 2001. The 
Chinese pilot died in the collision and the American plane was forced to land at a Chinese 
airport (Cohen, 2010:267). The incident provoked Chinese anger and calls for an American 
apology. In the end, Bush expressed regret for the loss of the Chinese pilot and the fact that the 
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American plane had landed without obtaining permission from China. The Chinese accepted 
this statement and American and Chinese relations normalized for the time being. The incident 
seems to have been an awakening for Bush who had earlier promised to be tougher on China 
than his predecessor were (Ibid: 266). In the face of an assertive China Bush had been forced 
to compromise.  
The Clinton administration’s newfound worry over the increasing Chinese strength 
seems to have continued into the early days of the George W. Bush administration. In the QDR 
for 2001 it is stated that there is a chance that a military competitor may arise in Asia, this 
combined with the lack of American bases in East Asia, as well as the distances involved in 
that region makes it, according to the review, more difficult for American forces to ensure 
access to this vital region. “This places a premium on securing additional access and 
infrastructure agreements and on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great 
distances with minimal theater-based support” (QDR, 2001:4).  
The QDR for 2001 also saw the first instance of a broad American strategy for realigning 
the U.S. armed forces to new threats around the world. Included in this realignment were plans 
to increase the U.S. Navy presence in the Western Pacific through the deployment of carrier 
battle groups as well as other assets, the U.S. Air Force was asked to ensure the logistic 
capabilities necessary for carrying out operations in the Western Pacific. Further, the feasibility 
of conducting training exercises for the U.S. Marine Corps in the Western Pacific was to be 
explored.  
Despite these stated goals the American troop levels in the Western Pacific, on Guam 
and Hawaii dropped by more than 9000 troops from 138 643 in September 2000 to 129 314 
September 2001. Nevertheless, by 2002 the numbers had increased again and were now at 
134 142. In fact, the troop levels to the region were to flux quite a bit for the entirety of the first 
W. Bush administration. In September 2003, at 137 358 troops, they were almost back to the 
September 2000 levels. However, American troop strength dropped markedly in 2004 down to 
128 128 and even more severely in 2005. As George W. Bush began his second term in office 
in 2005, the number of troops deployed to the region had fallen to 114 501, clearly the U.S. did 
not consider China to be a primary concern at the time. 
Overall, the foreign policy direction of the first W. Bush administration was influenced 
heavily by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade center and Pentagon in 2001 and the “War 
on Terror”, and as a result the Middle East, quickly took center stage (Cohen, 2005). The 
National Security Report for 2002 spoke, not surprisingly, at length about the importance of 
combating terrorism and extremists.  
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As with regards to China, some worry was expressed in the NSS report over continuing 
Chinese military modernization, and the Administration warned the Chinese about following 
this path. However, the importance of cooperation against extremists and stopping the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction seems to have taken precedence over any threat 
that China’s growth might constitute. In fact, the relationship between the two powers seems to 
have improved markedly in the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center. The 
Chinese were quick to offer their sympathy with the American people and aid in the War on 
Terror, at the same time the Americans agreed to consider the Chinese suppression of Muslims 
in the Xinjiang province as part of that same war (Cohen, 2010:269). 
With this in mind, it is interesting to see that during both the invasion of Afghanistan in 
2002 and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the number of troops deployed to the Pacific and 
East Asia was maintained at a considerable level. While there were some reductions, these were 
for the most part temporary and not until 2005 do we see a considerable reduction in the number 
of troops deployed to the Pacific and East Asia region.  
Alliances, change and consistency 
As for American alliance policy in the first W. Bush Administration, it followed the path of the 
later Clinton administration in attempting to reassure its old allies such as Japan, Australia and 
South Korea. Security cooperation between the United States and these nations was claimed to 
be the bedrock which the region’s stability rested upon (NSS, 2002:26). The report did however 
mention some changes that the administration would like to see. More specifically the report 
argues that the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea should be prepared for a larger role 
as a way of maintaining regional stability, rather than simply being used to ensure the good 
behavior of North Korea. 
Putting the traditional allies aside, the new direction American foreign policy seems to 
have taken with regards to India as a potential great power is of particular interests. Earlier 
reports from the Clinton days had focused upon the importance of maintaining peace between 
India and Pakistan and especially upon American worry over the considerable nuclear arsenals 
of the two countries. By 2002 however this stance seems to have shifted: 
The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based 
on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India… Differences remain, 
including over the development of India’s nuclear and missile programs, and the pace of India’s 
economic reforms. But while in the past these concerns may have dominated our thinking about 
India, today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have 
common strategic interests. (NSS, 2002). 
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While the report does not mention China as a reason for this newfound interest in India, one 
need only look at a map to see why a Pacific based power worried about Chinese growth would 
find an alliance with India to be of great importance (Friedberg, 2011: 108). India seems to have 
worries of its own when it comes to the increasing power of China and have taken some measure 
in order to balance out what they perceive to be a Chinese military advantage along their shared 
border (BBC, 2010a). As such, a closer relationship with the United States that force the 
Chinese into managing two fronts simultaneously makes good strategic sense for India as well.  
The election of George W. Bush to office also had consequences for the U.S. Taiwanese 
relationship. While greater defense cooperation started to take shape in the later Clinton years, 
the pace was picked up in the early months of the new W. Bush administration. Bush even 
stated in an interview that the United States would “do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend 
itself” (Quoted in: Chase, 2005: 168).  
According to Michael S. Chase, the U.S. was trying to striking a balance between selling 
and upgrading weapons for the Taiwanese and reassuring China. The Taiwanese for their part 
seems to value American weapons more as a symbol of American commitment to Taiwanese 
security than as a means for them to defend themselves. As such, before 1996 they were less 
concerned with the knowhow to use these weapons than the process of acquiring them (Chase, 
2005: 172). That aside it is clear that in the early days of the 21st century American and 
Taiwanese security cooperation kept advancing at a fast pace. The only logical explanation for 
this is the increasing threat that a powerful China represents to Taiwan, there are no other 
obvious factors that could have influenced Washington into taking this road.  
2005-2008: The second W. Bush administration 
Military deployments, diplomatic posture and U.S. focus 
As George W. Bush began his second term as President, the war in Iraq was turning into a 
quagmire and the war in Afghanistan was quickly getting out of hand. The administration 
struggled with mounting terrorist attacks against American forces abroad and a growing 
opposition to the war at home (Cohen, 2005: 160-163). Indeed, in the NSS report for 2006 the 
new security strategy is stated to be a war strategy and the “War on Terror” takes precedence 
over other problems and conflicts.  
Yet by 2005, the improvements in relations between the United States and China that 
followed the terrorist attacks on 9/11 seems to have abated somewhat. On a trip to China, the 
then U.S. foreign secretary Condoleezza Rice criticized the Chinese on their human rights 
record, and she would not offer any promises on Taiwan (Cohen, 2011: 273). The relationship 
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seems to have been further strained by the increasing discrepancy in the U.S.-China trade 
balance and Chinese unwillingness to take steps to safeguard intellectual property rights.  
In the reports to congress on Chinese military Power for 2005 and 2006 the Department 
of Defense expressed worry over the increasing military might of China, as well as over Chinese 
intentions with regards to Taiwan. The Chinese military seems to have focused a lot of attention 
on developing capabilities that could help them win a potential conflict with Taiwan and at the 
same time keep other powers from interfering. In particular, the implementation of modern 
missile systems and the ability to deny area access to other powers looks to be of paramount 
importance to the PLA. It was speculated that advances in Chinese missile technology could 
threaten even American carriers operating in the East Asia Theater of operations (Chase, 
Erickson &Yeaw, 2009). Further, improvements in the Chinese submarine force have led to at 
least one instance where a Chinese submarine was able to come within firing range of an 
American aircraft carrier (The Washington Times, 2006).  The report to congress for 2006 
focuses heavily on this military buildup and asks the questions: “Why this growing investment? 
Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust 
deployments?” (Annual Report to Congress, 2006: I).  
The QDR from 2006 is equally skeptical to Chinese military modernization and argued 
that improved Chinese military capabilities as well as the huge distances involved in any 
conflict with the Chinese could place U.S. forces at a disadvantage. The answer to these 
problems says the QDR, is to focus on cooperation with allies and to strive to maintain U.S. air 
superiority, improve cyber defense and secure the ability to strike fast and overwhelming 
against any aggressor through both naval and air power (QDR, 2006: 30-31). Despite these 
goals and the worries expressed over China’s military buildup, the focus of the QDR was still 
on how to combat terrorists and insurgents. As a consequence, improving the operational 
capabilities of American special forces, rather than other capabilities that could allow the U.S. 
to easier win a great power conflict, took precedence (Ibid.).  
I mentioned earlier that from 1995 to 2000 China’s defense budget increased by more 
than 50 percent and that this could help explain the buildup of American forces in the pacific 
during those years. In the period from 2000 to 2005 the estimated figures for Chinese defense 
spending kept increasing and almost doubled, from 32.1 billion US$ in 2000 to 62.1 billion in 
2005. It is clear from both the 2006 report to congress and the Quadrennial Defense Review for 
that same year that this development worried the American defense department. The lack of 
transparency in China’s military buildup was considered to be another serious issue by top U.S. 
officials and military commanders in 2006, and one which it were feared could lead to 
44 
 
misunderstandings and potential conflicts (Bloomberg, 2006). Nevertheless, by 2005 the 
American troop deployments to the Asia-Pacific region, at 114 501, were smaller than they had 
ever been since the end of the Cold War.    
This development continued in the following years with the number of deployed 
personnel in the East Asia/Pacific region falling steadily. By 2006 the number was 112 331, by 
2007 110 387 and by the election year 2008 the number of U.S. troops in the region had declined 
to 109 724. Put in perspective, the number of American forces deployed in this region declined 
with 28 919 troops during the Presidency of George W. Bush. At the same time Chinese defense 
spending kept increasing at a prodigious rate, up from 37.1 billion US$ in 2000 to 106.7 billion 
in 2008 (Sipri: 2012). This increase in spending continued to worry decision makers in 
Washington and the Pentagon as well as independent analysts (se for example: Kaplan, 2005).  
Besides the danger of increasing Chinese military power, U.S. decision makers were 
also increasingly worried over Chinese espionage and intelligence gathering. The report to 
congress for 2008 stated for example that the FBI and other law enforcements agencies 
considered China to be a leading espionage threat to the United States. The report also expressed 
worry over growing Chinese nationalism and the potential for unrest and foreign conflict this 
entail (For an insight on the effect of nationalism on Chinese military buildup see: Ross, 2009). 
It is also worth to mention that American planners seems to suspect that the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) was seeking the ability to deny access to enemy forces in as far away 
waters as Guam, or what the Chinese call “the second island chain” (Annual Report to 
Congress, 2008:23). If the Chinese were to develop these capabilities, they could potentially 
deny the U.S. Navy the ability to operate carrier air-groups in parts of the Western Pacific 
Ocean. 
Despite of these worries we see that the number of American military personnel 
deployed in the region kept decreasing (see figure 2.) At the same time, as stated in the QDR 
for 2006, there seems to have been a shift of strategy within the American military. The focus 
of American military doctrine in 2008 had moved even further in the direction of smaller but 
more mobile and formidable forces. Some have also argued that despite of Chinese naval 
modernizations, the United States did not need to start a new arms race in order to stay ahead 
of the PLA. It would simply be enough to continue with the current plans for modernization 
and deployment (Ross, 2009).  
Nevertheless, the ability to maintain military superiority in every scenario remained an 
important goal for the U.S. armed forces, and this led to a considerable realignment of U.S. 
forces in the Western-Pacific (Halloran, 2007). The idea was that in the years following 2007 
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the Americans would have fewer boots on the ground overall as the army withdrew some 
combat units from South Korea and Japan, in favor of the U.S. base at Guam. At the same time, 
Washington planned to improve air and naval capabilities in the region, with long time plans 
stretching to 2017. As a consequence, the U.S. Air Force and Navy started to deploy more and 
improved units to the Western Pacific during the second Bush administration. The number of 
aircraft carriers deployed in the Pacific and on the eastern-coast of the United States increased 
from five to six. The Navy also planned to improve on missile defenses in the region as a 
response to the increased proliferation of missiles, and especially Chines anti-ship missiles 
being deployed to East Asia (Ibid.).  
The Air Force for their part had started to deploy more modern fighter jets such as the 
F-22 to Japan and Guam as well as B-2 bombers to Guam. Both the F-22 and the B-2 are stealth 
aircraft and represented a marked improvement over the aircraft already present in the Asia-
pacific region (Washington Post, 2008). As a consequence of the increased threat from missiles 
in East Asia the Air Force , like the U.S. Navy, took steps to improve upon the overall missile 
defense of the region, this was done in part to reassure allies like Japan and Taiwan (Halloran, 
2007). The general investments in missile defense was a notable characteristic of the Bush 
presidency since it required that the U.S. withdrew from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. 
The White House claimed that this shield was meant to defend the U.S. and her allies from 
“rogue states” like Iran and North Korea (NSS, 2006). Nevertheless, both China and Russia 
were quick to condemn the plans and claim that the defense would constitute a danger to the 
balance of power in certain regions of the world as such a shield could potentially be used to 
endanger the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrent (BBC, 2008). 
While American officials are quick to dismiss the idea that they are trying to contain 
China’s rise, it is still clear that the Pentagon considered China to be potentially dangerous 
adversary in 2008 (Halloran, 2008), and this seems to have prompted the changes that one could 
see in American military strategy in the western pacific during the last Bush administration. 
The final National Defense Strategy paper of the Bush administration devotes quite some space 
to the potential threat from China and states that:  
“China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the 
foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing military modernization and 
the impact of its strategic choices upon international security…The objective of this effort is to 
mitigate near term challenges while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over 
time.” (NDS, 2008: 3). 
Besides the general challenge that a rising great power presents the NDS states that China in 
particular are developing capabilities specifically to mitigate the American advantage in 
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communications technology and the command and control aspect of modern warfare (Ibid:22), 
a trend that clearly worried planners in Washington. As the second period of President George 
W. Bush came to an end, one could observe a greater emphasis on the security problems that 
China poses to the U.S. than was present in 2001 as Bush took office.  
 
Figure 2. Source: DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics. 
Alliance policy in East Asia 05-08. 
The alliance policy that began with the first Bush administration was continued in the second 
term as well, and the support to traditional allies such as South Korea, Japan and Australia was 
maintained. As noted earlier the implementation of an American missile defense system in East 
Asia was something that both Taiwan and Japan clearly wanted to see. The Japanese seems to 
have been worried by the North Korean nuclear weapons program and the Taiwanese were as 
always worried about Chinese military buildup (Halloran, 2007).  
The relationship with India was also further improved upon as the United States became 
willing to help that country advance their civilian nuclear energy program and started to view 
India as a friendly rising power rather than a country locked in conflict with Pakistan (Blackwill, 
2005). In fact, the policy of engaging with India was given even more attention during the 
second Bush presidency and it proceeded even more rapidly than it had in the first period. 
Former American Ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill claims that reason behind this 
increase in pace lay with the many foreign problems that the first administration faced, as well 
as certain inertia among the foreign policy bureaucracy which had to be convinced into seeing 
India as a major partner rather than as a nuclear proliferation problem (Ibid.). By 2005 however, 
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these hurdles seems to have been overcome and the bilateral cooperation between the two 
countries proceeded at an even faster pace (Friedberg, 2011).  
Looking at South Korea, the number of U.S. troops in that country had been dropping 
for some time since 2004. However, in 2008 president Bush stated that the U.S. would once 
again increase their presence in South Korea to 28,500 troops and that this was the troop level 
that the United States would seek to maintain in the future (Korea Times, 2008). 
The White House was also hard at work trying to ferment greater multilateral 
cooperation between their allies in East Asia in the period. In 2007 the United States, India, 
Japan and Australia began the first naval exercises of the Quadrilateral Initiative, a strategic 
partnership that seems to have been formed as a counter to growing Chinese power (BBC, 
2007). Both Australia and Japan have expressed worry over China’s increasing power and 
according to Blackwill, the Indians have long been looking at China as a strategic competitor 
(Blackwill, 2005). This worry seems to have found an outlet in more frequent military exercises 
and closer strategic relationships between the U.S., India, Australia and Japan. In short then, as 
Chinese power kept increasing during the final term of George W. Bush, America strengthened 
its ties with natural allies like India and worked hard to implement greater security cooperation 
between the democratic countries in East Asia and the Western Pacific region. 
2009- 2013: The first Obama period 
Military deployments, diplomatic posture and new weapons programs 
President Barack Obama rode to the White House on a wave of public optimism during the 
election of 2008. The campaign message of the new President was very simply “Change”, but 
it seemed to be broadly appealing to an American public in the middle of a financial crisis and 
tired of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the 2008 campaign in general focused on the 
state of the American economy and the importance of creating jobs for the average American, 
Obama still promised changes on the foreign policy front as well. Concerning China, the 
president claimed that he would like to see the two countries work together on common interests 
like the climate issue (Obama, 2008). In general, the tone of the Obama campaign’s foreign 
policy was one of dialogue rather than confrontation and cooperation rather than conflict. In 
fact the Obama policy was claimed to be more realist in certain aspects than the one followed 
by Bush (The economist, 2009a). Still, the focus of the campaign was mostly on economic 
issues rather than foreign policy ones. 
Nevertheless, just a few months after Obama took office, the Sino-American 
relationship once again drew headlines (The Economist, 2009b). The situation in question was 
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in many ways similar to the one who confronted George W. Bush when he first took office in 
2001. An American survey ship operating in international waters was harassed by Chinese 
patrol boats who claimed the Americans were spying on Chinese submarines. The American 
ship eventually left the area after some time. During and following the confrontation both 
Chinese and American officials accused each other of breaking international law with one 
Chinese admiral likening the American navy to a criminal who was “wandering around just 
outside gate of a family home” (Ibid.). 
Despite an outspoken policy of change then, it would seem that Obama was faced with 
the same problems his predecessor had in the face of a growing China. China had, as we have 
seen, also grown stronger since the first Bush administration; as such, a realist foreign policy 
would be expected to attempt to improve upon American military capabilities in the face of a 
stronger China and continue the process of strengthening alliances and partnerships in the East 
Asia region. One final point should be made, in the campaign year of 2008 the seriousness of 
the global financial crisis became clear, and as a consequence the Chinese started to argue that 
America was now declining at an even faster rate than they had earlier believed to be possible. 
Following this argument, many Chinese now claimed that the world was turning more 
multipolar and they expected that other powers would take a more central role on the world 
stage (Friedberg, 2011:131). Statements like these do not normally go down well with 
American leaders (or Americans in general for that matter) and increasing Chinese self-
confidence could be expected to lead to increasing American worries over China’s rise.  
The early months of the Obama administration followed the recipe of the campaign and 
saw the US strike up a more cordial tone with several foreign powers, and among them the 
Chinese. This was quite contrary to the early administrations of Clinton and Bush who both 
came to office with a promise of a tougher stance on China (Ibid: 122). In contrast, Obama’s 
then foreign secretary, Hillary Clinton, stated in remarks given at the Asia Society in New York 
in 2009, that the Obama administration did not look upon China as an adversary but rather as a 
future and necessary partner. To quote Clinton: 
“Now, some believe that China on the rise is, by definition, an adversary. To the contrary, we 
believe that the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other’s 
successes. It is in our interest to work harder to build on areas of common concern and shared 
opportunities… And our two countries, I’m happy to say, will resume mid-level military-to-
military discussions later this month…Even with our differences, the United States will remain 
committed to pursuing a positive relationship with China, one that we believe is essential to 
America’s future peace, progress, and prosperity.” (Clinton, 2009). 
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The early Obama administration seemed determined to turn the foreign policy of President Bush 
around, at least in the first months after it took office. Clinton also stated that the new 
administration would not let disagreements over human rights issue stand in the way of 
improvements in U.S. and China relations. Some officials even suggested that a G2 group 
consisting of the U.S. and China should be created, although this scheme was later abandoned 
due to lack of Chinese enthusiasm for the idea (Friedberg, 2011: 113).  
Looking at actual security policy for the period, we see that Obama was occupied with 
the war in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency had gotten progressively worse during the later 
Bush administration even as the situation in Iraq started to stabilize. As a consequence the war 
in Afghanistan was the foreign problem that would receive the most attention from the new 
administration in Washington (Woodward, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the Pacific and East Asia regions did get some serious attention from the 
Obama administration from the very start. Hillary Clinton made her first trip as foreign 
secretary to Asia and the so called “Pivot to Asia” in 2012 saw a major shift in American foreign 
policy where the old world and Europe became less significant and Asia was prioritized 
(Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). In its first National Security Strategy (2010) the new 
administration stressed the importance of other regions of the world besides the Middle East, 
even as the war in Iraq was ebbing out and the war in Afghanistan took center stage. However, 
in a move that mirrors that of the President Clinton, Obama argued that the foundation of 
American strength depended on a strong and healthy national economy. Rebuilding American 
economic prosperity was to be a central goal in Washington’s new security strategy; this is 
perhaps not surprising considering the severity of the 2008 global financial crisis. Looking at 
the statements concerning China we find that they are by and large in the same vein as those 
one could observe coming from the Bush administration. China is emphasized as an important 
player on the world stage, and it is stated that while the two countries may differ on some issues 
a “positive” and “constructive relationship” is what the U.S. is aiming for. The White House 
also states that the new administration will work to see the amount of distrust between the two 
powers reduced.  
This is, as one could expect, all very diplomatic, however when one considers the actual 
outline of American defense strategy, we see that the Obama administration expected the 
Pentagon to be “preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating 
aggression in anti-access environments” (NSS, 2010). At the time the NSS for 2010 was 
written, China was the only potential adversary of the United States that was developing major 
area-denial and anti-access capabilities (Halloran, 2010). Further, the importance of cyber 
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security was mentioned specifically in the  NSS and the QDR for 2010, even as the competition 
between the U.S. and China in this particular area grew stronger and more tense (for an 
overview of issues related to increasing cyber security competition se for example: Rothkoph, 
2013).  
While cooperation and partnership is emphasized in the NSS for 2010, we can still see 
an administration that are aware of the potential threat that China was said to pose to U.S. 
interests and who focused part of its security strategy on meeting and countering Chinese 
military advances and buildup. In 2010 it also became clear that the U.S. would continue to sell 
defensive weapons to Taiwan, and Hillary Clinton started criticizing Chinese human rights 
records (Friedberg, 2011: 114).   
As for troop numbers present in the Pacific East Asia region, they started to increase 
during the first year of the Obama administration. In 2009 the amount of U.S. military personnel 
went up from 109 724 in September 2008 to 114 141 in September 20092. The increase 
continued somewhat in 2010 with troop numbers hitting 114 221. However, from 2010 and 
onwards the American presence in the region increased considerably. Looking at the 
deployment level for 2011 we can see that in the space of only one year the American presence 
increased by more than 16 000 troops, putting the combined forces present in East Asia, on 
Guam and Hawaii at 130 709. As of December 2012 this number had increased further, 137 
413 American troops were now present in this important region. In 2011 Obama also declared 
that 2 500 U.S. Marines were to be stationed in Australia in the following years and he further 
stated that the expected budget cuts within the armed forces would not “come at the expense of 
the Pacific” (New York Times, 2011). If we add these marines (which are not included in my 
current figures) to the other U.S. forces in the region we reach a number of 139 913 in 2012, up 
25 629 from 2010. Clearly, a considerable buildup of American armed forces in the Western 
Pacific. A second thing to consider is that this buildup came even as the Pentagon was facing 
serious budget cuts. In fact, while the Americans increased their presence in East Asia, they 
reduced some assets in other parts of the world. In Europe the planned missile defense system 
was put on hold because of budget issues and the Navy reduced their carrier presence in the 
Persian Gulf from two to a single aircraft carrier (BBC, 2013), (Seattle Times, 2013).   
                                                          
2 Note that from 2009 and onwards the DoD statistics does not include the number of troops deployed to the Republic of Korea. As such, I have been forced to use 
the number of U.S. troops deployed to South Korea for September 2009 stated in the 2010 Department of Defense Base Structure Report, and then added them to 
the numbers from the DoD statistics. By 2010 I expect the troop levels to have reached 28 500 personnel, which is what the U.S. has stated that it wishes to maintain 
in South Korea. There are some indications that the number of U.S. troops are even higher (see the Department of Defense Base Structure Report for 2011 and for 
2012, which gives even higher troop numbers for 2010 and 2011 respectively) however, I will keep to the official figure of 28 500 for 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
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Of further interest is the fact that the number of troops deployed to Guam and Hawaii 
had grown considerably during Obama’s first term in office. From 40 912 in 2008 to 54 888 in 
2012. As noted earlier, the Pentagon had begun a process in the second Bush administration 
which was meant to redeploy American forces from bases in Japan and Korea to these 
strategically important islands. This process seems to have picked up the pace as Obama took 
office and especially after the President launched his “Pivot to Asia” strategy in 2012 (Kan, 
2012).  
The base on Guam was particular important, due to its role as the new backbone of 
American security policy in the Western Pacific, and as a consequence the Change of strategy 
can most easily be detected here (Washington Post, 2008). On the American sovereign territory 
of Guam U.S. forces would be free to develop their capabilities as they saw fit (Kan, 2012). 
This stood in contrast to bases located in other countries such as Okinawa in Japan. Here 
opposition to the American presence among the local populace had already created problems 
for the United States (BBC, 2010b). There would be no such troubles on Guam. In short, Guam 
had the potential to fulfill the needs of U.S. forces in the region better than other locations closer 
to the Asian mainland had. In 2008, then defense secretary Robert Gates put it like this when 
he was asked about the buildup on Guam: 
“All in all, it will be one of the largest movements of military assets in decades and continue the 
historic mission of the United States military presence on Guam: to serve as the nation’s first 
line of defense and to maintain a robust military presence in a critical part of the world,” (Quoted 
in: Miles, 2008). 
The buildup on Guam as well as the strengthening of ties with traditional allies such as Japan 
and Australia was all meant to increase American military capability in the region, and at the 
same time make U.S. strategic assets more secure in the face of Chinese military buildup and 
increasing Chinese military capabilities (Kan, 2012). Further, it has been claimed that a strong 
American stance on Guam was meant to signal to the Chinese that the Americans refuse to let 
the Chinese push them out of South East Asia, and that they intend to maintain their presence 
in the region even in the face of growing Chinese missile threat and anti-access/area-denial 
capabilities (Halloran, 2011). In fact, while North Korea has long been stated to be the main 
antagonist of the U.S. in the region, the primary focus of the United States was said to have 
shifted towards China by 2011 (Ibid:47).   
2010 seems to have been a turning point for Obama’s China policy. As mentioned the 
number of American troops in the East Asia/Pacific started to increase quite dramatically after 
2010 and this year was also the year that the first Quadrennial Strategic Review of the new 
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administration was presented. This particular review has some interesting parts about American 
China policy, more precisely the new strategic concept called “AirSea Battle” (QDR, 2010). In 
short, the concept was to be developed by the Navy and Airforce in concert and allow the two 
military branches to work closer together and to complement each other’s strengths. AirSea 
Battle is meant to give the U.S. armed forces the tools “for defeating adversaries across the 
range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and 
area denial capabilities.” (QDR, 2010:32).  
While not overtly directed towards China, a report made by the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) on the AirSea Battle concept does identify the PRC as the main 
reason why such a concept is thought to be needed. In their introduction it is stated that: 
“The US military today faces an emerging major operational challenge, particularly in the 
Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO). The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA) ongoing efforts to field robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are 
threatening to make US power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts, 
prohibitively costly. If this occurs, the United States will find itself effectively locked out of a 
region that has been declared a vital security interest by every administration in the last sixty 
years” (van Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich & Thomas, 2010:VIIII). 
The report further states that Chinese power could be used to intimidate U.S. allies and that the 
American military’s ability to operate freely in the Western Pacific is of vital interest to the 
U.S. The new concept is meant to help maintain that ability, even as Chinese military power 
increases and their ability to deny other states access to this region improves.  
While the CSBA is independent of the U.S. government and its views do not necessarily 
reflect that of American politicians, it is still worth noting that the strategic “experts” in 
Washington had begun to view China as such a threat. (For an overview of the challenges that 
China is thought to pose to United States se for example: Denmark and Mulvanon, 2010). 
Reading through the 2010 QDR it seems that the American Department of Defense mirrors 
these views as well; after all, there would be very little reason to start the development of the 
AirSea Battle concept unless one shared the view that China’s rise was cause for considerable 
worry. Considering that the only other threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific region is 
North Korea, which does not seem to have the capability to challenge the U.S. and its allies on 
the Korean peninsula let alone in the pacific, it follows that China is the likely target for this 
new strategic concept that is being developed by the DoD.  
The concept of Air-Sea battle also fits in with the American redeployment to Guam and 
the new emphasis on Naval and Air power at the expense of the army in East Asia, which one 
could witness during the last Bush administration. The 2010 QDR also called for the 
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strengthening of the resilience of forward deployed personnel and capabilities, and while one 
big base on Guam might be more vulnerable to attacks than more dispersed forces (Kan, 2012), 
its relative distance from the Asian mainland would give the Americans better time to prepare 
for any potential attack. In Sum, Guam seems to have been deemed more than suitable to be the 
lynchpin for American power in the region (Ibid.). 
In order to maintain American military dominance the QDR directed the Department of 
Defense to improve American capabilities in several ways beside AirSea Battle, these were: 
 Expand future long-range strike capabilities; 
 Exploit advantages in subsurface operations; 
 Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure; 
 Assure access to space and the use of space assets; 
 Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities; 
 Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and 
 Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad. (QDR, 2010:XI). 
All of these improvements and especially improved long-range capabilities, access to space and 
ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) are assets which could prove vital in any 
confrontation with the Chinese which the Americans may find themselves in. Further, it is made 
clear in the report that the ability to defend Navy ships, bases and military aircraft against 
increasingly sophisticated missiles, as well as the ability to penetrate areas where the opponent 
retains significant anti-access capabilities, is a priority.  
While better cooperation between the Navy and the Airforce was explored in the AirSea 
Battle concept, the pentagon seems also to have felt the need for a conventional strategic 
missile, which could hit targets that would otherwise be out of reach. This need has led to the 
development of the Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept, which, while 
ostensibly not aimed at either China or Russia, nevertheless has sparked serious worries in both 
countries (Bunn & Menzo, 2011). A conventional missile that could reach hard to get at targets 
would also be a great strategic asset in a potential great power conflict as it could be used to 
take out parts of the enemy’s nuclear arsenal. Even if the original purpose was to give the 
Americans the ability to strike at hard to reach terrorist bases this assets could easily be used in 
other situations (Ibid). As of 2013 Chinese fears over this program seems to have increased 
further as the CPGS program began to test various missile types and American planning started 
to include CPGS as a possible response to a potential Chinese attack against strategic assets like 
American satellites (Richardson, 2013). 
It is also worth mentioning that as of 2013 it has become clear that the American focus 
on cyberspace has grown in recent years. Even as the United States complains about Chinese 
cyber-attacks against them, they are developing their own considerable capabilities in this 
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particular area (Aid, 2013). In the words of an intelligence source with extensive knowledge 
about the National Security Agency: “We hack everyone, everywhere” (the Guardian, 2013). 
In the face of a number of Chinese computer attacks this American focus on cyber-warfare is 
to be expected, but it does suggest that the Americans are actively working to counter the 
Chinese in at least one strategic area.  
While it is stated early in the 2010 QDR that this is a wartime defense review and that 
defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda remains the priority of the United States, the overall 
impression that the document gives is that the priorities had shifted somewhat since the Bush 
administration. A much stronger focus on the roles of the Navy, Airforce, command and control 
concepts and cyber security as well as less attention given to the special forces all suggests that 
the current questions occupying the minds of American leaders are more about how to defeat a 
powerful conventional enemy than the asymmetric forces of terrorists and political extremists. 
The development of new strategic concepts, the “Pivot to Asia” and the strength buildup on 
Guam all seems to suggest that American priorities had shifted in the few years since Obama 
took office.  
This shift corresponded with what seems to be a more assertive stance from China as 
many Chinese now feels that “the time is right for a more active assertion of Chinese interests 
and ideas” (Breslin, 2013:616). The Chinese also continued to increase their military spending 
in the period, up from 106.7 billion US$ in 2008 to 157.6 billion in 2012 (Sipri, 2012). Although 
some claim this assertiveness is far from new and that the Chinese have been willing to fight 
for their core interests for quite some time (Johnston, 2013; Fravel, 2005). Nevertheless there 
seems to be a strong and somewhat growing distrust between the leaders of the two countries. 
For the Americans this distrust is claimed to stem at least partly from Chinese military buildup 
and growing assertiveness on the international stage (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012).  
Indeed looking at the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidelines for 2012 one can observe that 
China is mentioned together with Iran as a state that pursues anti-access capabilities that could 
be a threat to American interests and ability to influence. The development of American 
capabilities to counter Chinese anti-access weapons seems to have been a running theme in U.S. 
security policy during the first Obama administration. Further, grouping China with Iran shows 
that American decision makers were really waking up to how potentially detrimental to 
American influence and interests the Chinese military buildup have the potential to be. Reading 
through the reports to congress starting in 2000 and ending with the report for 2013, one can 
see that the worry expressed over China’s military capabilities are rising in the U.S. department 
of defense. This fits with the increasing attention that the U.S. is giving East Asia as a whole 
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and the development that we have seen of capabilities that could counter increasing Chinese 
military power. That said lets now take a look at the alliance policy of the United States during 
the Obama Presidency. 
 
Figur 3. Source: DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics; DoD Base Structure Report, 2010. 
Alliance policy in East Asia during the first Obama presidency 
The American Defense Strategic Guidelines for 2012 stress the importance of strong partners 
in the East and South-East Asia regions even as the Americans withdraw some of their focus 
from Europe. The guidelines also express the wish for a policy that maintains the current U.S. 
alliances in Asia and attempts to create new strong partnerships among other nations in the 
region. For the most part this policy continued on the road laid down during the later Bush 
administration, although some worry did surface over the future Indo-U.S. relationship early in 
2009. 
In the early days of the Obama administration there seems to have been some concern 
among experts that the U.S.-India relationship might suffer. This worry arose as a consequence 
of President Obama’s though stance on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the 
new administrations seemingly friendlier stance towards China (Friedberg, 2011: 205). As of 
2010 however, these worries seems to have disappeared as the U.S. and India reiterated their 
wishes for a closer relationship. During a visit in 2010 Obama also endorsed India in their bid 
for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in a move that was seen as a way of countering 
the growing influence of China (New York Times, 2010a).  
Even as the relationship with India was further strengthened, the U.S. continued to focus 
on their traditional allies in East Asia. As mentioned above Obama decided in 2011 to begin 
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the regular deployment of 2500 U.S. marines to Australia in a bid to reassure the Australians 
about American commitment to their alliance (New York Times, 2011). The Australians had 
begun to worry about growing Chinese influence and a strong reassuring stance from the 
Americans seemed to be necessary (Friedberg, 2011). Further North the Americans removed 
some of their troops from Japanese bases and South Korea in order to redeploy these to Hawaii 
and Guam. At the same time, the U.S. government reiterated their commitment to the defense 
of South Korea. First and foremost this was meant as a deterrent against North Korean 
aggression against the South. Still, the Joint Communique that followed a meeting between then 
U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates and South Korean defense minister Kim, Tae Young in 
2010, also stressed that the defense relationship between the two nations was evolving into a 
full alliance with a goal of ensuring greater regional security as well as global aspirations (U.S.- 
ROK. Joint Communique, 2010).  
With regards to Japan, the strong alliance between it and the U.S. seemed to be 
weakening at the start of the Obama administration. The election of the Democratic Party of 
Japan to office in 2009, and their wish for a stronger Sino-Japanese relationship seems to have 
sparked some worries in Washington (Friedberg, 2011: 210-211). By 2010 however, these fears 
had been eased somewhat, and as of 2013 the continuing dispute between Japan and China over 
the Senkuku islands seems to have driven the Japanese further into American arms. This dispute 
had grown considerably in the years since Obama took office and does not seem to be solvable 
anytime soon and constitutes a potential security risk comparable to that of Taiwan. However 
as long as the Chinese maintain their demands for territorial sovereignty over the Islands, the 
Japanese seems likely to continue to depend on a strong alliance with the U.S. 
Increasing Chinese assertiveness has also had an effect on American alliance policy in 
other parts of the East Asian Theater. At the beginning of the 1990s the traditional American 
alliances with the Philippines and Thailand were unraveling to some extent and both countries 
started to develop closer economic and even to some extent military ties to China (Ibid: 206). 
However as Chinese aspirations in the South China Sea has started to encroach upon territory 
claimed by the Philippines, the Americans are once again considered to be important partners 
to the Philippine government (Ibid: 207; BBC, 2011a). The Americans for their part has stated 
that they want to see a peaceful settlement to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and 
have voiced that they would like to contribute to this diplomatic settlement (BBC, 2011a). 
These statements seems to have gone some way to reassure the smaller countries involved in 
the dispute and has certainly ruffled some feathers in Beijing as the Chinese strongly object to 
the idea of any form of American involvement in what they claim is a purely Asian issue. 
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Further, American joint military exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam has drawn 
criticism from the Chinese, even as the Americans stated that they would continue countries it 
considered to be allies, and that these exercises would go on (BBC, 2011b).  
As we can observe, the alliance policy of the Americans in East Asia remained relatively 
fixed during the first and beginning of the second Obama administrations. The Americans 
remains committed to the region and pursue strong partnerships with several countries as a 
consequence of this commitment. While little can be directly attributed to the growth in Chinese 
power and capabilities, it seems clear that both the U.S. and its partner nations watch this growth 
with some worry. India, Australia and Japan have all voiced their concern over Chinese 
aspirations to become a Great Power, and Taiwan, the Philippines and other nations around the 
South China Sea have already experienced the consequences of growing Chinese assertiveness. 
In this environment it should be relatively easy for the Americans to follow realist expectations 
and maintain and create strong alliances dedicated to preserving the status quo.  
Looking at the actual foreign policy that is being pursued this seems to fit rather well 
with the realist expectations. The Americans are engaging with countries all around China’s 
borders and disagreements with both India and the Japanese over issues such as American 
military bases and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons seems to have been put on hold as 
China’s strength has grown.  
In short, while very little of U.S. policy is said to stem from a desire to contain China’s 
rise as a global power, American decision makers have been focusing on creating the sort of 
strong bounds with strategically important nations that offensive realists would expect them to 
do. Growing and strengthening U.S. relationships with countries that surround China in Asia. 
In fact, the Chinese seems to be acutely aware of the fact that they might very well soon be 
surrounded at sea by a collection of American allies and partners. Consequently, they are even 
now looking at ways to ensure that vital supplies to China such as oil from the Middle East gets 
through in the case of a conflict (Pherson, 2006).  
Despite of some American foreign policy decisions that look to be realist in nature, one 
must keep in mind that the growing attention the Americans are giving to this region also could 
reflect the fact that Asia is becoming increasingly important to the American economy.  
In the next section I will examine this closer as I move on to testing for the Preference 
Based Liberal theory of Andrew Moravcsik that focuses upon the interests and wishes of the 
elites as vital for the foreign policy direction, rather than the structural explanations of 
Offensive Realist theory. 
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Mapping the evidence for a Liberal American foreign policy 
1992-1996: The first Clinton period  
As I wrote in the theory chapter, the variables that I consider to be of importance when testing 
for a liberal foreign policy are first, the presence of bilateral diplomatic cooperation and 
American support for Chinese integration into international institutions, and second, the U.S. 
bilateral trade with China. These will be mapped in the following section and this mapping will 
form the basis for the later analysis. 
Economic growth and cooperation 
As mentioned above, Bill Clinton came into office during the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square incident. The impact this violent crackdown on the student protesters had on the 
American opinion towards China was considerable. Indeed Clinton stated in his presidential 
campaign that he would take a tougher stance against the “Butchers of Beijing” than his 
opponent George Bush had done (Cohen, 2005). Central to this tougher stance was the 
renouncement of China’s Most Favored Nation status (MFN), a status that gave the Chinese 
considerable advantages when trading with the United States. This status had been granted 
China since 1980 but had to be renewed by the U.S. every year due to the nature of China’s 
political system. In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Democratic 
Party representatives in congress had wanted President Bush to revoke this status; something 
the President was reluctant to do (Cohen, 2011: 243-244). Clinton had promised to hold the 
Chinese accountable for their transgressions against human rights, and several democrats now 
felt that the time was right to do exactly that (Cohen, 2005:81).  
However, the new president had also based his campaign on the promise of 
strengthening the flagging American economy and removing MFN from China could push the 
two countries into a trade war which would be hurtful to American business as well as the 
Chinese. Having to choose between the demands from human rights activists to punish China 
and the worries of the American business elite, Clinton chose to maintain Chinese MFN for the 
time being. Several major American corporations with interests in China lobbied for quite a 
while in order to ensure that U.S. foreign policy wouldn’t hurt their businesses (Ibid: 82). Indeed 
as the Clinton administration settled in, issues concerning the licensing of technology sales to 
China were moved from the Defense and State departments to Commerce. In the words of 
Warren I. Cohen, in the new administration “Commercial rather than political and military 
considerations would be privileged” (ibid: 82). The National Security Strategy report for 1995 
supports the decision to remove the MFN status from the question of human rights by stating 
59 
 
that trade between the U.S. and China had grown significantly since that particular policy 
decision was made3 (NSS, 1995: 29). Being able to show actual economic gains achieved by 
pursuing a policy of cooperation must have given the adherents to this policy even greater 
influence in Washington and would probably have ramifications for the later foreign policy 
decisions of the Clinton administrations. It is worth noting though that while trade had indeed 
grown between the U.S. and China, most of that growth had come from American imports of 
Chinese goods, and the U.S. was now running a deficit in its trading relationship with the 
Chinese (United States Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2013).  
Working for a democratic change and the integration of China into the world order 
Besides the commercial considerations, there does seem to have existed among Clinton’s 
advisors a wish for more engagement with China on ideological grounds. The argument was 
the same as I mentioned in my theory section and rests on the notion that the U.S. could change 
China through cooperation and by integrating the Chinese into the current U.S. dominated 
world order. If American leaders through dialogue and cooperation could change the way the 
Chinese perceived their place in the world, and if the Chinese eventually started to implement 
democracy and liberal economic policies then there would be no need for conflict between the 
two countries. Liberals argued that this in turn would help stabilize the East Asia region and 
benefit all concerned as trade would increase and stability would reduce the costs of defense 
(Lieberthal, 1995). It was even expected that the Chinese eventually could help shore up the 
dominant world order and help maintain international law all over the globe as well as in Asia 
and the Pacific, thereby helping to serve American interests as well as their own (Ibid 
;Friedberg, 2011:91-92).  
Indeed, in 1994 the Clinton administration announced that it would pursue a policy of 
“comprehensive engagement” with China. More trade, more cooperation and more contacts 
were the watchwords of the day (Ibid, 2011: 92). Reading the National Security Strategy for 
1994, we find that cooperation with the Chinese and integrating them into a stabile world order 
took precedence over purely worries about growing Chinese power. To quote the document: 
“We are developing a broader engagement with the People's Republic of China that will 
encompass both our economic and strategic interests. That policy is best reflected in our decision 
to delink China's Most Favored Nation status from its record on human rights. We are also 
working to facilitate China's development of a more open, market economy that accepts 
international trade practices” (NSS, 1994). 
                                                          
3 On U.S.-China trade: A full overview of American imports and exports as well as the U.S. trade deficit with 
China throughout the five presidential terms I cover is found in the appendix. 
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The NSS for 1995 follows that of 94 to a large degree. Promoting democracy and liberal 
economic principles around the world remains the priority and China is an opportunity rather 
than a major problem. Overall, the impression one gets from the 95 National Security Strategy 
document is of an administration committed to a policy of engagement and economic 
cooperation, confident that this would eventually lead to a democratic and responsible China 
and certain that this would help to serve American interests in the long run. Before the Taiwan 
Crisis in 95-96, the only serious point of conflict between China and the Clinton administration 
was connected to the rampant pirating of American movies, CDs and computer software that 
was taking place in China. As big business became concerned so too did Clinton and in 1995 
he threatened to impose sanctions if the Chinese did not introduce laws that would reduce the 
amount of pirated movies that was produced (Cohen, 2010: 253). Still most American business 
were happy with a deeper economic relationship with the Chinese and supported Clinton’s 
policies in this regard (Cohen, 2005).  
1996-2000: The second Clinton period 
Supporting democratic development and Chinese international participation  
As Bill Clinton began his final term as president, the relationship between China and the U.S. 
had stabilized. In 1997 Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited the United States in what was the 
first state visit by a Chinese leader to the U.S. for more than a decade. Clinton himself seems 
to have had high hopes for this visit, his own later visit to China scheduled for 1998, and for 
the future relationship between the two countries. During a speech he made in 1997 concerning 
the upcoming visit by the Chinese president, Clinton reiterated his hopes for the visit and for a 
China that was “stable, open, and non-aggressive” and that “embraces free markets, political 
pluralism, and the rule of law” (Clinton, 1997). He further stated that while it was up to the 
Chinese people to decide the future of China, the Americans could by working with the Chinese 
and expanding cooperation between the two countries help ensure that vital American interests 
were maintained as this would help the Chinese start the development of their own democratic 
institutions and traditions (Ibid.). The President also brought up China’s increasing participation 
in international institutions and claimed that this showed major progress, and he hoped that 
China would continue to integrate itself into the existing world order. While the growing 
American trade deficit were of some worry, Clinton seems to have believed that this problem 
could be overcome as long as the Chinese played fair and opened their borders for more 
American goods.  
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As for democratic reform in China, the speech shows that the Clinton administration 
still believed that the growing Chinese middleclass, increasing exposure to liberal ideas and 
western media and a more open Chinese economy eventually would lead to the development of 
democracy. To quote Clinton:  
“The more ideas and information spread, the more people will expect to think for themselves, 
express their own opinions and participate. And the more that happens, the harder it will be for 
their government to stand in their way” (Ibid).  
In short, the speech followed the earlier policy of opening China up to more trade and 
cooperation while at the same time nudge the country in the direction of democracy as well as 
greater international integration and cooperation (Ibid.). The President claimed that this sort of 
policy was the very best way to engage a growing China.  
“This pragmatic policy of engagement, of expanding our areas of cooperation with China while 
confronting our differences openly and respectfully… this is the best way to advance our 
fundamental interests and our values and to promote a more open and free China” (Ibid.). 
Overall, Clinton does not seem to have been deterred by aggressive Chinese behavior in 95-96 
and he also took the time to criticize those who argued for a policy of containment against 
China. Clinton argued that such a policy would be counterproductive and dangerous in the long 
run as he feared that such a policy could potentially drive American allies away, both within 
China and in the greater world. As the second Clinton administration took office, it seemed like 
the liberals for the most part were in control of U.S. foreign policy despite of growing Chinese 
military might. 
The National Security Strategy reports for the second Clinton period follows the policy 
that was outlined in this speech as well. In the 1998 NSS it is stated that the United States will 
continue to support the integration of China into the international system and the rules that 
govern this system. To quote the 1998 NSS: 
“Our key security objectives for the future include:… encouraging a constructive PRC role in 
international affairs through active cooperation in ARF, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum (APEC) and the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue; and improving law enforcement 
cooperation with PRC officials through increased liaison and training.”. 
Further, following the presidential visits in 1997 and 98 the two countries decided to strengthen 
ties through regular summits and more high-level meetings, as well as meetings between army 
officials in order to ensure that the two countries could avoid any military related accidents or 
misunderstandings. America’s commitment to integrating China became especially apparent in 
1999 when Clinton strongly endorsed Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization 
(New York times, 1999). Chinese membership had been questioned for some time due to the 
62 
 
Chinese human rights record and Chinese trade practices. Clinton however seems to have 
believed that Chinese membership were both in the economic interest of the United States and 
that it would speed up the internal reform that he claimed were already transforming China into 
a more liberal and democratic country (Ibid.). Weighed against these possibilities the White 
House seems to have considered human rights violations to be of less importance. If trade did 
in the end encourage the development of democracy in China, these violations could be 
addressed at a later point. 
As for Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, it started out somewhat confrontational when 
Clinton in his first speech to the Chinese people denounced China’s human rights record and 
the oppressiveness of the communist party (Cohen, 2010:260). Nevertheless, Clinton also 
decided to throw the Chinese leadership a bone when he stated in his later Shanghai address 
that the United States continued to support the one China principle and that a Taiwanese 
declaration of independence was unacceptable (Ibid.)  
The NSS for 2000 follows that of the 98 report and continues to argue the case that a 
stable and responsible China is of paramount importance to both the East Asia region and the 
larger world. Despite some setbacks, such as the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the document stresses improved cooperation and a better 
relationship between the United States and China. The successful completion of bilateral WTO 
negotiations between the U.S. and China as well as the presidential visits in 1997 and 98 are all 
highlighted in the NSS as proof of a better relationship and the Clinton administration’s 
commitment to further cooperation. The report also mentions the effort of the U.S. in 
convincing the Chinese to join non-proliferation agreements on both nuclear weapons and 
advanced missile technology. Further, it argues that Chinese and American cooperation was 
important in order to ensure that North Korea did not develop nuclear weapons, weapons that 
if deployed could destabilize the East Asia region further (NSS, 2000). 
Despite of a certain optimism and strong claims of progress that you can find in the NSS 
for 2000, as Clinton’s second term came to an end the foreign policy experts in Washington 
seems to have been divided on how to handle China (Cohen, 2010:262). With a republican 
president supported by some rather hawkish foreign policy and security advisors (Cohen, 2005), 
the relatively liberal policy that President Clinton and his administration had followed were in 
danger of being supplanted.  
Growing economic interdependence 
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As the 20th century came to an end, the growth in trade between China and the United States 
just kept increasing. From 1994 to 2000, the value of all trade between the two countries had 
more than doubled, from 48068.5 million in 94 $ to 116203.2 million in 2000. An increase of 
68134.9 million $ (United States Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2013). The two economies 
were clearly becoming more dependent upon each other as many liberals hoped they would, 
and as President Clinton had argued they should. This however does not tell the whole story. 
As trade between the U.S. and China grew, it became quite apparent that the Americans were 
importing far more from the Chinese than they were exporting. In 1994 the trade deficit between 
them were 29,505.1 million $ in favor of the Chinese, by 2000 however the deficit had grown 
to 83,833 million $, almost tripling in size (ibid). 
It is worth noting that despite such a huge trade imbalance the interests of the American 
business elite in continuous trade with China was considerable. At certain moments their 
interests even seems to have outweighed what was perceived to be serious national security 
concerns. When an American firm came under fire over its sales to China in 1998, the 
allegations were that technology sale to China had allowed the Chinese to improve upon their 
ballistic missile guidance systems (Cohen, 2005:88; Washongton Post, 1998). As a 
consequence of these allegations, voices in congress wanted to stop a planned satellite 
technology sale by the company to China. Clinton, who had received generous donations to his 
campaign from said firm and, some claimed, even the PLA (New York Times, 1998), decided 
to let the sale proceed. Clinton was accused of having “at best”, put American business interests 
and jobs before keeping advanced technology and development secrets out of Chinese hands, 
contrary to what many meant was in the national interest (Cohen, 2005:88). This could not have 
been done unless Clinton and his team really believed that time were on their side and that 
China eventually would evolve into an open and democratic society. 
Clinton also managed to win a victory for his China policy when Congress voted to 
grant permanent Most Favored Nation status to China in 2000 (New York Times, 2000). The 
vote was surprising to some, due to the large amount of Republicans who voted in favor of the 
motion. That the Republicans supported it seems to have been mostly due to the hope that such 
an act would help open the Chinese market to Americans and help on the trade deficit (Ibid.). 
Indeed, the argument that American business would benefit from permanent Chinese MFN 
status, seems to have been critical for the outcome, despite the fact that President Clinton 
claimed that the decision had more to do with national security than economy.  His argument 
was still that engagement would help bring China into the world order as a responsible partner, 
and that MFN status would help in that regard (Ibid). 
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 Despite some worries over Chinese military buildup and the security of Taiwan there 
seems to be few indications that Washington would change its relatively liberal trade policy 
with China anytime soon. 
Neither did it look as though there would be any halt to the massive increase in trade 
that that the previous years had seen when Clinton left the White House. Despite of a growing 
trade deficit with the Chinese, the U.S under Bill Clinton kept to its policies of an open market. 
Further, the interests of the business elite seems to have been kept firmly in mind during the 
final Clinton administration, and in some cases they trumped what looked to be important 
national security interests.  
2001-2004, The first Bush period 
Democratic development and gaining China as a partner 
As mentioned earlier, George W. Bush came to power with a rather different China policy than 
that which Bill Clinton had followed. In the view of many of Bush’s advisors China was a 
dangerous and an undemocratic state that repressed its own people. As a consequence it would 
be necessary for the United States to be firm in order to ensure that China did not turn into a 
state that could threaten American presence in East Asia (Cohen, 2010: 266-267). Writing in 
early 2000, then foreign policy advisor to the President, Condoleezza Rice claimed that despite 
the importance of including China in the greater global community, the U.S. “should never be 
afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide”. In addition, it was her belief that the 
United States needed to stand resolute in the face of potential Chinese aggressions especially 
concerning Taiwan (Rice, 2000).  
However, as I have written earlier, Bush’s China policy soon changed considerably. The 
surveillance-plane incident in early 2001 and the tough Chinese stance on several other issues 
quickly forced the administration to rethink its policy, moving away from a China policy more 
bent on containing China to one more focused on cooperation and engagement. When Colin 
Powell, then U.S. Secretary of State, flew to China in July 2001, it was with a promise of further 
cooperation and a wish for a stronger U.S.-China relationship (Cohen, 2010: 268). 
Nevertheless, this turnaround might have been less radical than it seems at first glance, 
since it is worth noting that despite the seemingly hard stance that Bush had wanted to towards 
the Chinese, he did argue in favor of some cooperation in the presidential campaign. Speaking 
on the attempt to get China to join the WTO as a full member, Bush claimed that he was in 
complete agreement with Clinton, and that a Chinese participation in the world order was vital 
to the U.S. In Bush’s words, Chinese membership “holds out the hope of more open contact 
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with the world of freedom” (Bush, in: the New York Times, 2000). As one can see, Bush was 
not necessarily against cooperating with China.  
The attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 seems to have strengthened 
this policy of cooperation. With American forces busy responding to the threat of terrorism, 
balancing against China seems to have been low on the priority list. Indeed, while the QDR for 
2001 does mentions China as a possible peer competitor and calls for better base structures in 
the Eastern Pacific-Ocean, the report focuses most its attention on terrorism and strategies to 
prevent terrorist attacks (QDR, 2001).  The National Security Strategy report for 2002 shows 
the change in Bush’s foreign policy quite profoundly. Cooperation with the Chinese is 
emphasized and the report also argues that democratic development is vital in order to ensure 
greater Chinese development in the years to come: 
“To make that nation truly accountable to its citizen’s needs and aspirations, however, much 
work remains to be done. Only by allowing the Chinese people to think, assemble, and worship 
freely can China reach its full potential.” (NSS. 2002) 
One can also see influence from the ongoing “War against Terror” in the report’s handling of 
China. As this war grew in importance for the United States, Countering terrorism seems to 
have opened up new avenues of cooperation with the Chinese. 
“The United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China. We already 
cooperate well where our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in 
promoting stability on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future of 
Afghanistan and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counterterrorism and similar 
transitional concerns” (Ibid.). 
Indeed the cooperation on counter-terrorism was, according to the new administration, the main 
reason why the Sino-American relationship would continue to improve. As President Bush put 
it in his 2002 State of the Union address: “common danger is erasing old rivalries” (Bush, 2002). 
For the most part this remained true during the first term of the Bush Administration. As China 
was rapidly growing in strength and economic importance, the Americans were busy fighting 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgents in Iraq. As long as the Chinese refrained from doing 
anything rash, President Bush seemed perfectly happy to keep cooperating with the Chinese 
and hope that time and development eventually would lead to a more democratic China.  
Several liberal observers and experts supported this policy and the argument was that 
democratic change was already taking place despite attempts by the Chinese government to 
suppress all opposition (Economy, 2004). In her 2004 article, Elizabeth Economy argues that a 
bigger media picture, access to internet and more economic freedom all influence the Chinese 
people into demanding more democracy and government transparency. As Chinese leaders 
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were waking up to these demands it was believed that they would have to accommodate some 
of them in order to stay in power.  Even if the development were going along at a slower pace 
than many had hoped for, it would, according to Economy, still be prudent to continue on this 
course and not return to a strategy of confronting China. 
However as Bush entered his second term, some of the advice given by liberal advisors 
and experts were beginning to be supplanted by arguments that China were quickly becoming 
a peer competitor and therefore a danger (Cohen, 2010). Chinese disrespect for human rights 
also kept nagging American politicians and the trade deficit between the two countries were 
finally getting to high to ignore. 
Economic cooperation during the first Bush period 
Despite an ostensibly hardline China policy, George W. Bush did consider trade between the 
United States and China to be of great importance. In the campaign, he argued that the trade 
relationship was vital for American employees and business as well as for the bilateral 
relationship between China and the U.S. (Bush, 2000). According to Bush, trade would also be 
what would eventually lead China down the path of democracy. 
“Trade with China will promote freedom. Freedom is not easily contained. Once a measure of 
economic freedom is permitted, a measure of political freedom will follow. China today is not 
a free society… Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create 
expectations of democracy. There are no guarantees, but there are good examples, from Chile 
to Taiwan. Trade freely with China, and time is on our side” (Ibid.). 
This sentiment echoes the writings of Condoleezza Rice (2000), who also claimed that 
maintaining trade would help open China up to democratic ideas and most likely would lead to 
a liberalization of Chinese society. In short, there was little support in the Bush administration 
for limiting trade with China let alone stopping it altogether. 
From 2001 to 2005 the bilateral trade between China and the United States kept 
increasing at a steady rate. The Americans continued to increase the amount of goods it exported 
to China through 2001 to 2004 and by 2005 the amount had more than doubled, from 16 185,2 
million $ in 2000 to 41 192,0 million in 2005. As one can see, China was importing far more 
from the U.S. than earlier. However during the same period the value of American imports from 
China grew with 143 451,9 million$ from 100 018,2 million to 243 470,1. As of the end of 
2005 the U.S. trade deficit with China had reached a total of 202 278.2 million (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2013) and several voices in congress and among American workers unions were 
beginning to call for sterner measures including special tariffs against China due to complaints 
over Chinese currency policy (Washington Post, 2004; New York Times, 2006). Some worry 
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was also expressed over Chinese firms who tried to buy American companies and in some 
instances these purchases were actually stopped by U.S. authorities who feared Chinese 
competition (Cohen, 2010: 274).  
Even if some were calling for special tariffs on Chinese goods in order to protect 
American industry and others worried about the huge trade deficit and what this might do to 
the balance of power, trade between the U.S. and China kept increasing during the entire first 
term of President Bush. As the U.S. maintained a careful diplomatic stance and kept pushing 
for an integrated and responsible China, so too was the liberal Strategy of letting trade work its 
magic, maintained by President Bush.   
2005-2008: The second Bush period 
Diplomacy and cooperation amidst China’s growth 
As we learned in the previous section, when President Bush began his second period in 2005, 
China and the United States had a stable working relationship that benefitted both parties. In 
fact, the United States seems to have been prepared to let China take a greater role on the world 
stage and greater responsibility for international stability. The deputy Secretary of State Robert 
Zoellick suggested as much in late 2005 (Zoellick, 2005), and the Chinese for their part seemed 
more than willing to accept both the international responsibility and the greater national status 
that followed it (Cohen, 2010:274).  
Indeed, in his 2005 remarks, Zoellick argued that the best possible way for the United 
States to go forward was to continue its policy of engaging with China. As Chinese power grew, 
the Chinese would have to become a more “responsible stakeholder” and American fear could 
only help ruin what might become a productive relationship (Zoellick, 2005). 
“We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international 
system. As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would 
work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success…You hear the 
voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear. But America succeeds when we 
look to the future as an opportunity, not when we fear what the future might bring… We can 
cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of 
tomorrow”. (Ibid.). 
The national security strategy for 2006 focuses for the most part on “the War on Terror” and 
the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the analysis about China and East Asia follows 
the arguments of Zoellick in calling for a responsible China that can participate in maintaining 
the international system. To take a concrete example, the Americans were expecting the 
Chinese to help negotiate a deal with North Korea that would terminate that country’s nuclear 
weapons development program (Ibid.). Such a China would, according to the 2006 NSS, 
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become an asset to the international community rather than a potential problem and source of 
conflict. It is further stated in the report that the growing economic liberalization is still expected 
to lead to a democratic development in China as the growing middleclass begins to demand 
more influence over the political decisions that are made.    
“The United States encourages China to continue down the road of reform and openness, 
because in this way China’s leaders can meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the 
Chinese people for liberty, stability, and prosperity. As economic growth continues, China will 
face a growing demand from its own people to follow the path of East Asia’s many modern 
democracies, adding political freedom to economic freedom” (NSS, 2006:41). 
2006 was also the year where George W. Bush declared the Sino-U.S. relationship to be “the 
best ever” (Cohen, 2010:276) and despite some issues such as the ever present Taiwan question, 
the two countries were becoming increasingly dependent upon each other and cooperated on 
more issues than at any time earlier. By the end of 2006, the U.S. and Chinese navies had held 
their first joint exercise and the two countries had organized the first of what was to become a 
formal biannual strategic dialogue. The Chinese also proved willing to meet some American 
economic concerns by strengthening its laws on intellectual property rights and allowing 
foreign firms greater access to the Chinese domestic market (Ibid.).  
As the end of President Bush’s second term approached, the U.S.-China relationship 
remained stable although somewhat precarious. During his trip to China in 2008, Bush publicly 
rebuked China over its civil liberties and human rights record, while at the same time praising 
China for their culture and economic progress in the last decades (New York Times, 2008). 
While Bush did criticize China to some degree, he fell well short of the kind of condemnation 
that many human rights watch groups expected. His main message remained the same as before; 
cooperation was of paramount importance and a good relationship was still the goal. The United 
States might complain about human rights abuse and political oppression in China from time 
to time, but in the end, the policy of engagement and the hope that this might lead to democratic 
change within China remained. 
As one can see, despite of the fact that China was clearly a non-democratic state, we 
hear the same arguments from the second Bush administration as we heard from the Clinton 
administrations. If the United States continued to cooperate with the Chinese then democracy 
would eventually win through and China would become an important partner rather than a peer-
competitor. As such, it seems that the Americans were indeed making a serious effort to engage 
with China despite of the promise of a though China-policy that Bush had promised during the 
presidential campaign of 2000.   
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One should note however that while this policy was the stated China policy of the White 
House, the Pentagon (as I have mentioned above) was starting to upgrade their base structures 
on Guam, Hawaii and on other locations in the western pacific. The Department of Defense 
also began to redeploy a considerable part of their forces in the East Asia region, in what seemed 
to be an attempt at countering growing Chinese military strength (Halloran, 2007). The NSS 
also ends on a note of caution when it states that while U.S. strategy is still to nudge China in 
the direction of democracy, the Americans also “hedge against other possibilities” (NSS, 2006: 
42). 
Economic developments 2005-2008. 
The years of 2005-2008 saw some of the biggest upheavals in the international economy in 
recent memory. While 2005 and 2006 remained relatively calm, the consequences from the 
global economic crisis that developed in late 2007 and especially in 2008, was profound. While 
the Americans were trying to maintain their stricken financial system, the Chinese economy 
continued to grow at a steady pace. Some Chinese observers were even wondering whether this 
crisis signaled a decline of U.S. power that could allow China to take a greater role in the 
international system and maybe even supplant the Americans in time (Nye, 2010). 
Coupled with the growing economic power of China and the financial crisis influencing 
western countries, was the huge and increasing trade deficit with the Chinese that the United 
States suffered from. From 2005 to 2008 the deficit grew by 65 761.7 million $ to reach a new 
high of 268 039.8 million. While the U.S. did increase the amount of goods it exported to the 
Chinese, from 41,192.0 million to 69,732.8 million (U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2013), 
this increase was still far outweighed by the money the Americans spent on imported Chinese 
goods. As the deficit became more and more obvious, some Americans started to complain 
about the abilities of American companies to access the Chinese market. In addition, the 
Chinese were still not producing considerable results in the fight against intellectual property 
theft; the Chinese were not “playing a fair game” according to one official. (New York Times, 
2007a). Indeed after several complaints, the American government decided to take action 
against China in the WTO in 2007 (New York Times, 2007b). Despite of these worries the 
value of goods imported from China from 2005 to 2008 increased from 243 470.1 million to 
337 772.6 million $ (United States Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2013). Clearly, Sino-U.S. 
trade was not slowing despite growing American financial woes and worries over Chinese trade 
practices.  
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Looking at the statements from American leaders in the period this development is 
hardly surprising. In his 2005 speech, Robert Zoellick pressured for increasing cooperation with 
China, and writing to the next American President in 2008, then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry M. Paulson Jr. argued that engagement with China was “the only path to success” 
(Paulson, 2008). 
“Even if it were possible to block China’s growth, it would not be in the United States’s interests 
to try… the inextricable interdependence of China’s growth and that of the global economy 
requires a policy of engagement. In fact the overriding importance of economic growth to 
China’s leaders presents the best means of influencing China’s emergence as a global power 
and encouraging its integration into the international system.” (Ibid.: 59). 
Paulson further claimed that China viewed the world through a mostly “economic lens” and 
that a future president should understand this and base his policies on that knowledge. The 
Secretary of the Treasury also stated that the cooperation that was set up in 2006 through the 
U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue led to a new level of cooperation and trust between 
the two countries. Paulson claims that as a consequence of this, China became more active in 
the WTO and began to participate more in international fora in general (Ibid.).  
The dialogue was also credited with improving the environment for trade between the 
U.S. and China and especially in the financial sector. This allowed American companies greater 
freedom of movement and more opportunity to invest in China, and it also improved the 
Chinese’s abilities to operate in the United States (Ibid.: 68). In the end, the Secretary of the 
Treasury argued that the policies of economic engagement pursued by the administration had 
been a success and he urged the next President to continue to engage with China (Ibid: 76-77). 
2009-2013 the first Obama period 
Barack Obama and American diplomatic focus 
The campaign of Barack Obama was launched on a platform of “change”. In the foreign policy 
area this implied changing the course which had seen many foreign countries begin to consider 
the U.S. to be a threat to world peace, these countries also included several close allies (Cohen: 
2010). Obama wanted to engage more with the world and to use American economic power, 
ideas and diplomacy in order to do this (Obama, 2008). For the China policy however, the 
change was less profound. The U.S. would “continue to engage China on common interests like 
climate change, even as we continue to encourage their shift to a more open and market-based 
society” (Ibid.).  
As I have stated earlier, the policy of engagement was pursued rigorously during the 
first year of Barack Obama’s presidency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the 
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United States would “work harder to build on areas of common concern and shared 
opportunities” with China (Clinton, 2009). Clinton also stated in a Q&A session that followed 
her speech that the United States would attempt to broaden the economic dialogue with China 
and incorporate other issues more connected to diplomacy and defense as well (Ibid.). In the 
Clinton period one could observe that issues having to do with China were moved from the 
State Department to the Department of the Treasury. As Obama took office and the global 
financial crisis worsened, some of these issues seems to have been moved back to the State 
department. Further, some American officials even suggested that a G2 group consisting of 
China and the U.S. should be set up in order to facilitate closer cooperation on some issues. 
Although, as I have mentioned before, this idea was eventually abandoned due in no small part 
to lack of enthusiasm from the Chinese over the idea (Friedberg, 2011: 113). In fact, one could 
argue that in 2009 several Americans considered China to be stronger than the Chinese 
themselves thought they were, and as a consequence the Americans argued that the Chinese 
should take a greater responsibility and play a larger role internationally than they had been 
willing to do before (ibid).  
The first National Security Strategy report released by the Obama Administration in 
2010, largely followed the policy that the President had earlier laid out. It stated that the United 
States would continue to pursue engagement and cooperation with other countries (NSS, 
2010:11). The U.S. would also maintain its commitment to spreading democracy abroad and 
hold other countries accountable for human rights transgression, although the administration 
seemed less inclined to use force to further this end than their predecessors had been (Ibid.). 
While not directly aimed at China, both of these issues would most likely influence any China 
policy that Obama pursued. 
On China, the NSS claims that the U.S. “will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, 
and comprehensive relationship” (ibid.). It also states that despite of growing Chinese military 
strength the U.S. will engage with the Chinese on several issues and attempt to encourage the 
Chinese to contribute in maintaining peace and stability in the international system. To quote 
from the document: 
“…we will encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity 
as its influence rises…We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human 
rights concerns and areas where we differ. But disagreements should not prevent cooperation 
on issues of mutual interest, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United 
States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century.” (Ibid: 43).   
Clearly, engagement and not containment remained the name of the game. Despite some 
changes in American military posture from 2007 and in the following years, the Americans 
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seemed determined to maintain the policy of engagement and hopeful that as China grew it 
would also take on greater responsibility for maintaining international stability and solving 
world problems such as pollution, terrorism and climate change. 
As we get further away from the election however, we see the outline of some change 
in direction for Obama’s China policy. As I have stated earlier, Barack Obama and his team 
were faced with a minor diplomatic crisis with the Chinese few months after they took office 
(The Economist, 2009b). As the Chinese accused the Americans of spying and likened them to 
a “criminal lurking outside the door” (Ibid.), the Americans seemed to struggle with how to 
engage with an increasingly assertive China while at the same time ensure both the Chinese and 
their allies that the U.S. were in East Asia to stay. This new turn was especially visible as China 
tried to assert their territorial claims in the South-China Sea. The Chinese had previously 
warned the Americans to stay out of the dispute as they considered the maritime region to be 
exclusively Chinese territory and therefore an internal matter that should be handled exclusively 
by the East Asian nations involved. However, as the dispute grew increasingly heated, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton offered to help ease tensions between the countries involved. Clinton 
also said that, “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access 
to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea,” (New 
York Times, 2010b) a statement and position that was received with anger by Chinese 
authorities.  
In fact, one senior American official claimed that the U.S. had “tested the limit of how 
far you can get with China through positive engagement” and that by year two of the first 
Obama period the State Department was forced to “toughen their position” when dealing with 
the Chinese (New York Times, 2012a). Another U.S. official stated that, while the United States 
did not conduct the same cold war policies that it had applied against the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese nevertheless respected strength and determination when negotiating. As a consequence 
to this, the administration started to show more strength when dealing with China (ibid.). With 
a harder line in place, the Chinese seems to have had problems placing the new administration, 
with some officials complaining over the mounting pressure on China and the Chinese foreign 
minister allegedly saying that “Big countries can get bullied by little countries” (ibid.). Clearly 
the Chinese were less than pleased about the American change in policy direction. 
When we reach the election year of 2012, one can see that the liberal policies of 
engagement looks to be increasingly put aside in favor of a harder stance. In its Defense 
Strategic Guidance report for 2012, the Administration argued for a stronger presence in the 
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East Asia theater and a more cautious policy towards China while still hoping for a strong 
cooperative relationship. 
“Over the long term, China.’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect 
the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake 
in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. 
However, the growth of China.’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its 
strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region… The United States will 
continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the 
ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law.” 
(Defense Strategic Guidance, 2012). 
This statement comes at the same time that the United States kept increasing their forces in East 
Asia and the Pacific region. The Chinese actually confronted Hillary Clinton about this force 
buildup during her trip to China that same year, arguing that the Americans should reconsider 
their strategy in the region. China was also adamant that the U.S. was not to interfere in the 
dispute concerning the South-China Sea (New York Times, 2012a). The Americans for their 
part, asked the Chinese to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
rather than with individual countries, something the Chinese were reluctant to do (Ibid.). It is 
worth noting that Secretary Clinton still considered the relationship between China and the U.S. 
to be moving forward and that the annual meetings between top officials were having an effect 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, the tone between American and Chinese officials seems to have grown 
more confrontational than had been for quite some time. 
Intellectual property rights and U.S. trade deficit 
When President Obama entered the White House in January 2009, he had a profound task ahead 
of him. The American economy was reeling from the 2008 financial crisis, and the national 
debt, was higher than ever before. It should come as no surprise to anyone then, that rebuilding 
the American economy were a top priority for the newly elected president. In Obama’s words 
“The state of our economy calls for action: bold and swift. And we will act not only to create 
new jobs but to lay a new foundation for growth” (Obama, 2009b). 
With a goal of strengthening the American economy, one could be forgiven for 
expecting Obama to attempt to reduce the trade deficit with China. Indeed Obama did file a 
case against China in the WTO in 2012, claiming that the Chinese were breaking the rules by 
subsidizing local industry (New York Times, 2012b). According to Obama, this was putting 
American jobs in danger, and at the time, he promised to take step in order to stop this practice. 
The Chinese for their part also filed a complaint that very same year claiming that the 
Americans were breaking the rules as well (Ibid.). Obama had also previously imposed a tariff 
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on tires produced in China, as a response to complaints from American unions (Washington 
Post, 2009).  
Trade with the Chinese were still growing, but as time wore on the White House seems 
to have taken a much harder stance on this issue as well. Especially the allegations that Chinese 
authorities were committed to policies that favored Chinese firms over foreign ones were said 
to be of particular concern to the president, who during the Campaign had promised to protect 
ordinary American workers and their jobs (ibid). Worry was also expressed over the Chinese 
decision to restrict the export of rare earth minerals (Washington Post, 2012). These minerals 
are necessary in the production of most advanced technology, including military technology 
vital to the U.S. armed forces (Humphries, 2012) and the Chinese monopoly on this particular 
area had been a concern to the Americans for some time.  
Fast forwarding to 2013 and we find that a U.S. government report on the abuse of 
intellectual property (IP) rights lists China as one of the main offenders internationally (Special 
301 Report, 2013). The report argues that IP enforcement in China remains “a central 
Challenge” and that increasing cybertheft originating in China has made the situation even 
worse. Of concern were the fact that Chinese laws and policies regarding intellectual property 
rights “unfairly disadvantage U.S. Rights holders in China” (ibid: 4).  
Nevertheless the Report maintains that ongoing law amendments in China is a positive 
step in order to reinsure U.S. authorities and U.S. firms of China’s commitment to upholding 
intellectual property laws, and allowing U.S. firms to compete fairly on the large Chinese 
market (Ibid 31). Yet for all the promise that new Chinese laws were said to hold, the Americans 
still worried over their competitiveness in the face of Chinese IP theft. Of a particular concern 
were the fact that many Chinese companies seemed to be actively stealing or copying 
information and technology that belonged to U.S. companies and IP holders both in China and 
abroad. This had been going on for quite some time but had become progressively worse. The 
report also mentions that the PLA was suspected of being behind many of these attacks and that 
firms that developed advanced technology were particularly vulnerable (Ibid.). 
“The theft of trade secrets is an escalating concern. Not only are repeated thefts occurring inside 
China, but also outside of China for the benefit of Chinese entities… Particularly troubling are 
public reports by independent security firms that actors affiliated with the Chinese military and 
Chinese Government have systematically infiltrated the computer systems of a significant 
number of U.S. companies and stolen hundreds of terabytes of data, including IP, from these 
companies. The United States strongly urges the Chinese Government take serious steps to put 
an end to these activities and to deter further activity by rigorously investigating and prosecuting 
thefts of trade secrets by both cyber and conventional means” (Ibid:32). 
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However, despite of these worries and the measure Obama took against China in the WTO, the 
trade between the two Countries, as well as the trade deficit, kept increasing during the entire 
first period of Barack Obama. In 2009 the value of U.S.-China trade lay at 365 870,6 million $, 
this was a reduction from 2008 and the deficit had also been reduced, down from 268 039,8 
million to 226 877,2 million (United States Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2013). By 2010 
however the deficit was once again growing and were now at 273 041,6 million $, well above 
2008 levels and a considerable increase since 2009. When we reach 2012, the trade deficit had 
reached its highest level yet at 315 095.3 million US dollars. The value of American goods 
being exported to China did increase significantly from 2009, but U.S. imports from China had 
grown even more. From 296 373,9 million in 2009 to 425 578,9 when we reach the end of 2012 
(Ibid.). As one can see, despite growing concern over the deficit and Obama’s promise to 
preserving American jobs, the trade between the U.S. and China keeps increasing. 
Over the course of three different administrations and almost five presidential terms, the 
U.S. trading policy towards China had remained relatively unchanged. The idea remained that 
China would open its political system if it were allowed to trade and import goods and exchange 
ideas. However, in the last half of President Obama’s first term, the situation seems to have 
changed somewhat. As the American economy grew weaker, and Chinese trading practices 
came under increasing scrutiny by the Americans, United States policy also looks as though it 
might have shifted somewhat in a harder, more confrontational direction. I will follow this line 
of thought closer in the following analysis. 
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Part 4. Analysis of the Empirical data 
The question I initially posed was whether there exists an exceptional American foreign policy 
tradition that breaks with the expectations derived from realist theory and instead fits better 
with liberal theory. Having finished my empirical mapping, I will now analyze the data that I 
have systematically collected and determine whether there is a case for claiming that American 
foreign policy is indeed special in the sense that it deviates from the traditional realist foreign 
policy by being more focused on ideals and the interests of elites rather than realpolitik. 
In the theory section, I argued that it should be possible to observe very distinct patterns 
of behavior in U.S. policy towards China, if either of the two theories fit. China was chosen as 
a case because of China’s status as a rising great power. Offensive realist theory expects some 
very distinct behavior from existing great powers when faced with a rising power 
(Mearsheimer, 2001) which is why a rising China is a good case. On the other hand, we should 
expect a quite different form of policy if the liberal theory of Andrew Moravcsik is a better 
match. Since this would imply that the liberal experts and policy makers that are dominant in 
Washington (Friedberg, 2005) would have the greatest influence on U.S. foreign policy. As we 
can remember, this group is mostly in favor of a softer China policy based on engagement and 
cooperation and American democratic ideals.  
I divided these behavior expectations into four hypotheses, two supporting realist theory 
and two that would suggest a liberal foreign policy (see the theory section). I will in part one of 
the analysis chapter examine the empirical data and determine whether any of the hypotheses 
are strengthened or weakened by what I have found. In part two I will put the different 
hypothesis against each other in order to determine which theory is the better fit for American 
foreign policy. 
Realist foreign policy expectations 
Hypothesis 1: Stance and military deployments  
To reiterate the Hypothesis from the theory section I expect:  
 A strong and clear American posture with regards to Chinese expansion of its military 
capabilities and Chinese attempts at influencing its neighbors, as well as a substantial 
increase in American military deployment to the East-Asia and the South-East Asia 
regions. I also expect American military assets in the Pacific and in East Asia to be 
shielded from defense cuts, even to the point where the budget for this area is increased 
despite other cuts. 
o Variable: Military focus and American perception of China as a threat. 
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Presence of empirical indicators supporting realist theory hypothesis 1. 
Table 1. 
Table 1. above lists the presence of indicators that supports my hypothesis about military 
deployments that corresponds with Offensive Realism theory. The table lists the different 
administrations and the four indicators I have chosen to look for, here an N (No) indicates that 
there are little or no presence of the relevant indicator, whereas a Y (Yes) indicates the presence 
of policy decisions that supports Realist theory. 
Looking at the development of policy throughout the period as a whole we see that there 
is very little that suggests a U.S. foreign policy based on realist considerations during the first 
Clinton years. This serves to weaken the hypothesis somewhat right from the start, as realist 
theory would expect these indicators to be present in U.S. policy if the Americans were 
beginning to balance against China. However, as I have mentioned before, China was relatively 
weak during this period and few expected Chinese power to grow with such speed as it has 
done. At the time, many Americans considered countries like Japan and Germany to be as much 
of a competitor as China (Cohen, 2005), and it was apparent that the Chinese still had a long 
way to go if they were ever to become a peer-competitor. We do see some warnings from writers 
like Kissenger (1994) and Huntington (1993), but these were not acted upon to any great extent. 
China at the time was a relatively minor power that was still adapting to capitalism and the 
liberal international system. Chinese defense spending was low compared to what it was to 
become less than a decade later (Sipri, 2011), and Chinese military technology had still to 
evolve to a point where it could be a serious threat to American forces (Ross, 2002). We can 
therefore expect that the sense of threat was less in this period than it would be at a later date 
and as such a lack of realist based foreign policy decisions are not all that surprising. What I 
would claim then, is that despite the fact that the policies of the first Clinton administrations 
seemingly fly in the face of realist expectations, it does not seriously weaken the hypothesis 
overall.  
Empirical Indicators Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 
Statements of policy N Y N Y Y 
Military presence N Y N N Y 
Development and deployment 
of weapons aimed at 
countering China 
N N N Y Y 
American military Strategy N N N Y Y 
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In Clinton’s second period, we see that the policies changes somewhat and some of the 
realist expectations are realized. This change corresponds with growing Chinese power, and 
especially with greater Chinese assertiveness. In particular, the Taiwan crisis in 95-96 seems to 
have given the Americans some worries about Chinese power in the future. American reactions 
to this particular situation follow the expectations of realism as they responded to a perceived 
threat with an attempt at balancing. Looking at the empirical indicators we find that: the United 
States stated that it would remain in East Asia for the foreseeable future and that it would defend 
its allies there, such as Taiwan. The American military presence in the region also started to 
grow after it had been continuously reduced since the early 1990s (See appendix). Although 
U.S. decision makers were starting to take an interest in Chinese military capabilities and how 
they might affect the United States and its allies. Since American military strategy remained 
relatively fixed. I do not consider this enough to claim that there existed an American intent to 
counter China.  
The sense of threat from China also seems to have grown during this period. In 2000 the 
congress asked the Department of Defense for the first of what was to become annual reports 
on Chinese military power and the QDR for 1997 talked about China as a potential future peer 
competitor. As the sense of threat from China grew, we also see the presence of the expected 
indicators. Consequently, I would suggest that the hypothesis was somewhat strengthened 
following Clintons second term as president. Although far from all of the expected indicators 
were present in U.S. policy at the time.  
Reaching the presidency of George W. Bush, we see that the indicators that suggests a 
realist policy towards China all goes by the wayside. Instead, the focus shifted towards the war 
on terror and Bush himself moderated the China policy that he favored during the campaign. 
At the same time, China keeps increasing its defense budget and the Chinese economy turns 
the country into an increasingly important player on the world stage. This does throw some 
doubt upon whether the U.S. does follow a realist foreign policy, and weakens the hypothesis 
somewhat. I consider a weakening of the hypothesis during this period to be of greater 
significance than the weakening that we saw during the first Clinton years. This is because of 
the growing power of China, but also because of the greater sense of threat that developed 
during the early 2000s.  That said, the Bush administration was preoccupied with two wars in 
this period and China did not yet constitute a real threat to American dominance (Ross, 2002). 
This period does seem to constitute a weakness in the realist argument. Yet some of this 
behavior can be explained by looking at the wars that the United States committed itself to 
during this period, especially if these wars were seen to be a greater threat to American security.  
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By the end of the second Bush period in 2008 we see that the indicators suggesting a 
realist foreign policy is resurfacing. The Americans looked increasingly worried by Chinese 
power and the National Defense strategy for 2008 even went so far as to state that the U.S. 
would need to “hedge” against China in the coming years (NDS, 2008). This sense of threat 
also seems to have manifested itself in the actions of the second Bush administration. From 
2005-2008 the Americans were increasingly focusing their attention on strategies on how to 
countering and containing the Chinese military buildup. This is evident in the deployment of 
more sophisticated weapons to the East Asia region as well as the American redeployment to 
Guam. Yet for all that, the Americans were still not increasing their military presence in East 
Asia and the Western Pacific in raw numbers, even if the units stationed in that region were 
becoming more sophisticated and capable. In Offensive Realism, the presence of military 
personnel and military force trumps all other considerations (Mearsheimer, 2001), and even if 
a case can be made that the Americans were increasing their firepower while reducing troop 
numbers, this would still only partially explain why the U.S. refrained from increasing the 
amounts of troops. If the Chinese were considered to be a growing threat, then we should expect 
to see troop numbers rise also. Still, the presence of all the other indicators does strengthen the 
hypothesis to a considerable extent and while I would not yet claim that the U.S. was balancing 
against the Chinese, the empirical evidence does suggest that U.S. policy was, at least partially, 
moving in that direction.  
When we reach 2009 and especially 2010-2011, we see that U.S. policy has changed 
even further and it now looks like the United States is actively seeking ways of balancing 
against China. This, despite a president who went out of his way to extoll the virtues of 
cooperation between nations. The American military presence starts growing rapidly from 2010 
and onwards, and by the end of 2012 the number of American troops stationed in the region 
was at greater than it had been at any time since 1994 (see figure 4 in the appendix). In addition, 
U.S. strategy and military developments starts to focus increasingly on how to counter another 
great power in short high intensity conflicts, featuring advanced Anti-Access/Area-Denial 
capabilities. We observe this development even as the American military budget is reduced and 
the Americans reduce their presence in other areas of the world. As is made perfectly clear in 
Obamas Defense Strategic Guidance report for (2012), the Americans were “pivoting to Asia”. 
This pivot coincide with growing Chinese assertiveness and a more volatile political situation 
in East Asia.  
With the presence of all four empirical indicators and such a steep rise in American 
troops deployed to the region I can only conclude, and quite strongly, that the hypothesis was 
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strengthened during the first Obama administration. It is somewhat ironic that a president who 
argued heavily in favor of a foreign policy based on engagement and cooperation in the 2008 
campaign, eventually committed to a foreign policy towards China that incorporates all the 
empirical expectations suggested by Offensive Realist theory. 
To sum up then, we see a development from the second Clinton administration and 
onwards of a U.S. who is increasingly following realist policies in their dealings with the 
Chinese by improving their military capacity in East Asia, developing strategies and weapons 
aimed at China and by signaling their intent to remain a power in East Asia. This corresponds 
with growing Chinese power and, perhaps more importantly, a growing sense of threat in the 
U.S., most easily discerned by looking at the official documents such as the Annual Report to 
Congress. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan does seem to distort the image somewhat, but 
overall it still remains relatively clear that the Americans were following a policy that 
corresponded more with the expectations of realism in 2012, then they were in 1992. In 
conclusion, I would suggest that the empirical evidence supports and strengthens my first 
hypothesis about U.S. foreign policy behavior, the Americans were focusing more and more of 
their military power in East Asia and the Western Pacific Ocean even as Chinese power, and 
perhaps more importantly American sense of threat from China grew.  
Hypotheis 2: The presence of a realist alliance policy 
To reiterate the Hypothesis from the theory section I expect:  
 Hypothesis 2: The presence of a realist alliance policy. An attempt at containing China 
through the application of alliances and cooperation with the other states in the region.  
o Variable: Alliances and American alliance building in the region. 
Presence of empirical indicators supporting realist alliance theory. 
Table 2. 
Mearsheimer claims that threatened states prefer buck-passing to a policy of containment, he 
also suggests that when buck-passing is impossible states will prefer to balance against an 
aggressor with the aid of allies. After all, containing a threat is hard and expensive and the 
Empirical Indicators Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 
Statements of intent N Y Y Y Y 
High profile joint exercises N N N Y Y 
Defense agreements N Y Y Y Y 
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presence of allies that can share the load would in most circumstances make the task easier 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). As such, we would expect the Americans to be more willing to focus on 
alliances than to spend money and military resources on an attempt to contain the Chinese on 
their own. Looking at the periods in question, we nevertheless see that the Americans are not 
fulfilling any of the expectations during Clinton’s first years in office. Important American 
partners were mentioned only briefly in the 1994 NSS and some experts even argued that Japan 
was a greater challenge than China was. South Korea was mentioned as an important ally, but 
that could have more to do with the threat from North Korea than any perceived challenge from 
the Chinese. As was the case with the hypothesis about American military deployments, the 
evidence from the first Clinton period only serves to weaken the case for a U.S. alliance policy 
based on realist considerations. However, I must once again stress that the sense of threat that 
China conveyed in the U.S. at this time was relatively small. Some commentators such as 
Kissinger (1994) and Huntington (1996) did predict that China would rise to become a 
challenge but there was no great sense of urgency among the American elites. As such this can 
partially explain why we do not see any of the relevant indicators for this period. 
This is also the only presidential period where the Americans remain so passive. From 
Clinton’s second period and onwards, we see that the Americans are clearly signaling their 
intent to protect allies, and particularly Taiwan if we look specifically at the second Clinton 
period. We also see that the Americans are hard at work shoring up support among allies in the 
region. First through defense agreements with Japan and Taiwan in the second Clinton period 
and following that, agreements with India, South Korea and Australia as President Bush took 
office. Indeed, the policies and actions taken in both Clinton’s second term and Bush’s first 
period strengthened the hypothesis concerning a realist alliance policy. We do not yet see large 
high profile joint exercises, but there is still more support for claiming that the U.S. was 
conducting a realist alliance policy then there was in the previous period. I would especially 
highlight the policy decision to engage more closely with India. While Clinton had often 
criticized India for their nuclear weapons program and seemed to look upon that country purely 
through the lens of the India-Pakistani conflict, Bush turned to India as an important partner 
and chose to ignore the Indian nuclear weapons program. The NSS for 2002 is crystal clear in 
stating that the U.S. was no longer willing to let disagreement over nuclear issues stand between 
it and what it regarded to be a vital partner with the same strategic interests as the United States. 
While these strategic interests are not stated explicitly, the geographical positions of India and 
American bases in East Asia would in the case of a conflict force the Chinese to fight on two 
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opposite fronts simultaneously. As such, an argument could be made that the Americans were 
attempting to encircle China. 
The development in Bush’s second term as President strengthens the hypothesis even 
further. As with the two preceding periods, we see the presence of statements of intent as well 
as a strengthening of defense agreements. In addition, we also the presence of high profile joint 
exercises in the relevant areas. In fact, The Quadrilateral Initiative was a partnership that 
seemed to have been created as a specific counter to Chinese power, and the Chinese themselves 
certainly saw it that way (BBC, 2007). What we see is American commitment to the Koreans, 
as well as closer relationships with the Japanese and Taiwan. The relationship with India was 
further improved upon and the Americans hosted exercises meant to increase the effectiveness 
of cooperation between its allies and it self. All of these actions suggests that the Americans 
were indeed following the expected policy of Offensive Realist theory. The Americans were 
actively building their alliances in the region even as the Chinese improved upon their own 
military capabilities. With all three empirical indicators present. I can only conclude that the 
hypothesis was strengthened considerably during Bush’s second term.  
 Looking at the indicators for the first Obama period, we see that they are all present in 
this period as well. U.S. allies were increasingly expressing their worries over Chinese growth 
in this period and the new administration seems to have continued on the policy of strengthening 
American alliance and partnerships in the region. The U.S. supported India’s bid for a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council and stood behind Japan when the Japanese-China 
conflict over the Senkuku Islands flared up. The Obama administration also started to involve 
itself more in the South China Sea situation by standing behind the Philippines and Vietnam in 
their conflict with China over this important maritime region. In the final two presidential 
periods I have been looking into, we also see the presence of high profile joint exercises straight 
in the middle of the areas of contention. These exercises were carried out despite serious 
protests by Chinese authorities. 
The U.S. clearly stated in this period that they would stand by their allies and these allies 
were increasingly venting their worries over China’s growing military strength. The United 
States also looked to be fermenting alliances that in a sense encircled China from the sea and 
that could cut off Chinese trade from the rest of the world if a conflict should arise. As China 
is dependent upon foreign imports for their energy consumption, this tactic could very well be 
a winning one if conflict between the two nations ever arose.  All of this is in accordance with 
what one would expect to see if the Americans were following realist principles in their security 
and foreign policy deliberations. 
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Similar to what we saw with the empirical indicators of a realist policy concerning 
military deployment and containment policy, we see that as the Chinese grow stronger, the 
Americans focused more attention on their partners in the relevant regions. If anything, the 
Americans were pursuing closer alliances and stronger partnerships more closely than they were 
pursuing military balance and the ability to contain China through military means. While we 
only see the presence of all four empirical indicators for a military containment policy in the 
Obama administration, we can observe that the final Bush administration also followed an 
alliance policy that incorporates all the indicators expected by Offensive Realist theory. 
Considering the theory that assumes countries prefer to have partners and allies help them with 
containment rather than go it alone, this is not particularly surprising. The development of U.S. 
policy certainly seems to become more realist as Chinese power and influence in East Asia and 
the Pacific increased.  
The lack of a realist policy in the early years of Clinton’s presidency is not necessarily 
detrimental to this hypothesis, as we remember that China at the time was less of a challenger 
than it eventually would become. We also see the U.S. was quicker to shore up its alliances in 
East Asia than it was to increase its military presence in the region. This is in accordance with 
the expectations that follows from Offensive Realist policy, as it assumes a state will prefer to 
balance with allies rather than to balance all on its own. 
To sum up, there are strong empirical evidence for the growing US ambitions through 
the period to balance China by strengthening alliance commitments in the region. The 
hypothesis is thus strengthened. 
Liberal Foreign Policy Expectations 
Hypothesis 3: The importance of economic considerations 
To reiterate the Hypothesis from the theory section I expect:  
 An American diplomacy focused on human rights and democracy while attempting to 
bring about these changes within China through cooperation and avoiding unnecessary 
confrontation between the two nations. I also expects a policy that seeks to integrate 
China into international institutions in order to create a more stable frame for China to 
rise within. In other words, China is not contained in the traditional sense. 
o Variable: Bilateral diplomatic cooperation and American support for Chinese 
integration into international institutions 
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Presence of empirical indicators supporting a liberal trade theory. 
Table 3. 
As I stated in the theory section, Friedberg (2005) and Mead (2001) both claim that liberals are 
in the majority among American foreign policy experts and decision makers. As such, I 
expected to find indicators that suggests a liberal foreign policy if American foreign policy 
traditions adheres more to the theories of Andrew Moravcsik than realist theory. As we know, 
the ideas of a peace based upon interdependence and the belief that democratic reform follows 
the liberalization of the economy are deeply ingrained in liberal theory. Therefore, I would 
expect liberal American decision makers to focus on trade with the Chinese rather than more 
confrontational policies.  
Looking at the actual policy for the different periods, we see that the two Clinton periods 
have instance of all three indicators of such a policy. Clinton’s focus when he won the 
presidential election in 1992 was on the economy and despite delivering harsh criticism of 
China’s handling of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations, Clinton quickly realized that China 
was too important as a trading partner to antagonize further. Instead, the Clinton administration 
put human rights concerns on hold for the time being, and proceeded to renew China’s Most 
Favored Nation Status despite critics in congress who wanted the MFN to be revoked. This 
move is very much in line with what we would expect if the U.S. were following a foreign 
policy based on the ideals of the liberal elite, as liberals expect trade to change China into a 
democratic state. The trade deficit was also growing throughout both Clinton periods, and yet 
we see few attempts to try to rectify this. I consider the trade deficit to be especially important, 
since allowing a large trade deficit directly contradicts one of the assumptions in Offensive 
Realist theory, which is the idea that a state will try to maintain an economic advantage over its 
rivals. The Americans were somewhat worried about Chinese pirating of copyrighted material, 
but despite some heavy rhetoric, this worry never translated into a big change in trading 
Empirical Indicators Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 
Successful pressure on U.S. 
decision makers from 
business 
Y Y N N N 
Increase in trade despite a 
U.S. trade deficit 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Statements of intent Y Y Y Y N 
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policies. What we find then, is that all the empirical indicators are present throughout both of 
Clinton’s two periods.  
Looking at the Bush periods, we see that the pressure from business seems to have 
abated somewhat. Some American firms were even starting to become skeptical to the growing 
China trade and especially to Chinese trading practices. Still, the value of goods traded, and the 
deficit kept increasing and the American administration stated their intent to keep trade with 
China flowing on several occasions. In fact, while President George W. Bush differed greatly 
from his predecessor on many issues, he nevertheless supported trade with the Chinese. If 
anything, we see that he wanted to increase it rather than reduce it. Like Clinton before him, 
Bush also seems to have believed that maintaining and strengthening the trade between the U.S. 
and China were of vital importance and that it eventually would lead the Chinese down the path 
of democracy (Bush, 2000).  
As we can see from table 3, the two Bush periods shows a minor weakening of the 
hypothesis overall. However, as I stated earlier, the most important empirical indicator for this 
particular hypothesis was always the increase of trade despite an American deficit. As we can 
see, this increase continued throughout both Bush periods. Not only did trade increase but the 
deficit grew considerably as well. This growth suggests that the Americans were not yet 
abandoning a liberal policy towards China, and that the belief that trade would change China 
into a liberal democracy was still strong. The statements of Bush also supports this.  
The fact that the deficit kept growing even at a time of general crisis in the U.S. economy 
is significant, but may also have come about if the average American would turn more 
frequently to cheap Chinese goods, as her personal economy got poorer. This is a possibility 
that cannot be discarded. Still, the Administration did allowed trade to continue despite a clear 
deficit that must have been hurting the American economy’s ability to restore itself. There is 
less that supports a liberal policy in this period if we look only at the empirical evidence. but 
the fact that U.S. businesses no longer applied so much pressure on the administration might 
very well be because many U.S. firms were becoming more skeptical to the China trade than 
they had previously been and not because of any change in U.S. policy (New York Times, 
2012a).   
Reaching the first Obama administration, we see that American decision makers were 
no longer praising an open trade relationship with the Chinese to the extent they had previously 
done. In fact, Obama started to implement some reforms that were meant to help American 
business compete with the Chinese. The new administration filed several complaints against 
the Chinese and took them to the WTO in 2012 claiming that the Chinese were subsidizing their 
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own national companies and thereby making it harder for American firms to compete in China. 
Obama had also previously imposed a tariff on imported Chinese tires in 2009. Allegedly, to 
protect U.S. firms which found it hard to compete with the Chines and their business practices.  
The Obama administration also seems to have increased their fight against intellectual 
property rights theft and pirating of American software, films and music. This suggests that the 
Americans were increasingly worried about their ability to compete in the Chinese market and 
their ability to maintain the technological edge against Chinese companies. China’s growing 
economic strength and their propensity to favor local Chinese businesses seems to have started 
to have an impact on the Obama administration and their policies. Officials were no longer 
pushing for more trade with China at any cost.  
This new policy direction leads to a further weakening of the liberal trade policy 
hypothesis during this period. Nevertheless, the U.S.-China trade and the U.S. trade deficit kept 
increasing in this period despite statements from the White House that suggested a harder line 
on China. By the end of 2012, the deficit from U.S.-China trade that the Americans suffered 
from had reached a staggering 315,095.3 million $ (United States Census Bureau, 2013). While 
words are important, actions speaks louder, and it is clear from the numbers that the Americans 
were still allowing the Chinese to walk away with most of the profits generated by the trading 
relationship of the two countries. This happened despite of a more difficult economic climate 
and harsher rhetoric from American politicians and leaders. 
As we can observe, the indicators for a liberal trading policy weakens over the period. 
This suggests that the Americans were less eager to maintain the trade with the Chinese as it 
became obvious that China was benefitting greatly from trade with the U.S. while the 
Americans were losing money on account of the same trade. It is interesting to observe that as 
the Americans were moving more in the direction of a realist security policy, they were moving 
away from a liberal trading policy. As such, the hypothesis of a liberal trading policy is 
weakened by the empirical evidence. Although this weakening remained relatively minor until 
we reach 2009 and the first Obama administration. 
Nevertheless, the most important indicator in this table, increase in trade despite a U.S. 
trade deficit, was present throughout all five presidential periods. In fact, despite of the 
American financial crisis and spiraling U.S. national debt, the trade deficit reached its highest 
point ever in 2012 at 315,095.3 million. To sum up then, I do consider the hypothesis to be 
weakened, but the presence if increased trade despite the huge deficit does suggest that the 
Americans were still relying upon trade with China to a great extent.  
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Hypothesis 4: Presence of a policy pursuing a democratic and accountable China 
To reiterate the Hypothesis from the theory section I expect:  
 American attempts at fostering greater economic cooperation and integration between 
the two powers in order to ensure a peaceful relationship as well as cater to the whishes 
of the American business elite. 
o Variable: U.S. bilateral trade with China. 
Empirical indicator: Statements of intent, increase in trade between the U.S. despite of an 
American trade deficit and China, as well as successful pressure on decision makers from the 
economic elite 
Presence of empirical indicators supporting the presence of a policy pursuing a democratic and accountable China 
Table 4. 
As we can see from table 4, American behavior has been relatively consistent for four of the 
five periods I examine. Only during President Obama’s first administration do we see any sort 
of change to the American diplomatic stance, as the American rhetoric towards China became 
harsher and more critical and the U.S. policy towards China seemed to become more cautious. 
In the theory section, I explained that if U.S. foreign policy adhered more to the principles of 
liberalism, I would expect the Americans to conduct their diplomacy towards China in a 
positive and friendly way so as not antagonize the Chinese. I suggested that the U.S. policy 
would be one focused on cooperation and engagement with the Chinese rather than conflict and 
competition. I also expected the U.S. to aim at integrating China into the international 
organizations and the international system in general.  
Bill Clinton’s China policy during his first term is in line with what liberal theory 
expects U.S. policy to be as all three empirical indicators are present. Clinton had promised to 
be hard on China during the election campaign, but this policy was quickly changed in favor of 
a policy that focused on integrating the Chinese into the international community. As with trade 
Empirical Indicators Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 
U.S. support for Chinese 
membership and participation 
in international organizations 
and fora 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Statements of Policy Y Y Y Y N 
Positive and friendly rhetoric 
towards China 
Y Y Y Y N 
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issues, we see that the Clinton administration was far more concerned with developing the 
relationship between China and the United States, rather than worrying about China as a 
potential competitor and threat to U.S. interests. In general, I consider it safe to claim that by 
and large President Clinton and his administration was following liberal principles in their 
policies towards China during his first term as president. 
Clinton’s second period as president followed the serious confrontations between the 
U.S. and China over Taiwan in 95-96 and the Chinese military exercises and Clinton’s response 
of sending two aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait, strained the relationship between the 
two countries considerably. One thing that should be noted though is that despite the 
considerable tension that existed between the United States and China at the time, the 
relationship did not suffer too badly from the whole situation in the long term. In fact, Chinese 
and American leaders were quick to reestablish a friendly working relationship after the crisis 
had abated (Cohen, 2010, 257-258). Neither the Americans nor the Chinese seems to have been 
willing to pay the cost of a serious cooling in their relationship and as a consequence diplomatic 
relations were soon back on track. Indeed, President Clinton appears to have speeded up his 
policy of engagement with the Chinese during his second term. The NSSs for the period all 
stress the importance of engaging with the Chinese in order to turn China into a responsible 
stakeholder in the international community. Further, the Clinton administration also argued in 
favor of Chinese membership in the WTO and Clinton met with the Chinese president on 
several occasions, including the Chinese visit to the U.S. in 1997, the first visit by a Chinese 
head of state to the United States for more than a decade. As we can see the policy of engaging 
with China remained strong, and both the first and the second Clinton periods present strong 
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis. I would also claim that the fact that the 
relationship between China and the U.S. was restored to its previous warmth so soon after the 
Taiwan Crisis further strengthens the hypothesis. The Americans were clearly not ready to give 
up on engaging with China, despite the seriousness of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. 
If anything, the relationship between the United States and China improved further as 
George W. Bush became president. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the U.S. seemed 
happy to consider the Chinese to be a partner rather than a competitor, and the Chinese for their 
part seemed pleased to be able to improve their relationship with the U.S. Overall, tensions 
were low during Bush’s first presidential term. Looking at the official documents from the 
period shows an administration that still claimed that democratic change was needed in China, 
but who also claimed that cooperation with the Chinese on several issues, not least that of 
terrorism, was of vital importance (NSS, 2002). In sum, the policies of the new administration 
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echoed those of President Clinton, and the Americans most definitely stated that cooperation 
was the order of the day. This development might be surprising when one considers Bush’s 
hard stance towards China during the campaign of 2000, and it serves to strengthen the idea 
that the U.S. was very much committed to liberal foreign policy based on engagement rather 
than containment.  
As we can see through both reports from the period and statements from American 
politicians such as Zoellick (2005) and Paulson (2008), the friendly tone between the Chinese 
and the U.S. was kept during Bush’s second presidency. Although it did abate somewhat during 
the final years, and the Americans seemed less inclined to sweep Chinese human rights abuse 
under the carpet as we approach the 2008 election. Nevertheless, the policies of the second 
Bush administration also shows strong empirical support for the liberal hypothesis as all three 
empirical indicators that I am looking for was present. The rhetoric did change somewhat during 
Bushe’s final years, but because the change happened late in the period and because Bush chose 
to moderate his speeches somewhat when he visited China, I do not consider this change 
significant enough to warrant an N on the indicator. Overall, I consider the American diplomacy 
towards China to have remained relatively fixed, and neither worries over trade deficits, 
Chinese growing military might or Chinese assertiveness seems to have changed this to a very 
large degree. 
Looking at the presidency of Barack Obama from 2009 and onwards, we are able to 
observe a somewhat cooling of the relationship between China and the U.S. As I stated in the 
last section, this cooling was also in evidence in the late second Bush period, but with the stated 
policy of President Obama, one should perhaps have expected the relationship to improve. After 
all Obama did state that the wanted to build his foreign policy upon cooperation. However, 
from late 2010 and onwards we see that the rhetoric of the Obama administration becomes 
increasingly harsh towards China. The U.S. still pursued a policy that aimed at incorporating 
the Chinese into the international system, for instance they argued that China should negotiate 
a settlement over the South China Sea within the ASEAN group. The Obama administration 
also stated quite clearly that they would continue to commit to a policy of engagement, yet this 
policy now became more nuanced as the new President also made commitment to remain as a 
power in East-Asia and assured allies of U.S. commitment to their security. I would in fact 
argue that the U.S. policy changed from 2010 and onwards. As China became more assertive 
so the American policy became more focused on countering Chinese assertiveness. In fact, the 
Defense Strategic Guidance for 2012 states as much when it says that China needs to be more 
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open about its strategic intent if friction is to be avoided, and that the U.S. would make sure 
that it maintained access to South East Asia.  
Looking at the presented evidence, I would argue that while the other presidential 
periods mostly supports a liberal diplomatic policy, the Obama period shows an important 
change in the China-U.S. relationship. The new administration seems to have been more willing 
to show strength when dealing with the Chinese, and less willing to accommodate Chinese 
demands. As we can observe by now, all of the indicators that I expected are empirically present 
right up to the first Obama administration, where two of them fall away. There is therefore a 
case in favor of a liberal American foreign Policy in general, yet one should also note that 
following the financial crisis in 2008 the balance of power between the U.S. and China shifted 
somewhat, and it looks like the Americans started to consider the Chinese to be more of a threat. 
As such, it is very possible that the changes that we see during the first Obama administration 
is a warning of more to come. Like with the economic considerations, the indicators of a liberal 
diplomatic policy are weakened as time goes by. This corresponds with a more pronounced 
sense of threat present in American strategic documents stemming from China’s growth. I 
therefore also considers this hypothesis to be weakened overall. 
Summary 
Having concluded the first part of this analysis, I have found that while the two realist 
hypothesis is relatively weak during the first presidential periods that I examine, the two liberal 
hypothesis is correspondingly stronger and then slowly grows weaker over time. As one can 
see from table 5, both realist theories and liberal theories are sometimes strengthened during 
the same period, this is fine as the theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and it could 
very well be possible that both theories retain some explanatory power.  
Status of hypotheses following part 1 of the analysis.  
Hypothesis Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 Summary for all periods 
Hypothesis 1 W S W S S Strengthened  
Hypothesis 2 W S S S S Strengthened 
Hypothesis 3 S S W W W Weakened 
Hypothesis 4 S S S S W Weakened 
 Table 5. W=Weakened, S=Strengthened. 
Note that while the liberal hypothesis are not weakened to the point where they become 
irrelevant, an important part of my argument is that the liberal policy needed to be upheld 
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throughout the period in order for liberal exceptionalism to remain as a viable explanation. The 
Realist one however, needed only to grow stronger as China’s power increased, since Realist 
theory expects countries to follow certain patterns in the face of a growing power. This is why 
I still consider both liberal theories to be weakened by my analysis despite the fact that some 
empirical indicators for both hypothesis remained even in Obama’s first period as president.  
That said there remains some support for a liberal policy even during Obama’s 
presidency. As such, I will in the following section, put the hypothesis up against each other 
and try to reach a conclusion on whether there still is a case for arguing in favor of an 
exceptional American foreign policy.   
Final analysis 
My initial argument was that if United States was shown to follow realist rather than liberal 
policies in its dealings with a rising China, then there would be strong reasons to doubt the idea 
of an American foreign policy exceptionalism in general. As the preceding sections show, we 
can observe the presence of indicators that support both liberal theory and realist theory 
throughout the period that I have examined. Yet for all that, I have also concluded that liberal 
indicators lose a lot of their strength as time goes by and the perception of China as a threat 
grows in the United States.  
I have found support for both liberal and realist theory in the foreign policy of the United 
States during these last twenty years, but this support exists somewhat at different places in 
time. In no period are all the expectations of both a realist and a liberal foreign policy fulfilled. 
The two behavior patterns that supports a realist foreign policy grows increasingly strong as 
time goes by and this corresponds with a growing worry over China’s power and intentions 
among decision makers and experts in the United States. Similarly, the two patterns that would 
support liberal theory remain strong throughout the presidency of Clinton and most of Bush’s 
as well, but they are weakened considerably as we reach the presidency of Barack Obama. The 
empirical evidence therefore shows that as the perception of China as a threat to American 
power grew stronger, the Americans became less willing to cooperate with it and instead began 
to prepare for a potential conflict that could arise between the two countries. This would explain 
why we see a weakening of the liberal indicators and a strengthening of the realist ones. 
On the realist side, the factors indicating a realist alliance policy grows strong before 
those indicating a realist military stance. This fits with the Offensive Realism theory of 
Mearsheimer, as he expects a country to avoid taking all the burdens of balancing a growing 
power upon itself. What we see then, is that as China increases its presence in East Asia and 
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the Pacific. The Americans are busy shoring up alliances and even building new ones. The 
improved relationship with India is as such a strong indicator. That the Americans were 
choosing to forget old disagreements in order to gain friends which shared their strategic 
interests is significant. The act of establishing alliances is also relatively easy, compared to the 
act of actively balancing against an opponent. The first require mostly words and commitments, 
the second requires expensive military deployments, which may not have been available due to 
American commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the liberal side, we see that the liberal 
diplomacy hypothesis remains strong longer than the liberal trade hypothesis. Similarly to the 
alliance hypothesis, diplomacy requires mostly words and it would therefore be easier to 
maintain a friendly diplomatic stance and rhetoric than it would be to maintain an unbalanced 
trade relationship. This could explain why the liberal diplomacy hypothesis remains strong 
despite the strengthening of the Realist indicators. Despite of this we still see that most traces 
of a liberal diplomacy policy is gone by the end of Obama’s first period. Only the focus on 
integrating China into international organizations remained and that might actually have more 
to do with the structure of the international system than any actual policy decisions. When the 
Americans had first integrated the Chinese to a large degree, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible to push them back out. 
  As for military presence and policies that suggests the U.S. was actively balancing 
against the Chinese, these came somewhat later, most notably during the Second Bush 
administration and Obama’s first period. Still, we are able to see some increase in U.S. military 
deployments in the second Clinton period as well, following the Taiwan crisis in 1996. This 
suggests that the force reduction seen during Bush’s presidency might have been precipitated 
by the war in Afghanistan and Iraq rather than any specific lack of realist considerations in U.S. 
foreign policy. Yet there was little that suggested an American strategy for countering China 
during Clinton’s second presidency. These strategies and developments came first during 
Bush’s second term and Obama’s first. This also fits with the American perception of threat 
that China’s rise constituted during the Clinton period. China seems to have given the 
Americans a mild scare in 1996, but for the most part the consensus among American decision 
makers and experts looks to be that the Chinese did not pose any considerable threat yet. I 
would therefore argue that the insurances of American commitment to East Asia and the force 
buildup was a direct response to the Taiwan crisis, rather than an answer to a more general 
sense of threat stemming from China’s growth. In contrast, the new weapon deployments and 
strategies of the second Bush administration and especially the impressive force buildup that 
followed in Obama’s first period, is vital to the argument of a realist U.S. policy. Consider the 
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fact that the U.S. defense budget was reduced during President Obama, yet the number of 
American troops in the Eastern Pacific and East Asia rose. East Asia is a relatively peaceful 
region compared to the Middle East, yet the Americans still choose to increase their presence 
here, while they reduced in other parts of the world. This strongly suggests that the Americans 
were indeed prioritizing to balance against a potential aggressor. As it stands, the only country 
in East Asia even moderately capable of challenging the Americans is China. Looking only at 
U.S. troop deployments and security policy from the second Clinton Period gives the 
impression that Washington was actively pursuing a Realist foreign policy. 
The one big counter argument to this would be the strong position that the indicator for 
U.S.-China trade continues to have, as realists expects countries to focus on relative gains from 
trade rather than absolute gains (Mearsheimer, 2001). If Mearsheimer is right and a country will 
attempt to maximize its economic advantage as well as its military, then it would make no sense 
for the Americans to keep accepting a negative trade balance with the Chinese. If the Chinese 
are rivals to the U.S., this can only help them achieve their own advantage in any potential 
struggle. However, if the decision makers in Washington believe that the trade is going to 
transform China and lead to a more stable and peaceful relationship, then it makes sense for the 
Americans to maintain the open trade relationship despite a considerable trade deficit. This 
argument is important and it does strengthen the hypothesis of a liberal trade policy. However, 
as we have seen, the other indicators of this hypothesis disappears during Bush and Obama’s 
presidencies. In fact, steps were taken by the Obama administration that was clearly meant to 
reduce the advantages that the Chinese enjoyed. Even to the point where the U.S. was increasing 
tariffs on Chinese goods and focusing a lot of attention on combating pirating of American 
software and technology in China. Because of this development, I would argue that the fact that 
trade increases while the trade deficit remains is less important than it would otherwise be. It 
could very well be the case that the Americans are caught up in a situation where the average 
citizen is dependent upon cheap imports from China and where the economies of the two 
countries are so interconnected that any break or even change in policy is difficult to achieve. 
Alternatively, changes in policy that are meant to rebalance the trade relationship may already 
be in development or on the table (see for examples suggestions to congress by the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012), but these may not yet have made a great 
difference. With the willingness of the Americans to trade with China reduced, and new polices 
that address this issue implemented, I would expect that the actual trade relationship may 
change more in favor of the U.S. in the coming years. As one can see, there are strong reasons 
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to claim that as China’s power grows and American sense of threat increases, the policies of 
the United States turns in the direction predicted by Offensive Realist theory. 
This is why I would argue that the Americans are overall fulfilling the expectations of 
Offensive Realist theory in their relationship with China. While the policy is neither completely 
Realist nor completely Liberal throughout all of the relevant presidential periods, the evidence 
points to a considerable weakening of the liberal policy in American foreign policy. Even if 
liberal ideals were still present in the minds of the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for 
policy decisions, they were not followed up on. Instead we see a strong strengthening of Realist 
indicators, even to the point where the United States were significantly increasing their forces 
in East-Asia and were developing weapons and strategies that seemed to directly counter 
Chinese military developments.  
These actions are not the actions of an exceptional great power that focuses their foreign 
policy on cooperation, diplomacy and liberal ideals. Instead, they represent a very clear 
traditional great power policy based on realist considerations and realpolitik. The explanatory 
power of liberal theory is weakened even as the strength of the realist indicators increase. At 
the end of our time frame we see that U.S. foreign policy is very strongly realist rather than 
liberal. Therefore, I will argue that realists like Walt (2013) and Kissinger (1994) can breathe 
easy. Despite all claims to the contrary the Americans have begun to actively balance against 
China in East-Asia and the Western Pacific, and as tension in the region rises I can see no reason 
as to why they should change that policy in the foreseeable future.  
China represents a considerable challenge to American dominance in the East Asia 
region, and as I mentioned in the introduction, such a threat represents a good opportunity to 
test for an exceptionalism based on the perceived lack of realism in American foreign policy.  
As the United States is clearly fulfilling realist expectations in their relationship with a growing 
China, I can only conclude that the Americans are not immune to realist considerations when 
they decide upon their foreign policy. Further, as the empirical evidence show not only the 
presence of realist foreign policy decisions, but also the strong prevalence of them, it becomes 
clear that to speak of a special American foreign policy tradition that is defined by its lack of 
adherence to realist expectations is problematic at best.  
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Part 5. Concluding thoughts 
A rather ordinary foreign policy tradition 
The scope of this study was considerable, nothing less than to examine whether the idea of 
exceptionalism in the American foreign policy tradition could be maintained under scrutiny. 
This idea has been heavily ingrained in the American mythos and in both American leaders and 
the general population; however, as I have shown in this case study, there are strong reasons to 
reject this idea. As with any country, a certain way of doing things that differs from other nations 
may very well exist in the United States. Indeed Waltz (1979) claimed that foreign policy was 
inherently difficult to analyze because it depended so much upon the unique position of the 
state in question. However, to claim that the US foreign policy is exceptional is problematic, at 
least when you look at the period from 1993 to 2012 that I have examined. The United States 
fulfill the expectations of realist theory when they commit to alliances in East Asia, and they 
also fulfill realist expectations when they deploy thousands of troops and billions worth of 
military hardware to a region where another great power and potential challenger is rising in 
strength.  
As I have shown, liberal ideals does seem to influence American foreign policy in 
periods, but when faced with a challenger, the United States moves away from these ideals and 
the policies that are derived from them. Instead, it focuses on its own security and on 
maintaining its position as the strongest great power in the world through balancing and 
containment strategies. Some may argue that the fact that there exists evidence for both a realist 
policy and a liberal one means that there are reasons to argue in favor of American 
exceptionalism. However, as I stated earlier, the premise of an exceptional foreign policy was 
not the presence of liberal policies in U.S. foreign policy, but rather the absence of realist 
foreign policy considerations. This study has shown that U.S. policy decisions for the last two 
decades meet the expectations derived from realist theory to a large degree. As such, it makes 
little sense to keep insisting upon the existence of an exceptional U.S. foreign policy towards 
China that is based on the rejection of realpolitik.  
One could argue that it is problematic to make an assumption about the wider U.S. 
foreign policy tradition based upon only a single case study that spans the last two decades. 
After all, the history of U.S. foreign policy spans more than 200 years and the American position 
in the world differs widely within that time span. This argument is correct in the sense that one 
cannot use this single study to prove that the foreign policy tradition of the United States has 
never been exceptional. However, I would argue that the rise of China provides such a crucial 
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example of the problems surrounding the rise of a new great power (Mearsheimer, 2006) that 
the findings of this study retains considerable explanatory power for American foreign policy 
in general.  
As I claimed in the introduction and the theory section, China’s rise constitute a classic 
case of a rising great power (Ibid.). The dominant position of the U.S. and the importance of 
American interests in East Asia, further improves the case as a way of testing for exceptionalism 
in U.S. foreign policy, especially when one considers the importance of balance of power and 
maintaining ones hegemony in realist theory (Mearsheimer, 2001). If the Americans did not 
react according to the expectations of realism in this particular case, then one could reasonably 
expect that they would not do so at any other time. However, the evidence shows that the 
Americans have followed a policy in East Asia that corresponds more and more with the 
expectations of realist theory for most of the last two decades, similarly one sees that the policies 
expected by liberal theory is increasingly falling by the wayside. Since the United States did 
not pass the test for an exceptional foreign policy in this theoretically important case, there are 
reasons to assume that it would also fail when one examines other periods of history.  
Implications of the findings 
I mentioned in the introduction that the question of American exceptionalism was relevant for 
the greater realism/liberalism debate. As you will remember, I claimed that realism would suffer 
if I found that that theory was unable to give any explanation to U.S. behavior in the face of a 
growing challenger. Similarly, liberal theory would be strengthened if American policy were 
found to reflect the ideals and opinions that exists among the American foreign policy elite and 
politicians. Having found evidence that supports both liberal and realist theory in this study, it 
would be wrong to come down in favor of one theory or the other.  
In contrast, it would seem that the two theories both retain some explanatory power, but 
during different circumstances. When the United States remained in a position of strength 
during the 1990s, it looks like liberal theory provides a better fit than realist theory. In that 
period, the liberal optimists and their policies of choice seemed to be firmly in control. 
Similarly, the explanatory power of realism increases as the American position grows 
somewhat weaker, and more importantly, as China grows into a real challenger to American 
power in East Asia and American worry over this growth increases. One could argue that both 
theories are needed if one is to understand the intricate system that is a country’s foreign policy, 
and that the real difficulty lies in choosing when to apply one or the other.  
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Looking at the implications for the literature that focuses on American foreign policy 
alone, the picture changes somewhat. It is my conviction that the authors who write about an 
exceptional foreign policy tradition devoid of realist considerations should reconsider their 
position and rethink their theories. Similarly Realists who despair at the seemingly idealist 
policy of the United States should be able to breathe a sigh of relief. At the very least, they 
should not fear that the U.S. would refrain from balancing against a rising power when it needs 
to. Kennan’s fears that America might be dragged into unnecessary conflict due to ideology is 
still somewhat relevant as evidenced by the war in Iraq, but as I have shown, great power 
challenges to American security interests takes precedence in the end. As such, this propensity 
for ideological wars does not seem to threaten the United States in a fundamental way.  
An interesting research approach for the future and one that could yield good results 
would be to look for other patterns of realist considerations in the history of American foreign 
policy, and to see whether these patterns corresponds with a greater sense of foreign threat in 
the American leadership and among the foreign policy experts in the U.S.. I would expect that 
they do, and that others will find similar results to mine. One interesting line of approach could 
for example be the policy pursued during the 1800s, when the United States remained a 
relatively minor power for much of the century. Another could be to look upon U.S. policy 
during the 1920s and 30s when isolationism was seemingly at its peak. Without such research, 
it is possible to argue that this development in favor of a realist foreign policy is a relatively 
new occurrence and that the United States has remained exceptional for most of its history. 
However, if others are able to show that there have been realist considerations in American 
foreign policy decisions throughout its history, then we can assume that the myth of American 
exceptionalism has little basis in reality.     
The way foreward 
In the end, I would like to stress that an American realist foreign policy in itself is not 
necessarily problematic and could, as Kennan (1984) claims, have positive repercussions. It 
could for example hold the United States back in situations where the idealistic response would 
otherwise be to engage in costly and perhaps unnecessary wars. However, if Americans 
continue to believe that their country stands above petty power competition and does not stoop 
to the realist strategies that other countries employ, it may lead to mistakes and miscalculation 
from both American and foreign leaders in the future. Mistakes that could have far reaching 
consequences for all involved.  
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Friedberg (2010) claims that it is the combination of realist “containment” policy and 
liberal “engagement” policy that led to the China policy that we have seen in the last two 
decades. A policy that Friedberg calls “congagement”. He argues that the U.S. should continue 
to follow this sort of policy and incorporate both traditional balance of power considerations as 
well as liberal policies into its China policy in order to safely manage the rise of China and 
ensure that the United States remains a power in East Asia.  
This does seem to be the most prudent course of action in my mind as well, and there is 
still evidence of both a liberal and realist China policy in the policy pursued by the Obama 
administration. Nevertheless, I fear that the belief in a “special” American way of doing things 
might very well stop future politicians from taking the right decisions in crucial moments. In a 
worst-case scenario, a weak president might decide to fulfill the expectations of the American 
people rather than commit to the best policy option. There is also the danger that American 
politicians might conceivably adapt a policy that lack realist considerations simply because they 
are convinced that U.S. foreign policy has never employed the lessons of realism. In any event, 
such decisions could have serious ramifications for both the United States and the world.  
Human beings have an extraordinary ability to learn from both past failures and 
successes, and the ability to use history as a guide should be one of the most important tools for 
leaders everywhere. However, if history ends up becoming distorted due to the proliferation of 
myths and fairytales, then this tool risks being left unused at best, at worst it could lead to 
serious mistakes and miscalculations. It is therefore imperative that those that practice the art 
of diplomacy or decides upon their country's policies have the necessary knowledge and 
awareness about past events, so that they can copy successful policy where appropriate and 
even more importantly, avoid policies that resulted in failures. 
Despite very different conclusions about the amount of realism that exists in U.S. 
foreign policy, both Mead (2001) and Mearsheimer (2001) agrees that it has been mostly 
successful throughout its history. After all, the American foreign policy tradition helped turn 
13 fledgling colonies on the edge of the world into the greatest power on the planet. Americans 
should note that this achievement is not in any way lessened by the fact that U.S. foreign policy 
also makes use of the realist tradition. It would therefore be very unfortunate if future American 
leaders were unable to capitalize on, and learn from the successes of their predecessors due the 
prevailing myth of American Exceptionalism.  
 
 
99 
 
Sources 
Aid, Matthew M. (2013), “Inside the NSA’s Ultra-Secret China Hacking Group”, Foreign 
Policy, found at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/10/inside_the_nsa_s_ultra_secret_chin
a_hacking_group?wp_login_redirect=0, on the 11.06.13. 
Ajemian, Chris (1998), “The 1997 U.S-Japan Defense Guidelines under the Japanese 
Constitution and their implications for U.S. foreign policy”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal, Vol. 7, No. 8. 
Albright, Madeleine K. (1998), interwieved on NBCTV, Found at: 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980219a.html on the 03.02.13. 
America’s Navy Fact File (2012), “Aircraft Carriers – CVN” Found at: 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4 on the 
14.05.13. 
Annual Report to Congress (2000), “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China”, Office of the Secretary of State, Found at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2000/china06222000.htm, on the 18.04.13. 
Annual Report to Congress (2002), “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China”, Office of the Secretary of State.   
Annual Report to Congress (2004), “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2005), “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2005”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2006), “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2006”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2007), “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2007”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2008), “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2008”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2009), “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2010), “Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2010”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2011), “Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2011”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2012), “Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2012”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Annual Report to Congress (2013), “Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2013”, Office of the Secretary of State. 
Australian Defense White Paper (2009),”Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: 
Force 2030”, found at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pd
f. 
100 
 
BBC (2007), “New strategic partnership against China”, found at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6968412.stm, on the 18.05.13. 
BBC (2008), “Presidents Condemns U.S. Shield Plan”, found at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7416734.stm, on the 18.05.13. 
BBC (2010a), “India to deploy 36,000 extra troops on Chinese border”, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11818840, on the 15.05.13. 
BBC (2010b), “Anger simmers over Okinawa base burden”, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11390281, on the 25.06.13. 
BBC (2011a), “U.S. stands by Philippines amid South China Sea tension”, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13899465, on the 05.04.13. 
BBC (2011b), “U.S.-China spat over South-China Sea military exercises”, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14097503, on the 06.04.13. 
BBC (2013), “U.S. scraps final phase of European missile shield”, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21812161, on the 17.03.13. 
Bennet, W. Lance (1990) “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, 
Journal of Communication, 40(2), spring.  
Bernstein, Richard & Munro, Ross H. (1997), The Coming Conflict With China. New York: 
Alfred A Knopf. 
Blackwill, Robert D. (2005), "The India Imperative", National Interest no. 80 (Summer 2005) 
pp. 9-17. 
Bloomberg, (2006), “Fallon, U.S. Commander, Pushes China to Modernize Its Military”, 
found at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8Wqk11um0ok , 
on the 15.04.13.  
Breslin, Shaun (2013), “China and the global order: signaling threat or friendship?” 
International Affairs, 89:3, pp. 615-634. 
Bunn, M. Elaine & Vincent A. Manzo (2011), “Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic 
Asset or Dangerous Liability?”, Strategic Forum, February, No. 263, pp. 1-23.  
Bush, George W. (2000), “Join Together in Making China a Normal Trading Partner”, Quoted 
in New York Times, found at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/18/world/in-bush-
s-words-join-together-in-making-china-a-normal-trading-partner.html, on the 
05.08.13. 
Bush, George W. (2002), “State of the Union Adress” Quoted in the Washington Post, found 
at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm 
on the 23.08.13. 
Bush, Richard (2005), "Lee Tung-Hui and "Seperatism", in Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf (Ed), 
Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Carr, E. H. ([1939] 1946), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, An Introduction to the Study 
of International Relations, London: The Macmillian Press LTD.  
Chase, Michael S. (2005) “U.S.–Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial 
Relationship”, in: Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf (ed.), Dangerous Strait The US-Taiwan-
China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press. 
101 
 
Chase, Michael S., Andrew S. Erickson & Christopher Yeaw (2009), “Chinese Theater and 
Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States”, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:1, 67-114. 
Chinese Govt. White Paper (2011), "China's Peaceful Development", Found at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm, on the: 
12.11.12. 
Christensen, Thomas J. (2006), “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China 
and U.S. Policy toward East Asia”, International Security, Volume 31, Number 1, 
Summer 2006, pp. 81-126. 
Clinton, Bill (1997), “Remarks by the President in address on China and the national interest”, 
The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, found at 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19971024-3863.html, on the 15.07.13. 
Clinton, Hillary (2009), “U.S.-Asia Relations, Indispensable to Our Future”, remarks at the 
Asia Society, New York, New York, found at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm, on the 18.04.13. 
Clinton, Hillary (2011), “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, November, Found at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?wp_lo
gin_redirect=0, on the 12.02.2013. 
Cohen, Warren I. (2005), America’s Failing Empire, US Foreign Relations since the Cold 
War, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Cohen, Warren I. (2010), America’s Response to China, Fifth Edition, New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
Copeland, Dale C. (1996), “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 
Expectations”, International Security, Volume 20, Number 4, Spring, pp. 5-41.   
Defense Strategic Guidance (2012), “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense”, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Denmark, Abraham M (ed.) and Dr. James Mulvenon (ed.) (2010), Contested Commons: The 
Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, Center for a New American 
Security. 
Department of defense Base Structure Report (2010), “Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline, A 
Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory”, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Installations and Environment).  
Department of defense Base Structure Report (2011), “Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline, A 
Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory”, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Installations and Environment).  
Department of defense Base Structure Report (2012), “Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline, A 
Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory”, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense (Installations and Environment).  
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1990), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/Hst0990.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1994), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
102 
 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/Hst0994.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1995), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/Hst0995.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1996), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/Hst0996.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1997), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/Hst0997.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1998), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0998.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (1999), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0999.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2000), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0900.pdf, on the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2001), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0901.pdf, on the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2002), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0902.pdf, on the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2003), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0309.pdf, on the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2004), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst0409.pdf, on the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2005), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0905.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2006), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0609.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
103 
 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2007), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0709.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2008), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0809.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2009), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0909.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2010), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1009.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2011), “ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309a)”, 
Found at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1109.pdf, on 
the 05.06.13. 
DoD Personnel & Procurement Statistics (2012), “Total Military Personnel and Dependent 
End Strength”, Found at 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm, Total DoD-December 
31, 2012 (DMDC data), on the 05.06.13. 
Doubleday, Mike (1996), DoD News Briefing : Tuesday, March 12, 1996, 1:30 p.m, Found at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=443. On the 
13.03.13. 
Doyle, Michael W. (1986). ’Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science 
Review 80(4): 1151-1169. 
Dueck, Colin (2005), “Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America's Peculiar 
Path to World Power”, Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April–June 2005): 195–231. 
Dunne, Tim (2005). “Liberalism”, in John Baylis & Steve Smith (ed.): The Globalization of 
World Politics (3rd ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dunne, Tim & Brian C. Schmidt (2005). “Realism”, in: John Baylis & Steve Smith (ed.), The 
Globalization of World Politics (3rd ed.). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dwyer, Devin (2012) “Obama Rebuffs Romney  on American Exceptionalism” Found at 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/obama-rebuffs-romney-on-american-
exceptionalism/, on the 13.02.13. 
Economist, The (2009a), “Barack Obama’s foreign policy. All very engaging”, found at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13278173, on the 18.03.13. 
Economist, The (2009b), “China and America spar at sea. Naked aggression. With an 
impeccable sense of timing”, found at http://www.economist.com/node/13279348, 
on the 19.03.13. 
104 
 
Economy, Elizabeth (2004), “Don’t Break the Engagement”, Foreign Affairs, May/June, pp: 
96-109. 
Fravel, M. Taylor (2005), "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining 
China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes", International Security, Vol. 30, No.2, 
PP 46-83.  
Friedberg, Aaron L. (2005), “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” 
International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, fall 2005, pp. 7-45. 
Friedberg, Aaron L. (2011), A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for 
Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W. Norton.  
Guardian, The (2013), “U.S. draws up list of foreign cyber-targets”, Article, Saturday 
08.06.13. pp. 1, 4-7. 
Halloran, Richard (2007), “A New Line in the Pacific”, AIR FORCE Magazine, December, 
pp. 34-39. 
Halloran, Richard (2008), “PACAF Between War and Peace”, AIR FORCE Magazine, 
August, pp. 30-33.  
Halloran, Richard (2010), “China Turns Up the Heat”, AIR FORCE Magazine, April, pp. 34-
37. 
Halloran, Richard (2011), “Pacific Push”, AIR FORCE Magazine, January, pp. 46-50. 
He, Kai & Feng, Huiyun (2009), "Leadership, regime security, and China's policy toward Taiwan: 
Prospect Theory and Taiwan crisis", The Pacific Review, 22:4, pp. 501-521. 
Herz, John H. (1950), “IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA”, 
World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1950), pp. 157-180. 
Heywood, Andrew (2007) Political Ideologies, an Introduction, 4th edtition, Palgrave 
Macmillian. 
Howard, Michael (2001) “Grand Strategy in the 20th Century”, Defense Studies, Volume 1, 
Issue 1:1-10. 
Humphries, Marc (2012), “Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain”, CRS Report for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service.  
Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer, pp. 
22-49. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World 
Order, London: Free Press. 
Ikenberry, G. John (2008), “The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Can the Liberal 
System Survive?”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008. 
Iyengar, Shanto (2011), Media Politics, a Citizen’s Guide, W.W. Norton & Company: New 
York.  
Johnston, Alastair Iain (2013), “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?”, 
International Security, Volume 37, Number 4, Spring, pp. 7-48.  
Kan, Shirley A. (2012), “Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments”, CRS Report for Congress, 
Congressional Research Service. 
Kaplan, Robert. (2005), "How would we fight China?" The Atlantic Monthly, 295(5), 49–64. 
Kennan, George F. [1984] (2012), American Diplomacy, Sixtieth-Anniversary Expanded 
Edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
105 
 
Keohane, Robert O. (1988), “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, No 4 (Dec.), pp. 379-396. 
Keohane, Robert O. (1998), “International Institutions: Can interdependence work?”, Foreign 
Policy, Issue: 110, Spring, pp. 82-96. 
Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy, New York. 
Korea Times (2008), “U.S. To Keep 28,500 Troops in Korea”, Found at: 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/07/205_22820.html, on the 
24.08.13. 
Krauthammer, Charles (1990-91) “The Unipolar Movement”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 
America and the World 1990/91 (1990/1991), pp. 23-33. 
Kristof, Nicholas D. (1993), “The Rise of China”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 Nov. – 
Dec., pp. 59-74. 
Layne, Christopher (1994), “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn), pp. 5-49. 
Legro, Jeffrey W. & Andrew Moravcsik (1999) “Is anybody still a Realist?”, International 
Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall,) pp. 5-55. 
Li, Rex (2004), “Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and 
International Stability”, in: Zhao, Suisheng (Ed), Chinese Foreign Policy Pragmatism 
and Strategic Behavior. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth (1995), “A New China Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6 (Nov.-
Dec.), pp. 35-49. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang Jisi (2012), “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, John 
L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Number 4, March. 
Lippmann, Walter (1955), Essays in the Public Philosophy, Boston: Little Brown and 
Company. 
Locke, John ([1689] 1988). Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mead, Walter Russel (2001) Special Providence, American Foreign Policy and how it 
changed the world. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis group. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-95), “The False Promise of International Institutions”, 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter), pp. 5-49. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton.  
Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). "China's Unpeaceful Rise", Current History, Volume: 105 
Issue: 690 Pages: 160-162. 
Miles, Donna (2008), “Gates views massive growth underway in Guam”, American Forces 
Press Service, found at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=50042, 
on the 02.03.13.  
Moravcsik, Andrew, (1997). “Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics”, International Organization, 51, 4m Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, (2005). “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights policy” in: Ignatieff, 
Michael (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, Princton University 
Press, pp. 147-197.  
106 
 
Morgenthau, Hans J. [1948] (1993). Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and 
Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
Moses, Jonathon W. and Torbjørn L. Knutsen (2007). Ways of Knowing – Competing 
Methodologies in Social and Political Research. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
National Defense Strategy (NSD) (2008), “2008 National Defense Strategy”, United States of 
America Department of Defense. 
National Defense Strategy (NSD) (2011),”The National Military Strategy of the United States 
of America 2011, Redefining America’s Military Leadership”,  United States of 
America Department of Defense. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (1994), “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement”, The White House. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (1995), “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement”, The White House. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (1997), “A National Security Strategy for a New Century”, 
The White House. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (1998), “A National Security Strategy for a New Century”, 
The White House. 
National Security Strategy, (NSS), (2000), “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age”, 
The White House. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (2002), “The National Security Strategy for The United 
States of America”, The White House. 
National Security Strategy (NSS), (2006), “The National Security Strategy for The United 
States of America”, The White House. 
National Security Strategy, (NSS), (2010), “National Security Strategy”, The White House. 
New York Times (1998), “Clinton Says Chinese Money Did Not Influence U.S. Policy”, 
found at: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/18/us/clinton-says-chinese-money-did-
not-influence-us-policy.html, on the 20.06.13. 
New York Times (1999), “Clinton Gives Strong Push to Admitting China to WTO”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/08/news/08iht-clint.2.t_1.html, on the 20.06.13. 
New York Times (2000), “The China Trade Vote: A Clinton Triumph; House in 237-197 
Vote, Approves Normal Trade Rights For China”, Found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/world/china-trade-vote-clinton-triumph-
house-237-197-vote-approves-normal-trade-rights.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm, 
on the 21.06.13.  
New York Times (2002), “WAR WITH IRAQ IS NOT IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL 
INTEREST”, Advertisment on the 11.26:2002. 
New York Times (2004), “U.S. Trade Deficit Hits Record High in 2005”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht-
usecon.html?_r=1&, on the 28.08.13. 
New York Times (2007a), “Enormous number of trade barriers in China, U.S. official says”, 
found at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-
lavin.1.5070188.html, on the 03.09.13. 
107 
 
New York Times (2007b), “U.S. Toughens Its Position on China Trade”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/business/worldbusiness/10trade.html, on the 
03.09.13.  
New York Times (2008), “Bush Praises China but Continues Rebuke During Embassy 
Dedication in Beijing”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/sports/olympics/08prexy.html?_r=0, on the 
02.08.13. 
New York Times (2010a), “Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council”, found 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html?_r=0, on the 
14.06.13. 
New York Times (2010b), “Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China Disputed Islands”, 
found at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html, on the 
06.09.13. 
New York Times (2011), “A U.S. Marine Base for Australia Irritates China”, found at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/obama-and-gillard-expand-us-
australia-military-ties.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&, on the 20.05.2013. 
New York Times (2012a), “Obama’s Journey to Tougher Tack on a Rising China”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/us/politics/obamas-evolution-to-a-tougher-
line-on-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, on the 07.09.13. 
New York Times (2012b), “In Car Country, Obama Trumpets China Trade Case”, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/us/politics/in-car-country-obama-trumpets-
china-trade-case.html?ref=politics, on the 08.09.13.  
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2010), “American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis”, The 
Washington Quarterly, 33:4, pp. 143-153. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and David A. Welch (2011). Understanding Global Conflict and 
Cooperation, 8th edition, New York: Pearson. 
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2011), The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs. 
Obama, Barack (2008), “Full text: Obama's foreign policy speech”, in The Guardian, Found 
at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/16/uselections2008.barackobama, 
on the 17.05.13 
Obama, Barack (2009a), “Nobel Lecture”, Found at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html, 
on the 14.05.13. 
Obama Barack (2009b), “Inaugural address”, transcribed in the New York Times, found at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-
obama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, on the 13.08.13. 
Paulson, Henry M. Jr. (2008), “A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening U.S.-
Chinese Ties”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5 (September/October), pp. 59-77. 
Pherson, Christopher J. (2006), “A String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising 
Power Across the Asian Littoral”, Strategic Studies Institute, found at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub721.pdf, on the 06.06.13. 
Popper, Karl ([1959] 2003), “The Problem of Induction”, in: Gerard Delantly & Piet Strydom 
(red.): Philosophies of Social Science – The Classic and Contemporary Readings. 
Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
108 
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer), pp. 427-460. 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (1997), “Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review”, 
United States of America Department of Defense. 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2001) “Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, United 
States of America Department of Defense. 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2006) “Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, United 
States of America Department of Defense. 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2010) “Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, United 
States of America Department of Defense. 
Restad, Hilde Eliassen (2012) “Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: U.S. 
Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism”, American Political Thought, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (spring 2012), pp. 53-76.  
Reynolds, David (2000), Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 
Twentieth Century, Second Edition, Pearson Education Limited. 
Richardson, Michael (2013), “New U.S. weapons have China worried”, commentary in Japan 
Times, found at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/30/commentary/new-u-
s-weapons-have-china-worried/#.UhoIuj_XsTF, on the 24.06.13.  
Rice, Condoleezza (2000), “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign 
Affairs, January/February. 
Rosato, Sebastian & John Schuessler (2011), “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States”, 
Perspectives on Politics, December 2011 Vol. 9/ No 4, pp. 803-819. 
Rose, Gideon (1998), “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, 
Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct., 1998), pp. 144-172. 
Ross, Robert S. (2000), “The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility 
and the Use of Force”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 87-123. 
Ross, Robert S. (2002), "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, 
and U.S.-China Relations", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 48-85. 
Ross, Robert S. (2009), “China’s Naval Nationalism Sources, Prospects and U.S. Response”, 
International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 46-81.  
Rothkoph, David (2013), “The Cool War”, Foreign Policy, found at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_cool_war_china_cyberwar?pag
e=0,1, on the 13.03.2013. 
Russet, Bruce, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro and Michael W. Doyle (1995), “ The 
Democratic Peace”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring), pp. 164184.  
Scobell, Andrew (2000), “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 227-
246. 
Scobell, Andrew (2004), “Soldiers, Statesmen, Strategic Culture and China’s 1950 
Intervention in Korea”, in: Zhao, Suisheng (Ed), Chinese Foreign Policy Pragmatism 
and Strategic Behavior. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Seattle Times (2013), “U.S. to cut carrier fleet in Persian Gulf to 1”, found at 
http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/2020298246_apusdefensebudget.html, on the 
20.03.13.   
109 
 
Shambaugh, David (2004-2005), “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”, 
International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp: 64-99. 
Shinzo, Abe (2012), Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, hentet fra: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/print/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.  
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, http://milexdata.sipri.org. 
Siu-Kai, Lau (2004), “Pragmatic Calculations of National Interest: China’s Hong Kong Policy 
1949-1997”. I Zhao, Suisheng (Ed), Chinese Foreign Policy Pragmatism and 
Strategic Behavior. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Special 301 Report (2013) “Special 301 report 2013”, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive office of the President of The United States.  
Thies, Wallace J. & Bratton, Patrick C. (2004), "When Governments Collide in the Taiwan 
Strait", Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:4. pp. 556-584. 
Thucydides [1954] (1972): History of the Peoponnesian War, Penguin Books Limited. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de ([1835] 1972), Democracy in America: And Two Essays on America, 
London: Penguin Books. 
Toft, Peter (2005) “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power”, 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 8. pp. 381-408. 
Tol, Jan van, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas (2010), “AirSea 
Battle, A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept”, Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments. 
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf (2005), Dangerous Strait The US-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
United States Census Bureau (2013), “Foreign Trade, Trade in Goods with China”, found at 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html, on the 20.07.13.  
U.S.-ROK. Joint Communique (2010), “Joint Communique, The 42nd U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting”, found at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20101008usrok.pdf, 
on the 15.03.13.  
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2012), “Report to Congress”, Found 
at: http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2012-Report-to-
Congress.pdf, on the 24.04.13. 
Washington Post (1998), “Panel Faults Space Aid to China”, found at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/campfin/stories/satellite123198.htm, on the 19.08.13. 
Washington Post (2004), “2004 Trade Deficit Hits All-Time High”, found at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13474-2005Feb10.html, on the 
27.08.13.  
Washington Post (2008), “Guam Braces for Peaceful Military Incursion”, found at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/24/AR2008012403509.html?sid=ST2008012602071, on 
the 17.05.13. 
Washington Post (2009), “U.S. to Impose Tariffs on Tires From China”, found at: 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-09-12/business/36770811_1_chinese-tires-
tire-tariff-tire-companies, on the 08.09.13. 
110 
 
Washington Post, (2012), “U.S. challenges China’s curbs on mineral exports; China vows to 
push back”, found at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-
12/world/35446990_1_rare-earths-rare-earths-chinese-companies, on the 22.09.13.  
Washington Times, The (2006), “China sub stalked U.S. fleet”, Found at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/13/20061113-121539-
3317r/?page=all, on the 13.05.13. 
Walt, Stephen (2011) “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” Foreign Policy, Found at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the_myth_of_american_exceptional
ism?page=0,0, on the 14.02.13. 
Walt, Stephen (2012) “What if realists were in charge of U.S. foreign policy?” Foreign Policy, 
Found at: 
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/04/30/what_if_realists_ran_us_foreign_polic
y_a_top_ten_list?wp_login_redirect=0, on the 14.02.13.   
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). Man the state and war, a theoretical analysis. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth (1979), Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill. 
Woodward, Bob (2010), Obama’s Wars, Simon and Schuster. 
Zhao, Suisheng (2004), Chinese Foreign Policy Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Zoellick, Robert B. (2005), “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”, Remarks 
to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, found 
at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm, on the 30.08.13. 
  
111 
 
Appendix 
 
Source: DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics; DoD Base Structure Report (2010). 
Table 6. Number of U.S. Troops deployed to the East Asia and Western Pacific 
Year East-Asia and 
Pacific 
Hawaii Guam Total 
1990 119 118 41 887 7 033 168 038 
1994 98 269 42 161 6 319 146 749 
1995 89 306 38 172 5 509 132 987 
1996 95 191 36 392 5 305 136 888 
1997 91 295 34 826 4 510 130 631 
1998 95 680 34 643 3 935 134 258 
1999 98 106 32 708 3 621 134 435 
2000 101 447 33 930 3 266 138 643 
2001 91 670 34 322 3 322 129 314 
2002 96 385 34 608 3 149 134 142 
2003 99 862 34 203 3 293 137 358 
2004 89 846 35 061 3 221 128 128 
2005 78 854 32 629 3 018 114 501 
2006 74 530 34 934 2 867 112 331 
2007 72 719 34 838 2 836 110 393 
2008 68 812 37 847 3 065 109 724 
2009 74 281 36 890 2 970 114 141 
2010 72 453 38 755 3 013 114 221 
2011 84 171 42 371 4 167 130 709 
2012 82 525 49 242 5 646 137 413 
2012+U.S. 
Marines on 
Australia 
85 025 49 242 5 646 139 913 
All years count the numbers for September, except 2012 where December is used. Source: DoD Personnel and Procurement Statistics; DoD 
Base Structure Report (2010). 
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Table 7. U.S. imports, exports and trade balance with China. In Millions of U.S. Dollars 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1994 9,281.7 38,786.8 -29,505.1 
1995 11,753.7 45,543.2 -33,789.5 
1996 11,992.6 51,512.8 -39,520.2 
1997 12,862.2 62,557.7 -49,695.5 
1998 14,241.2 71,168.6 -56,927.4 
1999 13,111.1 81,788.2 -68,677.1 
2000 16,185.2 100,018.2 -83,833.0 
2001 19,182.3 102,278.4 -83,096.1 
2002 22,127.7 125,192.6 -103,064.9 
2003 28,367.9 152,436.1 -124,068.2 
2004 34,427.8 196,682.0 -162,254.3 
2005 41,192.0 243,470.1 -202,278.1 
2006 53,673.0 287,774.4 -234,101.3 
2007 62,936.9 321,442.9 -258,506.0 
2008 69,732.8 337,772.6 -268,039.8 
2009 69,496.7 296,373.9 -226,877.2 
2010 91,911.1 364,952.6 -273,041.6 
2011 103,986.5 399,378.9 -295,392.4 
2012 110,483.6 425,578.9 -315,095.3 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013).  
 
 
 
Table 8. Chinese military spending 1992-2012. 
Year Spending in millions of U.S. dollars 
1992 25,315 
1996 25,424 
2000 37,040 
2004 63,560 
2008 106,774 
2012 157,603 
Source: SIPRI, 2012. 
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Table 9. Presence of empirical indicators supporting the different hypotheses. 
Table 9. (Y=Yes, N=No). 
 
Empirical Indicators Clinton 1 Clinton 2 Bush 1 Bush 2 Obama 1 
Hypothesis 1      
Statements of policy N Y N Y Y 
Military presence N Y N N Y 
Development and deployment 
of weapons aimed at 
countering China 
N N N Y Y 
American military Strategy N N N Y Y 
Hypothesis 2      
Statements of intent N Y Y Y Y 
High profile joint exercises N N N Y Y 
Defense agreements N Y Y Y Y 
Hypothesis 3      
Successful pressure on U.S. 
decision makers from 
business 
Y Y N N N 
Increase in trade despite a 
U.S. trade deficit 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Statements of intent Y Y Y Y N 
Hypothesis 4.      
U.S. support for Chinese 
membership and participation 
in international organizations 
and fora 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Statements of Policy Y Y Y Y N 
Positive and friendly rhetoric 
towards China 
Y Y Y Y N 
